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Abstract 
 
 
Issues of wealth inequality have been the subject of considerable public interest and 
inquiry in recent years. The Great Recession of 2008 in the United States (US) made 
many question the extent to which the global economic system not only caused 
economic hardship but also managed to create a class of ultra-rich in the US and across 
the globe. Much focus in popular discourse has centred on the degree to which a group 
of individuals is able to wield enormous economic influence with a concomitant 
concentration of wealth holdings. In general, mainstream economics has largely played 
down this aspect of the capitalist system; instead, the poverty aspect of wealth 
distribution has garnered the attention of most economists.  
 
This thesis seeks to establish the ultra-rich as an area worthy of study by focusing on 
various dimensions that have affected wealth accumulation and brought about an era of 
unprecedented concentration of wealth at a global level. As a project largely bereft of 
contemporary prior work, the thesis seeks to explore and establish three key elements of 
modern wealth accumulation, particularly in its extreme form. Firstly, what are the 
general trends that signify the emergence of an economic elite across the globe, how has 
this elite evolved, and how are they distributed across countries and sectors of the 
economy? Here, the analytical approach adopted is one often utilised in historical 
economic studies of, for example, the US Gilded Age of the late 1800s. Major findings 
include that the US continues to lead the world in the generation of individuals with 
extreme wealth holdings, followed by Western Europe. Developing countries, however, 
provide a substantial portion of the increases observed. Inheritance continues to play a 
major role in the existence of billionaires in many regions of the globe, but its role has 
diminished at a global level, mainly driven by the influx of nouveau riche from China 
and Russia, as well as from the US. The majority of new wealth is concentrated in 
finance and real estate, followed by the consumer discretionary sector. These trends 
observed both before and after the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) of 2008. Further, the 
data reveal a high degree of survival among the great fortunes, and especially of 
fortunes based on finance. 
 
Secondly, the determinants of wealth accumulation are explored. Utilising an 
accounting identity of household wealth, issues of savings and consumption, 
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financialisation, the structure of top incomes, particularly the relative importance 
between capital and earned income are considered. Across all facets, the wealthy 
increasingly exhibit and exploit behaviours and actions that ensure persistence of their 
wealth stock while the poorest are being further disadvantaged. 
 
Thirdly, the empirical research in this thesis also considers the role of risk aversion and 
whether it varies with the level of wealth observed. Applying a mean-variance-based 
measure of relative risk aversion (RRA) to an Australian household micro panel derived 
from the Household, Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia1 (HILDA) survey, the 
level of risk aversion of Australia’s household financial portfolios is estimated. 
Controlling for various socio-economic characteristics, the present study explores 
whether risk aversion heterogeneity is a function of wealth heterogeneity. In contrast to 
most studies, it finds evidence of very high risk aversion among the majority of poor 
households but vastly lower risk aversion among the high percentiles in the wealth 
distribution. After applying a first differences model across three survey waves 
spanning 2002 to 2010, risk tolerance is found to increase significantly with wealth. 
Risk tolerance is positively associated with mortgage payments, but rental payments 
have no relationship. In addition, there is no evidence that holding a university 
education has any discernible impact on risk aversion. The study also elicited some 
preliminary findings on the impact of financial advice on observed risk aversion. 
Financial advice is found to accentuate risk aversion, particularly among the wealthiest 
households. These findings have potential implications for the distribution of wealth in 
Australia, which has received renewed interest. 
 
Finally, the sources of wealth across seven advanced economies are explored, with 
particular emphasis on the role of new and inherited wealth. Despite the consistent 
increases in the ultra-rich across these countries, there is a significant element of 
heterogeneity in the degree to which inheritance or new wealth dominates in a given 
country or region. Further, there is an element of variation in terms of the extent of the 
role of certain sectors in the rise of the ultra-rich. Across North America, financial 
services have played the dominant role in bolstering the population of billionaires, with 
                                                
1 This paper uses unit record data from the Household, Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia 
(HILDA) Survey. The HILDA Project was initiated and is funded by the Australian Government 
Department of Families, Housing, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs (FaHCSIA) and is 
managed by the Melbourne Institute of Applied Economic and Social Research (Melbourne Institute). 
The findings and views reported in this paper, however, are those of the author and should not be 
attributed to either FaHCSIA or the Melbourne Institute. 
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much of the growth in diversified financials followed by property. This thesis seeks to 
situate the trends within the context of the sweeping historical macroeconomic, social 
and institutional changes that have been wrought particularly since the end of the 
Second World War.  
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
People who are unable to motivate themselves must be content with mediocrity, no 
matter how impressive their other talents. — Andrew Carnegie 
… implied in all this is that wealth is the reward for virtue, which makes it hard to 
argue for redistribution. — Paul Krugman 
 
The above quotes, made almost over a century apart, the first during the Gilded Age 
(1893 to 1899) and the second in contemporary times, starkly illustrate the divergent 
narratives propounded by those exploring the dynamics associated with the 
accumulation of large fortunes. The associated debates have raged since the Gilded 
Age, which was characterised by the rise of vast wealth holdings amongst the few in the 
United States (US). In stark contrast to the previous economic system of feudalism, in 
which feudal lords extracted rents from serfs through rights and privileges bestowed by 
kings, under the capitalist system any individual could pursue wealth accumulation 
solely through success in commerce. This element of human agency, that anyone can 
attain great wealth through the successful application of their natural talents, is at the 
core of Andrew Carnegie’s (1901) words above. Contemporary economists such as 
Kaplan and Rauh (2013), for example, have sought to justify the existence of an ultra-
rich class, as exemplified by the Forbes 400, along the lines of skill and entrepreneurial 
talent. This ‘skill’ is at the core of the extreme wealth levels of a few thousand 
individuals today according to such narratives.  
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According to this viewpoint, Krugman (2014) argues, through hard work, along with a 
sprinkle of genius and luck, a vast accumulation of fortunes can arise. From a policy 
perspective, arguments that centralise and elevate the individual skill and talent above 
other factors in the wealth debate present a formidable challenge to any notion of wealth 
redistribution. Among business publications and the mass media, for example, one often 
encounters biographical portrayals of the wealthy containing ‘rags-to-riches’ stories. 
These stories simultaneously represent records of their success and the possibility that 
any individual, through sufficient application of productive hard work, can also attain 
the dizzying heights of extreme wealth (e.g. Giang & Goudreau, 2014; Baer, 2014; 
Stonington, 2010).  
 
The wealthy and the concomitant wealth distribution skewed in their favour is gaining 
much focus among the contemporary media, policy makers and non-governmental 
organisations. In the wake of the recent financial system crisis in the US and the 
sovereign debt crisis that has engulfed Europe since 2008, there has been much renewed 
debate over the extent to which prevailing economic structures and institutions brought 
on the crises and, as a corollary, exacerbated the levels of wealth inequality observed 
across the world. 
 
Indeed, the importance of the issue of wealth creation and accumulation can be seen 
from the drastic policies recommended or considered when viewed through the prism of 
inequality. A report by the organisation Oxfam (2014) details the extent to which 
inequality has for the past decade increased substantially, as the wealth held by the top 
one per cent now amounts to a staggering sum of USD110 trillion. In the US, home to 
the world’s most Forbes billionaires, the top one per cent captured 95% of the growth in 
wealth compared to the bottom 90%, who became poorer (Oxfam, 2014). To reverse the 
growing inequality, Oxfam (2014) recommended a number of policy initiatives. These 
policy recommendations ranged from reducing the incidence of tax evasion, enforce 
disclosure and transparency in all wealth holdings, the establishment of a living wage 
and, perhaps most controversially (depending on which side of the political spectrum 
one falls), the creation of progressive income and wealth tax regimes.  
 
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) also recently explored the issue of income 
inequality, including its key drivers and its impact on economic growth (Dabla-Norris, 
Kochhar, Suphaphiphat, Ricka & Tsounta, 2015). Dabla-Norris et al. (2015) find that 
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significant income inequality decreases economic growth and that there is no ‘trickle 
down’ effect that represented the cornerstone of growth and development theories since 
the 1950s. They recommend investing more into education and training to develop the 
human capital for the poorest classes as well as implementing progressive tax regimes. 
The issue has already the entered political debate at the national government level. In 
2012, for example, President Barack Obama raised the capital gains and dividend tax 
for couples with incomes above USD250,000 (Sanders, 2015). Of course, some 
countries have maintained a wealth tax for some time. France instituted the Solidarity 
Tax on Wealth in 1981, while a number of other western European nations have 
maintained wealth taxes throughout their respective histories, including Norway and 
Switzerland. Still, other countries have abandoned such an approach. Germany, for 
example, repealed a property tax law after it was found to be unconstitutional by the 
Federal Constitutional Court in Germany (“Umfairteilung,” 2012).  
 
Recently, the Group of Twenty (G20) bloc has sought to reduce tax evasion via offshore 
financial centres by creating and enforcing a series of bilateral tax agreements and 
treaties (Lewis, 2014). More recently still, the Australian Federal Government has been 
in discussions with the United Kingdom (UK) Government in proposing a global tax on 
multinational corporation profits at source (Owens, 2015).  
 
The purpose of this thesis is to analyse the processes through which the modern forms 
of large fortunes are amassed. Despite the recent spate of governmental and non-
governmental interest in inequality (be it wealth or income), the most privileged and 
fortunate have not generated much interest in mainstream economics. However, the 
publication of Piketty’s (2014a) book, Capital in the 21st Century, has once again 
catapulted wealth accumulation into the focus of scholars. As the issue of wealth 
accumulation is multifaceted, this thesis is not merely an exercise in business history 
but deals with the issue from multiple perspectives, accordingly employing alternative 
research methods. Broadly, the trends and dynamics in high-tier wealth accumulation 
are coupled to the economic, political and social mechanisms that have been in play for 
at least half a century or more in some parts of the world. This approach leads to 
potential policy implications since much of the debate on wealth distribution centres on 
the extent to which wealth has been ‘justly’ attained. Further, how wealth is distributed 
in the capitalist system can have an impact upon economic growth. 
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1.2 Justification for the Research 
 
As the preceding section discusses, both world governments and non-government 
organisations are directing attention to the related issues of tax policy, wealth 
concentration, and inequality. Piketty (2014a) forced a reconsideration on how 
economics and the social sciences at large tackle the issues driving wealth accumulation 
and concentration. By emphasising the importance of “capital” in capitalism and the 
transition from an affluent society to a society based, potentially, on inheritance and 
patrimony, Piketty has revealed tremendous gaps and logic in how the latter is analysed.  
 
Amongst mainstream economics, when the issues of high wealth concentration have 
been recognised and explored, the boundary of analysis has been restrictive. This body 
of research has focused on the returns to skills and education as an overriding aspect of 
the new economic elite. One of the most recent works in this strain, Kaplan and Rauh 
(2013), seeks to explain the rise and rise of the US Forbes 400 to the education of these 
individuals – the rationale being the appearance of the ‘tech’ based billionaire where an 
education in computer science, preferably from an Ivy League university, is presumably 
a core requirement. Such sentiments echo Kalleberg (2011) where highly skilled 
workers reap enormous benefits in the “modern” economy while the low-skilled miss 
out. Bonnet and Thery (2014) argue the elite themselves have adopted this view, 
believing that discourse that associates great fortunes with hard work in itself explains 
their privileged standing in society.  
 
Such a discourse on the relation between economic elite and meritocracy negates much 
of the historical changes in both the political, social and economic realm that could 
potentially explain the existence of the new ultra-rich class. Meritocracy, for example, 
cannot explain the survival and prosperity of the German family dynasties throughout 
the past century which included two devastating world wars. Nor can a standard life 
cycle model account for its preponderance. Explanations in the realm of law and politics 
are better suited here. The importance and role of financial capital in wealth 
accumulation is also lacking in much of the literature. For example, do the rich exhibit 
preferences for wealth that makes them hold greater levels of financial risk in their 
portfolios?  
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1.3 Objectives of the Research 
 
To date, the exploration of the ultra-rich has been limited and often beholden to 
restrictive precepts of neoclassical thought. The rise of the ultra-rich, and ever greater 
wealth concentration into their hands, are largely grounded in notions of winner-takes-
all markets (Rosen, 1981), returns to education or human capital (Kaplan and Rauh, 
2013) or the increasing scale of markets. Piketty’s (2014a) focus on the rise of the 
patrimonial society heralds a transformation on how economists should explore these 
issues. The call for multidimensional studies into the dynamics of wealth accumulation 
(Piketty, 2014a; Piketty 2014b; Bonnet and Thery, 2014) to further understand the 
behaviour of the wealthy and their relation to broader economic, political and social 
forces is taken up in this thesis.  
 
The primary objective of this thesis is to explore and analyse the evolution of wealth 
accumulation across time, space, and the factors that play a critical role in any observed 
trends among the wealthiest sections of society, particularly in the advanced economies. 
This rests on the ability to amass and present statistical data on the world’s wealthiest 
individuals with particular emphasis on examining the trends and relationships across 
important economic cycles and institutional developments. Further, the behaviour of 
wealthy households must be considered as consumption and savings, debt levels, the 
structure of income and taxation all have a role in either reducing the pace of 
accumulation or accelerating and accentuating it depending on the level of wealth held 
by households. In addition, an examination is made of the role of wealth in permitting 
enhanced risk taking. Given the increasing financialisation of household budgets, this 
seems an important channel through which wealth can further accrue rapidly to 
wealthier households. This has recently been recognised by Saez and Zucman (2014), 
who find that rising wealth inequality in the United States is intimately intertwined not 
only with savings and consumption but also rates of return to household portfolios. This 
study establishes the level of risk aversion among Australian households and 
empirically demonstrates how this varies according to wealth. Data limitations restrict 
this aspect of the study to Australia. 
 
Based on a review of the literature of wealth accumulation, the following research 
questions were formulated: 
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1. Which regions of the world have given rise to the greatest private fortunes? 
 
The first research question is explored in Chapter Three where the general 
patterns of the rich are established at the regional level.  
 
This sets the global context by demonstrating how wealth accumulation is 
rapidly increasing at the highest wealth tier and establishing that this process is 
not just restricted to the developed world. Further, this research examines not 
only where today’s wealth is generated, but also conducting an analysis that 
explores the generation of wealth across all sectors, such as information 
technology (IT) and pharmaceuticals, to more traditional commercial activities 
such as finance and retailing. 
 
2. To what extent do various structural changes in economy and society impact 
upon wealth distribution and concentration across advanced economies? 
  
This question is examined in Chapter Four. The chapter seeks to establish a 
causal link, analytically, to historical trends in various factors associated with 
wealth dynamics. Significant emphasis is also placed on the changes in the 
structure of top income shares and the impact of tax policy on the dynamics of 
high wealth concentration, and the role of financialisation and consumerism in 
influencing the savings rates and the potential for household investment. 
Chapter 4 adopts an analytical approach in exploring how the above factors have 
played a role in increasing wealth concentration amongst the advanced 
economies. 
 
3. Given the increasing financialisation of household balance sheets, do risk 
aversion levels differ across wealth levels?  
 
This question is explored in chapter 5. A neoclassical approach in the 
measurement of risk aversion is adopted, then how it varies with wealth is 
empirically tested. The Chapter focuses on Australian households, employing 
data from the Household, Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia (HILDA) 
database. 
 7 
 
 
4. Is inheritance concentrated in a few countries or regions, or does it manifest 
itself evenly across the globe, particularly in advanced, developed, capitalist 
societies?  
 
5. What is the relationship between government policy and the creation and 
endurance of economic elites through succeeding generations of family 
dynasties?  
 
6. For the great self-made fortunes, are there differences in the role of 
entrepreneurialism versus appropriation in the initial creation of wealth 
depending on a country’s pattern of development? 
 
7. Do entrepreneurs, depending on their budgetary constraints, specialise in “low” 
budget risks or “high” budget risks?  
 
Questions 4, 5, 6, and 7 are explored in Chapters 3 and 6. Chapter 6 is a cross-
country study. This historical analysis focuses on the individual histories of 
extreme wealth holders and the historical context in which their wealth was 
made. Further, the relative importance of inheritance greatly varies across 
economies suggesting substantial divergence into the future. The analysis 
proceeds in the spirit of wealth historians (Rubinstein, 1980; Rockoff, 2012).  
 
1.4 Scope of the Thesis: Sample, Time Frame and Methodology 
 
To answer the research questions raised in section 1.3, the analysis is approached in a 
number of ways.  
 
Firstly, the general trends in wealth across various countries and regions are analysed, 
utilising data from wealth lists between 1990 and 2013 and national wealth to income 
ratios. In total, the analysis consists of an unbalanced panel of 2,609 individuals and 
families for a total sample size of 9,426 across the 24-year sample period.2 The wealth 
lists incorporate data on not only wealth size and demographic indicators but also the 
                                                
2 Unbalanced panel refers to data in which observations for a group are missing across time. 
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country of origin, age and date of birth, and the industrial or commercial sources of 
wealth.  
 
Secondly, the study examines which regions appear to be producing the wealthiest 
individuals and whether these observations can be tied to changes in the economic 
environment, or if other forces more aligned with political, social or even personal 
circumstances are at work. This follows Watkins (1907) and Rockoff (2012), among 
others, who viewed the extreme wealth levels of the Gilded Age to be by-products of 
technological change in certain industries and the rise of financial capital. For these 
writers, individuals became wealthy due to fortuitous economic and technological 
circumstances. A century on, are the same forces still at work? In the Gilded Age, 
railroad growth fuelled the growth of newfound riches in finance and real estate. Has 
the World Wide Web revolution of the 1990s had a similar impact? 
 
Thirdly, the study examines the world’s most advanced economies to determine 
whether systematic differences in the patterns of wealth generation across economies 
and industries exist. Which common traits appear across countries that incubate and 
give rise to the largest fortunes observable? For example, Watkins (1907) argued that 
the rise of ‘abstract property’ was a necessary condition for wealth in the Gilded Age in 
the US. In contemporary times, Torgler and Piatti (2013) and Petras (2007) posit that 
corruption plays a major role in some countries, while Sanandaji and Leeson (2013) 
find that secure property rights are the most important element. Alternatively, do these 
forces differ depending on the associated historical developments of these countries, as 
Richard Jones (1831) once argued? 
 
Generally, these issues are explored in an analytical and qualitative framework. The use 
of econometric analysis was rejected because the complexity of the micro data used in 
the study and its relationship to macro-wide or political factors does not readily lend 
itself to such an approach. Piketty (2014a), for example, argues that the use of a 
regression framework to explore the relationship between income and wealth inequality 
and r>g (where, r= rate of return on capital and g= rate of national income growth) 
encounters a major impediment. The obstacle is that the accumulation of wealth can be 
a very long process, often spanning generations, making it difficult to select an 
appropriate lag length. Indeed, the present study found numerous instances, for 
example, where an individual acquired wealth from their father’s construction business 
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that was built up before the Second World War. Subsequently, their progeny was 
catapulted into extreme wealth levels some two decades later. How does one choose an 
appropriate lag length in such an instance? In more extreme scenarios, some European 
dynasties span generations greater than three or four centuries, or greater than the 
existence of some nations. This thesis follows Piketty’s (2014a) preferred approach, 
which relies ‘on a mixture of careful case studies and structural theoretical models’ (p. 
77), and has been used previously in a number of economic history studies such as 
Rubinstein (1980) and Rockoff (2012). Ultimately, this thesis occupies a middle ground 
between econometric studies that utilise media rich lists (see e.g. Canterbery & Nosari, 
1985) and studies adopting a historical perspective (see e.g. Rubinstein, 1980). 
 
A regression framework is adopted only insofar as to explore the relationship between 
wealth and risk aversion in Chapter 5. A regression approach is possible because of the 
availability of quality data on household financial portfolios from the HILDA database 
across all wealth levels for Australian households.  
 
1.5 Limitations and Weaknesses of the Research 
 
Throughout the process of data collection and collation for this research, a number of 
weaknesses and limitations were identified that reduced the scope of the thesis. 
 
Firstly, the data on the ultra-rich is sourced from secondary data sources. Media lists on 
the ultra-rich are the most accessible data source on these individuals – but are plagued 
by errors or inaccuracies. This is particularly apparent when demarcating between 
fortunes that are inherited or self-made. In many instances, media publications appear to 
have moved to a flexible interpretation of what constitutes inheritance over the entirety 
of the sample period for any number of individuals. Given the longitudinal nature of the 
data and to ensure consistency across time, such instances were checked and validated 
from other primary sources including newspaper articles or biographical sources to 
ensure the coherence and consistency from period to period. Still, data accuracy 
represents a major caveat to the analysis of the data.  
 
Secondly, the issue of gender is not explored at all in this thesis. Some literature has 
identified this as an area demanding greater scholarship. For example, it would be 
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instructive to observe the apportionment of wealth between siblings of different 
genders. Are these related to cultural norms or do the ultra-rich take a different 
approach? Such an issue could be explored in the primogeniture theoretical frameworks 
of Stiglitz (1969). Data on gender and inheritance is available in our database but the 
aforementioned research avenue is not explored in this thesis. In addition, the 
relationship between sector and gender is worthwhile exploring.  
 
Thirdly, a major limitation of the study is not being able to expand the scope of certain 
sections to include more countries in the study. A primary obstacle is a lack of data 
availability in a longitudinal format. This is particularly in relation to distributional data 
on wealth, income and taxation. This limitation is particularly acute for this study 
focusing on the economic elite as many of these individuals come from Asia or Latin 
America for which relevant data is scarce. Even in the instances of advanced 
industrialised economies, significant data impediments were encountered despite great 
strides over the recent past toward this end. For example, wealth distribution data over a 
long time period, and without missing observations, for Canada, Germany or Japan is 
not available. Further, data on some variables may simply be missing or not directly 
comparable across countries due to definitional changes. In addition, much of the data 
that is available comes from household surveys undertaken on usually intermittent 
basis. These may only be produced once every ten years. These impediments ultimately 
limit the scope of the thesis in certain areas. 
 
1.6 Organisation of the Thesis and Main Findings 
 
The thesis is divided into seven chapters. Chapter 2 reviews the literature on wealth and 
the ultra-rich. This research is relatively limited, given the importance of the ultra-rich 
in a capitalist system. The literature covers various aspects of wealth from different 
analytical frameworks. The Chapter begins with historical notions of wealth and capital. 
Particular attention is paid to Piketty (2014a) and the associated framework for 
exploring the accumulation of wealth. These range from studies based on social science 
theories examining the emergence of economic elites in a society to the contemporary 
economics literature that has researched the issue of wealth from numerous areas, 
including from industry structure to corruption or stochastic accumulation models. The 
chapter also reviews how the definition of wealth has evolved over the ages and how it 
has been differentiated in economics from the definition of capital. Further, in a broader 
 11 
 
context, this Chapter situates the thesis amongst the broader corpus of work associated 
with wealth accumulation models. 
 
Chapter 3 presents an overview of the construction of the ultra-rich database including 
establishing age, industry and, where warranted, citizenship. Secondly, trends in 
aggregate wealth amassment are analysed in the form of wealth to income ratios and the 
amassment of wealth as exemplified by billionaire population and holdings. Statistical 
analysis is restricted to the one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) tests to detect any 
systematic regional differences in relation to important characteristics such as sources of 
wealth and inheritance. The chapter also discusses the impacts of economic crises, 
specifically the Asian Financial Crisis and the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) on these 
trends.  
 
The main findings of Chapter 3 are as follows. Firstly, aggregate wealth, as measured 
by wealth to income ratios, has been accumulating at a rapid rate across the advanced 
industrialised economies. At a micro level, the trends in accumulated wealth are 
reflected in the rise of the billionaire class across the world with average increases in 
wealth of the class dwarfing income growth. The rise of this class is not restricted 
merely to the First World, but in all regions of the world. Here, Russia, China and South 
America are especially prominent. North America, however, remains the main engine of 
billionaire growth. Inheritance remains a significant force amongst the ultra-rich class in 
parts of Europe, Asia and South America contrary to the findings of studies that focus 
only on the US. 
 
Chapter 4 discusses the rise of a dual economy among the world’s advanced economies 
where wealth is concentrated in fewer hands proportionally. It follows the wealth 
accumulation model developed by Saez and Zucman (2014) and in the spirit of Meade 
(1965), as well as the work of Piketty and Zucman (2014a) and Piketty (2014a), among 
others. The purpose of this chapter is twofold. Firstly, it illustrates the stark chasm that 
appears to be emerging between the wealthiest households and the rest of the population 
in certain advanced economies across several variables relevant to wealth accumulation 
and concentration. Secondly, heavy emphasis is placed on situating these variables on 
the ever-increasing roles of financialisation and consumerism in both enhancing the 
position of the wealthy and suppressing the upward mobility of large sections of 
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society. Taxation policy is also introduced in relation to labour and capital income, 
inheritances, and tax evasion.  
 
The major findings of Chapter 4 are that various forces are increasingly becoming 
beneficial to the richest segments of society or economy. In each facet, consumerism, 
financialisation, income shares (wage and capital income) the rich are dominating. 
Further, the cross country comparisons of taxation show again movement favouring the 
rich in all aspects of taxation. Taxes on labour incomes, capital incomes, estates and 
gifts, and wealth taxes all have moved in a direction that favour wealth accumulation. 
Tax evasion itself is increasingly providing a further avenue of reducing the tax burden 
of the wealthy. 
 
In Chapter 5, the focus shifts away from an all-encompassing view of wealth 
accumulation to concentrate on a particular aspect of it. Specifically, the relationship 
between wealth holdings and risk aversion is analysed in a quantitative manner. The 
Chapter addresses the point first raised in Chapter 4 – that the increasing 
financialisation of households’ balance sheets suppresses lower wealth class households 
while enabling enhanced wealth generation by the wealthiest households – by testing to 
what degree relative risk aversion (RRA) is a function of wealth, controlling for a range 
of socioeconomic variables. The analysis uses the Australian HILDA survey of an 
unbalanced panel of more than 7,300 households. Estimates of risk aversion are derived 
within a mean-variance framework where it is found that risk aversion systematically 
decreases with wealth holdings. 
 
The main findings of Chapter 5 are that Australian households exhibit decreasing 
relative risk aversion. This finding remains robust in the presence of various other 
variables and specifications. Further, the estimated risk aversion of the wealthiest 
households is found to approach a risk aversion parameter of 2, well below the poorer 
households. These estimates largely fall in line with calibration models on wealth 
distribution that assume a risk aversion parameter of 1.5 to 2.  
 
Chapter 6 delves much deeper into the high wealth accumulation trends by exploring 
the historical sources and processes for the creation of large fortunes across the world’s 
advanced economies. Given the scope of the study, the focus here is to draw out the 
differing patterns of wealth accumulation, including the role of the entrepreneur and 
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inheritance, where one group may dominate in a given region or country. The 
discussion ultimately rests on the prediction by Piketty (2014a) that the high rates of 
return of yesteryear are diminishing now and links this to prevailing institutional 
changes. In addition, the theoretical prediction of Shorrocks (1988) is considered. 
Shorrocks’s model predicts that the dynamics associated with wealth accumulation vary 
substantially depending upon on the resources necessary to access certain 
entrepreneurial risks. Support for the theoretical predictions of both Shorrocks (1988) 
and Piketty (2014a) are found across the globe.  
 
Finally, Chapter 7 provides the conclusion to the study. It summarises the main findings 
of the thesis in greater detail and provides avenues for future research. 
 
1.7 Summary of Policy Recommendations 
 
Based upon the findings of the thesis, policy recommendations based on this research 
can be summarised along three possible avenues. Implicit in these recommendations is 
the assumption that government policy can have an impact on wealth concentration and 
a positive impact upon economic growth. 
 
Firstly, we consider the implementation and efficacy of more expansive and progressive 
income or wealth tax regimes. A forceful argument that progressive tax regimes do not 
have a deleterious impact on entrepreneurialism or economic growth is possible. The 
evidence, particularly in Chapters 4 or 6, does not suggest that entrepreneurial effort is 
blunted by a progressive taxation regime, particularly in light of the finding that many 
of the self-made billionaires attained initial success during periods of high taxation. 
However, the real world applicability of the implementation of higher progressive tax 
regimes, particularly those involving the ultra-rich and their ability to shift capital from 
off-shore centre to off-shore centre may limit the effectiveness of this tool in a 
contemporary context. Although a global wealth taxation system would provide a rapid 
mechanism through which wealth inequality might be reduced, the political realities are 
likely to make this an ineffectual approach without enormous political cooperation and 
coordination between nation-states. 
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An alternative approach to reducing the inequality of wealth accumulation is to view it 
within the context of how households deal with their financial holdings. The increasing 
financialisation of household balance sheets has so far appeared to have an asymmetric 
impact on households, depending on which side of the wealth distribution one falls. A 
policy consideration that naturally emerges from this finding in Chapter 4 is to consider 
the adoption of policies that incentivise savings and investment by all. The potential of 
utilising finance to increase the probability of upward mobility regardless of classes was 
well recognised by Watkins (1907) and, more recently, by Saez and Zucman (2014).  
 
Also, the extent of the representation of inheritance in the wealth lists requires attention. 
Wealth and estate taxes in themselves are not likely to have a dramatic impact given the 
formidable international issues that would emerge in coordinating tax regimes. An 
alternative approach may be to restrict the span and sphere of business interests in 
which these families engage thereby limiting their ability to gain greater shares of the 
world’s income.  
 
1.8 Contributions 
 
This study makes at least three major contributions to the extant literature of wealth 
accumulation and on the ultra-rich.  
 
Firstly, this study contributes directly to the literature on the sources of great fortunes 
by showing that the riches observed today significantly differ across the globe 
depending on the countries’ historical development. A recent trend in some literature, 
particularly that of a neoclassical economics standpoint, is to relate the rise of great 
fortunes to the human capital one possesses (Kaplan and Rauh, 2013). The results 
presented in Chapter 6 reveal that the wealth that has been amassed cannot be 
exclusively tied to such explanations. Instead, the cross-country comparative study 
demonstrates the roles of government policy and institutions in governing the rise of 
fortunes. The impact of these varies region by region. The results complement recent 
studies by Piketty (2014a) and various empirical studies by scholars focusing on 
specific countries (Siegfried and Roberts, 1991; Siegfried and Round, 1994; Hazeldine 
and Siegfried, 1997; Stilwell and Ansari, 2003; and Rockoff, 2012). 
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The second contribution is to show in a cross-country setting the dynamics of wealth 
accumulation through the prism of various socioeconomic factors. The work builds on 
the single country studies such as Saez and Zucman (2014), by using a convenient 
wealth accumulation model to decompose and to compare the process of accumulation 
across seven advanced economies. Unlike studies which purely focus on elements of 
inequality in isolation, this study seeks to combine the findings of a disparate set of 
studies into one uniform corpus of work.  
 
The third major contribution, is to develop a measure of risk aversion based on the 
portfolio holdings of Australian households. I am not aware of any study that explicitly 
estimates the degree of risk aversion for the Australian economy in relation to financial 
securities. A test is conducted on the hypothesised relationship of constant relative risk 
aversion in wealth, and find, contrary to the null, that risk aversion decreases in wealth. 
This adds to a growing but small literature on the uniqueness of the wealthy’s 
household portfolios relative to the rest of the population. In addition, the relationship 
between risk aversion, wealth and the receipt of financial advice was considered. I am 
not aware of any study that explores this relationship despite its importance in providing 
a potential advantage to the wealthy. Piketty (2014a) conjectures that one reason why 
the rich are able to maintain high investment returns is due to their ability to access 
financial advice. Some of the results present here suggest that this may very well be 
true. 
 
Fourthly, the thesis utilises media rich lists as a basis for constructing a new wealth 
database. Although this thesis is not the first to do so by any means (see for example, 
Siegfried and Roberts, 1991; Siegfried and Round, 1994; Hazeldine and Siegfried, 
1997; Stilwell and Ansari, 2003; and Rockoff, 2012), it has sought to bring greater 
consistency in the information provided by these lists. These include ensuring an 
accurate and consistent treatment of inheritance over time, and an accurate and 
consistent treatment of an individual’s industrial source of great fortune. This is 
achieved by applying the Global Industry Classification Standard (GICS) onto a media 
list back to 1990. By applying the GICS taxonomy I was able to ensure, for example, a 
consistent record of individuals’ movements between industries as it arose. Such 
tracking of individuals required a methodical search on all 2,609 individuals and 
families in the billionaire database.  
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Chapter 2 Literature Review: The Wealthy as a Sui 
Generis 
 
Chapter 2 provides a literature review of several of the works in the field of the ultra-
rich and wealth accumulation. To begin, a discussion of wealth and its close relative, 
capital is provided. Both concepts are explored within the context of the analytical 
framework of Piketty (2014a) who offers a unique approach here. In addition, the 
relationship between wealth accumulation and capital accumulation models are 
discussed. It is argued that Piketty (2014a) represents an attempt to bridge the two 
different conceptual frameworks. The thesis itself focuses on models of wealth 
accumulation rather than attempting to unify a theory of wealth distribution with an 
aggregate productivity theory of growth. Piketty (2014a) emphasises that a class of 
these models permit the exploration of questions that are not readily explorable in 
models of capital accumulation. In addition, a discussion of historical approaches to the 
issue of wealth accumulation is provided as it pertains to the ultra-rich specifically. This 
review is not solely limited to the discipline of economics but includes, aspects of elite 
theory from the social sciences. In addition, recent empirical analyses of the rich are 
reviewed, which have mostly focused on establishing the sources of great fortunes. 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
Economic research on the ultra-wealthy is scarce, despite the attention they have 
received in the popular mind as discussed in Chapter 1. Instead, academic discourse has 
typically examined the whole of the wealth distribution with a particular focus on the 
extreme left side of the distribution tail, namely poverty (Torgler & Piatti, 2013). 
However, such a focus may lead to the neglect of a class who play a pivotal role in 
economy and society in general. Economists who have researched the extremely 
wealthy such as Tuckman (1973), argue that effectively taxing the rich would provide 
significant budget relief to the US government’s finances. Attempting any such policy 
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initiative, directed at the rich demands strong economic justification given their role as 
owners of capital and enterprise (Slemrod, 2000). From a general economic or 
commerce perspective, Hassler (1999) forcefully argues that this group of individuals 
makes decisions every day that affects the economic well-being of millions. Indeed, the 
subjects of this study either found or own many of the world’s largest corporations that 
touch every aspect of our lives from food to computing, retailing to automobiles, and 
medicine to junk food.  
 
The surprising lack of research on the wealthy, despite the recognition that wealth does 
‘make the world go around’, could be related to how precisely the question of wealth 
accumulation is explored in orthodox economics.  
 
Neoclassical economics with its focus on marginal productivity theories of capital and 
labour are limited in providing a sufficient analytical framework within which to 
investigate certain aspects of both wealth accumulation and distribution. Similarly, the 
post-Keynesian approach may not be sufficient either in exploring certain sections of 
the wealth distribution given its overall macroeconomic perspective. The lack of clear 
disciplinary demarcation lines has also perhaps deterred economists from exploring the 
topic, particularly in contemporary times, whereas social scientists and geographers are 
often more prepared to tackle the subject. 
 
However, perhaps the biggest hurdle that confronts researchers, be they economists or 
social scientists, when seeking to grapple with the rich are the significant data 
limitations they encounter. Typically, economists approach the problem by employing 
tax records, deceased estate records or a rich list published by a major periodical. This 
data is then utilised in a typical econometric framework, employing regression analysis, 
to test various hypotheses. Tax records provide the most contemporary accurate records, 
but when dealing with the wealthiest of individuals, the issue of tax evasion becomes a 
consideration, as does reconciling tax measures across jurisdictions. Deceased estate 
records also provide a high degree of accuracy but can only be used for deceased 
individuals. Media lists provide a fruitful foundation for further exploration as long as 
one is mindful of their limitations, the most obvious being that of inaccurate wealth 
estimates. Numerous media lists exist across the world. In the US, the Forbes annual 
rankings are by far the most popular, focusing not just on the US but on regional and 
global wealth rankings. In Australia, there is the Business Review Weekly’s Top 400 
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Rich List, while in the UK there is the Sunday Times Rich List. Despite these data 
limitations, some economists have developed a body of work that provides a foundation 
upon which this thesis can build. 
 
In general terms, Chapter 2 is divided into two sections where there is a change in focus 
by moving from a general review of wealth accumulation to one focusing on just one 
aspect of the wealth distribution, the ultra-rich. Section 2.2 principally focuses upon the 
concepts of wealth and the theoretical models that have considered the accumulation of 
wealth and the concomitant distributions of wealth. This section also incorporates a 
lengthy discussion on Piketty’s (2014a) concept of wealth and why his definition of 
wealth is employed throughout this thesis. A discussion on the link between capital 
accumulation and wealth accumulation models is also considered, particularly 
considering the theoretical contributions of Piketty (2014a). Chapter 4 utilises a form of 
these models to examine the multifaceted nature of wealth accumulation. Section 2.3 
deals exclusively with the ultra-rich and the literature which explores this small, but 
important, class. In contrast to section 2.2 which is heavily focused on theoretical 
aspects, much of section 2.3 is focused on empirical works to this end. Some theoretical 
works are considered though from the history of ideas to more contemporary works that 
deal specifically with the ultra-rich. This section is particularly important for Chapter 6. 
Both sections informed the research questions discussed in section 1.2. Section 2.4 
focuses on the small body of literature that has grappled with the ultra-rich. 
 
2.2 Conceptualising Wealth  
 
The definition of wealth in economic or philosophical academic discourse has 
undergone significant variation since antiquity through to the contemporary era. In 
economics, the role of wealth has, to an extent, been supplanted by the concept of 
capital. The purpose of this section is to trace the historical evolution of the concept of 
wealth and how wealth and capital have become at once separated in the literature. The 
separation is often viewed as necessary as the two concepts may necessitate different 
conceptual frameworks in analysing their associated dynamics. The discussion then 
turns to the definition of wealth and capital that Piketty (2014a) has proposed in which 
the two are viewed equivalently. 
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The publication of Piketty’s (2014a) book has generated significant scholastic debate. 
One aspect of Piketty (2014a) upon which much criticism has centred is over his 
definition of wealth and capital (see e.g. Galbraith, 2014; Blume and Durlauf, 2015). In 
general, Piketty consistently equates wealth with capital. It will be argued that this 
approach is a by-product of Piketty (2014a) attempting to reconcile macro observations 
(growth theory) with micro observations (the distribution of wealth and income). This 
point is specifically discussed in section 2.2.4.1.  
 
2.2.1 The Concept of Wealth and Capital through the Ages 
 
Wealth and capital have undergone various definitional changes throughout history. In 
earlier times, the two concepts have been viewed as virtual synonyms, and in 
contemporary times they have emerged into distinct concepts.  
 
Economic historian Robert Heilbroner (1987) emphasises that wealth represents the 
fundamental business of economics. Despite the ostensible centrality of wealth in 
economics, a precise consensus surrounding the definition of wealth has failed to 
emerge. The lack of consensus may be due to the various meanings of wealth spawned 
through the ages. The lack of definitional rigour potentially obfuscating the manner of 
how to debate and analyse wealth. At the core, the issues tend be as to the true purpose 
of wealth in an economy. 
 
In antiquity, a consensus was absent. For some ancient Hellenic thinkers, the definition 
revolved around the ability to defy the need for work:  
 
A Greek was wealthy if he could live without having to work, poor if he did 
not have enough to live on without working. From this point of view, the 
majority of people in Greece were ‘poor’ since they had to work. (Austin & 
Vidal-Naquet, 1977, p. 16) 
 
Applying such a definition from antiquity would suggest that some of the richest 
individuals in contemporary times are not wealthy, given that the majority continue to 
take a day-to-day managerial or entrepreneurial role in the operation of their business 
enterprises. Similarly, Carroll, Slacalek and Tokuoka (2014) argue that wealth 
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inequality emerges from those with low wealth-income ratios (high wealth and high 
income) and not from purely asset-rich households alone. 
 
Distantly echoing concepts of modern capital rather than wealth, some ancient Hellenic 
thinkers emphasised the utility of wealth toward production. Xenophon (430-354 BC) 
viewed wealth as a resource that a person can use for some purpose. The use of wealth 
is not toward creating more wealth – but toward creating a household for the purposes 
of leisure and autarky. In other words, ‘Xenophon … gives no evidence of having 
considered wealth as anything but an instrument in the service of the good life …’ 
(Booth, 1993, p. 42). In some respects, this notion of wealth echoes those of modern 
neoclassical production functions in which capital (plant and machinery, land) is a core 
variable. 
 
Pre-Enlightenment discourse adopted an appreciably unique concept of wealth. The role 
of money or specie in wealth was emphasised – to the detriment of “real” goods. To 
some degree, these definitions were heavily informed, or aligned, with the machinations 
of the mercantilist international system and power politics that dominated international 
relations in the 1500s to 1600s. Negating the importance of production (unless it 
provided substantial trade surpluses), mercantilists’ elevated accumulated wealth as the 
primary means through which dominance in the international system could be attained. 
Large stocks of wealth were heavily tied to the amassment of specie, gold or silver from 
whatever source, including plunder or appropriation and not necessarily through an 
accumulation of national income. The massive reserves, representing a country’s 
wealth, provided a surer foundation upon which to conduct wars or dominate 
neighbours before the advent of efficient tax regimes or modern central banks.  
 
Equating only specie with wealth received considerable criticism, especially amongst 
the French laissez-faire thinkers and British Tories. Pierre de Boisguilbert vehemently 
rejected the amassment of specie, and instead emphasised that the essence of wealth 
was in goods. Spengler (1984) argues that the views of de Boisguilbert were highly 
influential on Adam Smith, though the latter never referenced the former. Similarly, the 
Tory, Dudley North, wrote that:  
 
… he who is most diligent, and raiseth most Fruits, or maketh most of 
Manufactory, will abound most in what others make, or raise; and consequently be 
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free from Want, and enjoy most Conveniences, which is truly to be Rich, altho' 
there were no such thing as Gold, Silver, or the like amongst them. (p. 14) 
  
Amongst these thinkers, monetary holdings were not wealth; instead, the goods that one 
could produce and accumulate constituted wealth. 
 
Enlightenment approaches to the problem of wealth significantly departed from pre-
Enlightenment conceptions – by seeking to elaborate other aspects of wealth. Classical 
economists developed a significant point of departure from previous generations of 
philosophers with a much more narrowly bounded concept of wealth, namely capital. 
Specifically, the idea of wealth largely transformed into the concept of capital and in 
doing so reduced the scope of economists’ analysis of wealth. To a great extent, the 
primacy of the monetary holdings in wealth (or capital) was divested. For Adam Smith, 
the emergence of capitalism was synonymous with goods that were produced and 
reordered by labour. Adam Smith emphasised the importance of labour when 
elucidating what he viewed as the wealth of nations:  
 
The annual labor of every nation is the fund which originally supplies it with all the 
necessaries and conveniences of life which it annually consumes, and which consist 
always either in the immediate produce of that labor, or in what is purchased with 
that produce from other nations. (p. 1) 
 
The key point here is the reconceptualisation of capital into something distinct from 
wealth. Capital now came to encompass productive resources and not money or 
monetary value as it was traditionally ensconced (Hodgson 2014). In this regard, 
Smith’s concept of wealth reflected the early laissez-faire thinkers more so than the 
mercantile thinkers. Subsequent authors further sought to cement the divorce of wealth 
and capital. John Stuart Mill (1848, ch. 3) viewed capital as the accumulated produce of 
labour – again mostly ignoring the monetary foundation traditionally used in commerce. 
The accumulation of stock through the production of labour now represented the key 
aspect of capitalism. Irving Fisher further enlarged the definition of capital (whilst 
negating the definitions adopted in commerce) to that which includes any item that 
generates flows of income. Wealth as it was traditionally viewed was becoming largely 
an issue with little or no interest from economists’ perspective.  
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Numerous economists have sought to re-establish the centrality of wealth and money 
into economic discourse and thereby attempt to synergise the concepts of wealth and 
capital. The early institutionalist economist Frank Albert Fetter (1930), sought to place 
commercial definitions of capital at the centre of economics, reversing the approach of 
Adam Smith (1952). Fetter (1930) redefined capital as a ‘conception of individual 
riches having real meaning only within the price system and the market where it 
originated, and developing with the spread of the financial calculus of business practice’ 
(p. 190). Similarly, Joseph Schumpeter (1954) rejected the definitions developed by 
classical, Marxist and neoclassical economics. Emphasising the historical development 
of the concept of capital from prior to Smith (1952), Schumpeter (1954) argues that 
capital ‘was essentially monetary, meaning either actual money, or claims to money, or 
some goods evaluated in money’ (p. 323).  
 
Extending the concept of capital to include all forms of wealth moves beyond the notion 
of capital as conceived by Karl Marx. Marx (1981) recognised that money capitalism 
was the driver of the system, but he sought to firmly place social relations between the 
workers and capitalists as the essential characteristic of capitalism. For Marx, including 
wealth runs counter to analysing capitalism and the struggle between workers and 
capitalists. Capital expands to accumulate more capital, but only through labour is the 
new value created.  
 
Hodgson (2014) provides a contemporary definition of capital that elevates it to the 
status of wealth. From a historical and business perspective, the definition of capital as 
used by economists today has largely neglected its roots found in commerce and 
business practice that conflated it with wealth. To return capital to its traditional roots, 
Hodgson (2014) strongly advocates the centrality of market value in any definition of 
capital. Capital to be defined as such must fulfil the following five criteria: 
 
1. Can its use rights be owned or hired? 
2. Has a price formed in the market for capital of this type? 
3. Can this kind of capital be used as collateral to borrow money? 
4. Can this kind of capital be sold with all rights of ownership transferred to the 
purchaser? 
5. Is the value of this kind of capital measurable? 
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Hodgson (2014) finds that the definition provided by the older, pre-Smithsonian use of 
the word capital adheres to all the criteria compared to modern definitions and 
approaches that of Piketty (2014a). 
 
2.2.2 Piketty on Wealth 
 
A definition of wealth that elevates the market valuation element as central and fulfils 
most of Hodgson’s (2014) criteria is found in Piketty’s (2014a) lengthy treatise on 
wealth. For Piketty (2014a), the concept of wealth and capital represent virtual 
synonyms. Piketty’s definition of capital makes explicit the role of market valuation for 
all forms of assets and goes beyond the concept of capital as defined in either 
neoclassical or post-Keynesian models of growth. The extent to which Piketty (2014a), 
ostensibly, conflates the concepts of capital and wealth is apparent in the following 
passage of text which defines national “capital” or “wealth”: ‘the total market value of 
everything owned by the residents and government of a given country at a given point 
in time, provided that it can be traded on some market’ (p. 48). Assets here go well 
beyond “productive” assets and encompass land and housing and even consumer 
durables.  
 
The definition adopted above follows a slew of studies dealing with wealth 
accumulation or wealth distribution. Similar definitions appear elsewhere, including 
Piketty and Saez (2014) and Piketty and Zucman (2014a). Piketty and Saez (2014) are 
clear in their definition of wealth: 
 
Wealth (or capital) is a stock. It corresponds to the total wealth owned at a given 
point in time. This stock comes from the wealth appropriated or accumulated in the 
past…. [W]ealth is defined as nonhuman net worth, i.e., the sum of nonfinancial and 
financial assets, net of financial liabilities (debt). National wealth is the sum of 
private wealth (net worth owned by private individuals) and public wealth (net worth 
owned by the government and public agencies). (p. 842). 
 
An explicit definition guided by the United Nations’ System of National Accounts 
(SNA) is found in Piketty and Zucman (2014a). In defining private wealth, they state: 
 24 
 
  
… is the net wealth (assets minus liabilities) of households and non-profit institutions 
serving households. Following SNA guidelines, assets include all the non-financial 
assets – land, buildings, machines, etc. – and financial assets … over which 
ownership rights can be enforced and that provide economic benefits to their owners. 
(Piketty and Zucman, 2014, p. 9). 
 
Both definitions are particularly relevant in the context of a dynamic wealth 
accumulation model provided in Piketty and Saez (2014).  
 
In essence, all forms of wealth are capital, and all capital is wealth. There is no 
differentiation per the framework advocated by Piketty (2014a), Piketty and Saez 
(2014), and Piketty and Zucman (2014a). Piketty and Zucman (2014a) explicitly state 
that their use of the word wealth or capital has its foundation in the work of 19th century 
scholars such as Foville and Giffen. Both used the concepts of wealth and capital 
interchangeably. Giffen’s (1889) book, The Growth of Capital, contains numerous 
instances wherein accumulation is used in conjunction with wealth and capital, as 
synonyms. For example, on page one, Giffen writes about continuing his work on 
“accumulations of capital” and on the second page about the “growth of wealth”. 
Foville (1893, p. 597) viewed national wealth as encompassing ‘everything within its 
territory which has an appreciable monetary value.’ King (1915) defined wealth as 
encompassing various aspects of property, social capital and consumer goods or 
durables. 
 
The question naturally arises as to why Piketty (2014a), Piketty and Zucman (2014a) 
and Piketty and Saez (2014), adopt a definition of capital that is, in reality, a definition 
of wealth. The issue emanates from the conceptual framework in which the 
aforementioned scholars seek to explore the issue of wealth distribution. To explore the 
distribution of wealth, the common starting point is to consider the macroeconomic 
context, including wealth to income ratios and capital shares. Ultimately, explanations 
for the trends in wealth to income ratios, and capital’s share of national income are 
sought in models of wealth accumulation and not the typical growth and distribution 
theories such as Solow (1956) or Pasinetti (1962). This point is developed further in 
section 2.2.4.1 
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Throughout this thesis, wealth is defined in the terms proposed by Piketty and Saez 
(2014). Analytically, the measure of wealth being proposed here is based on three key 
variables. These include real estate, corporate capital and financial assets. Real estate 
and corporate capital can be denoted as R and K, respectively, and let financial assets be 
denoted by F. Wealth, therefore, is W = K + R + F. Wealth accumulates through 
“capital” or real estate acquisition, accumulation or appropriation and or growth in 
financial assets. Further, the measure of wealth is confined to marketable wealth. Non-
marketable wealth such as pensions are excluded from the analysis. This definition of 
wealth falls within the definitions utilised in wealth accumulation models which are 
discussed in section 2.2.3. 
 
Numerous criticisms have been mounted about Piketty’s (2014a) definition of wealth 
and capital, particularly from neoclassical economists. Firstly, there is the issue of what 
can and cannot be included in the concept of “capital”. Blume and Durlauf (2015) argue 
that Piketty’s concept of capital is far too sensitive to changes in wealth holder 
preferences. ‘Changes in tastes concerning impressionist paintings will change the 
wealth share of national output even though such changes leave the productivity of the 
capital component of wealth unchanged’ (p. 752). Such a charge seems to neglect that 
the wealthy have preferences that can easily generate greater wealth beyond “productive 
capacity”. Similarly, Kabur and Stiglitz (2015) point out that a rise in property values 
will have a purely distributional effect but will not raise the productive capacity of a 
country. Rognlie (2014) argued that Piketty’s (2014a) data and results in relation to the 
capital share of income is predicated upon an inflated valuation of housing stock. These 
criticisms miss the potential for all forms of wealth to be gainfully employed in some 
manner, including the housing stock. Examples of finding new uses of capital abound. 
For example, “home equity” provides a means for retirees to provide an income stream 
in their retirement years by liquidating part ownership of their housing equity. 
Parkinson, Searle, Smith and Stoakes (2009) document the rise of this new product 
from 2000 to 2007 in Australia and Britain.  
 
Another issue surrounding Piketty’s (2014a) definition of capital or wealth emerges 
when one considers whether “human capital” should be included. Two critical reviews 
of Piketty (2014a) emerge from Weil (2014) and Kuehn (2015). Both argue that in not 
including “human capital”, Piketty is neglecting a significant component of national 
wealth. A few scholars have attempted to link human capital to the rise of contemporary 
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great fortunes. Wai (2014) finds that amongst the ‘0.0000001% of the wealthy, higher 
education and ability were associated with higher net worth, even within self-made and 
non-self-made billionaires, this was not however the case within China and Russia’ (p. 
54). Wai takes ability to mean ‘cognitive ability’ and equates it with the attendance of 
an elite school. Similarly, Kaplan and Rauh (2013) argue that access to higher education 
is a key determinant for amassing great fortunes: 
 
The rise in the college wage premium may have flattened somewhat in the 
past decade, but our evidence from the identity of the super-rich suggests that 
the premium for technological skill has continued to rise in the right tail of 
wealth outcomes. (p. 162)  
 
The role of human capital in the amassment of wealth has been criticised by scholars 
who prefer explanations grounded in an institutional framework. The economist 
Watkins (1907) and the social theoriser Mills (1956) argued that institutions, broadly 
defined, endowed individuals with wealth. Piketty (2014a) and Hodgson (2014) 
forcefully reject the notion of human capital on the more well-defined grounds that 
humans cannot trade their labour outside of slave society. Further, Piketty (2014a) 
argues that only in a slave society is ownership of humans available as well as the 
transference of this ownership to another party, either via a market mechanism or 
inheritance.  
 
2.2.3 The Contribution of Piketty’s Capital 
 
By enlarging the definition of capital to encompass all forms of wealth, Piketty (2014a) 
effectively permits exploration of wealth accumulation and concentration beyond the 
traditional lines of neoclassical economic enquiry, to political economy and other 
schools that incorporate elements such as institutionalism or power. This has been 
recognised amongst critics of Piketty (2014a). Galbraith (2014) states that ‘Private 
financial valuation measures power, including political power even if the holder plays 
no active economic role. Absentee landlords and the Koch Brothers have power of this 
type.’ In the very first chapter, Piketty (2014a) strives to emphasise this when stating: 
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The history of the distribution of wealth has always been deeply political, and it 
cannot be reduced to purely economic mechanisms. (…). It is shaped by the way 
economic, social, and political actors view what is just and what is not, as well as 
by the relative power of those actors and the collective choices that result. (p. 35) 
 
The multidimensional nature of wealth and the historical transformation it has 
undergone presents the opportunity to explore the issue of wealth accumulation and 
concentration from a plurality of dimensions. Aspects of modern day wealth scholarship 
do already fall largely within this framework. Contemporary studies, which incorporate 
analysis of industrial sectors, are a case in point and discussed section 2.3.2. 
  
The utility of conceptualising wealth along such plural or multidimensional lines 
becomes more evident when one attempts to analyse the impact of wealth accumulation 
on society at large. For example, given the potential re-emergence of inheritance as a 
source of great wealth, what will its impact be on societal relations? Alternatively, how 
does such a society and economy differ from an affluent society? The Affluent Society 
(Galbraith, 1958) largely coincides with a period when income growth was greater than 
the returns to wealth. Affluent societies tend to award meritocracy and are plural in 
nature. Societies dominated by inherited wealth move to a paradigm characterised by 
the power and dominance of an elite (Bonnet and Thery, 2014). In contrast, according to 
Piketty (2014a) the Affluent Society represents a historical anomaly. Instead, the 
domination of inherited wealth is the norm, particularly when returns to capital are 
greater than national income growth. Bonnet and Thery (2014) argue that Piketty’s 
approach to capital or wealth permits the detection of such societal transformations. 
 
2.2.4 Wealth Accumulation Models 
 
In this subsection, micro-founded wealth accumulation models are reviewed and 
represent the body of scholarship to which this thesis is most closely aligned. These 
wealth accumulation models can be used to model wealth distributions, to fix ideas 
surrounding the decomposition of the constituent processes underlying wealth 
accumulation, and to provide a framework for examining the sources of great fortunes. 
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Before discussing wealth accumulations models, a discussion of historical capital 
accumulation models is considered within the context of Piketty (2014a) and their 
relation to wealth accumulation models.  
 
2.2.4.1 From Captial Accumulation to Wealth Accumulation Models and Piketty 
 
It is important at the outset to differentiate wealth accumulation as envisaged by a class 
of models (life cycle, intergenerational, and dynamic multiplicative shock models) from 
theories of growth and development where the role of wealth or income distribution 
either affects growth or is impacted by it. The differentiation becomes particularly 
important in the light of the debates surrounding Piketty (2014a). According to certain 
scholars, Piketty places the determination of the distribution of income (and ultimately, 
wealth) at the feet of marginal productivity of capital theories. 3 In doing so, Milanovic 
(2014) points out that Piketty (2014a) is not only providing a theory of wealth 
distribution but also providing a general unification between growth theory and wealth 
distribution theory. Here it will be posited that Piketty (2014a) represents a bridge 
between the broad conceptual frameworks, though both share many characteristics and 
have reciprocal implications. 
 
Wealth accumulation models share much in common with capital accumulation models 
found in macroeconomics. For example, Atkinson and Harrison (1978) point out that 
Meade’s (1964) micro founded wealth accumulation formulation permits for intrinsic 
differences between individuals. In a similar vein, Kaldor (1960) and Pasinetti (1962) 
offer a macro model where workers and capitalists exhibit different savings 
propensities. In what precise manner does capital and wealth accumulation differ, given 
instances of shared ideas? Baranzini (1991) contrasts the differentiation in the following 
way: 
 
                                                
3 Post-Keynesians contend that the approach adopted by Piketty (2014a) attempts to combine micro-based 
foundations with macroeconomic logic in an overall neoclassical framework. The main problem with 
such an approach resides in the utilisation of an aggregate production function. As the Cambridge Capital 
Controversies demonstrated the theory of growth and distribution cannot be founded upon aggregate 
production function as such a function cannot be observed in reality (López-Bernardo, López-Martínez, 
and Stockhammer, 2016). 
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… the term ‘wealth accumulation’ is used to indicate the decisions of individuals or 
families to save for a specific objective, while the term ‘capital accumulation’ will, 
more generally, refer to the wide process through which society increases its 
potential to produce a flow of goods and services. (p.12) 
 
As Baranzini (1991) further argues, there is a link between the two concepts particularly 
when one considers that the process of accumulation can be viewed from either: a) the 
investment perspective (direct inputs into the production process) on which there exist 
both micro and macro perspectives and; b) the savings perspective where life-cycle and 
intergenerational dynamics become important. On the former point, the differentiation 
between macro- and microeconomic based theories becomes particularly important in 
considering how to explore the rise of the entrepreneurial ultra-rich, where theories 
relating to entrepreneurial risks become relevant. On the second point, micro-founded 
models provide a better framework of exploring such intergenerational transmissions of 
wealth. 
 
The attempt to unify theories of growth and distribution have a long history. The 
approach of Piketty (2014a) in this regard is not new and has its antecedents in the 
growth and distribution literature of the 1950s and back to the classical economists. The 
classical political economists were first concerned by the functional distribution of 
income, the accumulation of capital and economic growth, all of which were 
underscored by the existence of different social classes. The importance of the first 
item, income distribution, is apparent upon reading the title to Adam Smith’s (1952) 
title of Book I: ‘Of the Causes of Improvement in the productive Powers of Labour, and 
of the Order according to which its Produce is naturally distributed among the different 
ranks of the People.’ 
 
Modern growth and distribution theory as it arose after the Second World War broadly 
diverged into two schools, although both found their motivation in the works of Kuznets 
(1955; 1963) and Kaldor (1957). Both scholars established a number of stylised ‘facts’ 
upon which numerous theories and hypotheses would be built in relation to inequality 
and economic growth. Firstly, on Kaldor’s stylised facts, the most relevant were the 
stability of a nation’s capital to output ratio and that capital’s and labour’s share of 
national income was approximately constant. Based on these facts, Kaldor (1955-56; 
1960) proposed a theory of income distribution based on a Keynesian model of 
 30 
 
economic growth where inequality arises from different savings rates of labour and 
capitalists. In essence, Kaldor (1955-56;1960) hypothesised that the marginal propensity 
of the rich to save is higher than the poor. This had two implications, one on economic 
growth and two, on inequality. If economic growth is related to the proportion saved, 
unequal economies will grow faster than economies characterised by equal distributions 
of income. Empirically, Kaldor (1967) demonstrated that productivity growth 
throughout the 1950s and 1960s was a function of investment behaviour, ‘[h]ence the 
traditional and pervasive argument that inequality catalyzed capital accumulation’ 
(Fisher and Erickson, 2007, p. 54). Pasinetti (1962; 1966) built upon the ideas of 
Kaldor, and assumed, for example, that the working class received wage and interest 
payments, while the capitalist class received interest payments only.4 Atkinson and 
Harrison (1978) argue that a significant limitation of the Kaldor-Pasinetti approach is 
that it does not provide any theory on the origin of a capitalist from entrepreneurialism, 
and assumes the capitalists are solely rentiers. 
  
The Kuznets (1956, 1963) hypothesis represented the other significant development of 
the era in inequality studies. Through an accumulation of data on income shares and 
GNP per head, Kuznets found a concave relation between income inequality and 
growth. Here, inequality increases during the transition from, for example, a rural 
economy to an industrialised economy; inequality would initially increase before 
decreasing once again as the now industrialised economy matures. As Kanbur and 
Stiglitz (2015) note, both the Kuznets and Kaldor stylised facts (and their hypotheses) 
generated a slew of growth and development theories to explain these facts. The ‘old’ 
neoclassical growth models of Solow (1956) and Swan (1956) for example, sought to 
explain many the Kaldor facts and the Kuznets hypothesis.5  
 
However, many of the stylised facts of both Kaldor and Kuznets do not hold any 
empirical validity particularly in the long run of history (Piketty, 2014a). Principal 
amongst these is that the capital share of national income is increasing amongst 
advanced economies, contrary to what was established by Kaldor. To illustrate, Figure 
2.1 presents Piketty’s estimates of the capital share in rich countries. As Piketty notes, 
                                                
4 Pasinetti (1965, 1973, 1981) was readily prepared to examining issues of growth and distribution in a 
multisector economic system characterised by different technological progress and changes in consumers’ 
preferences. 
5 In future years, endogenous growth theory was developed to explain the variance of growth rates across 
countries. 
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in 1970 the capital share of income ranged between 15% and 25%, and between 25% 
and 30% in the 2000 to 2010 period. Secondly, Piketty observes that in the standard 
model, the only way to explain how capital income ratios move with capital shares is to 
assume that the capital-labour elasticity is greater than one (Piketty, 2014a; Kanbur and 
Stiglitz, 2015).6 
 
 
Figure 2.1 Capital share in rich countries, 1975-2010 
Source: Piketty (2014a), retrieved from http://www.piketty.pse.ens.fr/capital21c 
 
 
Kabur and Stiglitz (2015) argue that the new observations of Piketty (2014a) and their 
associated implications for the Kuznets and Kaldor stylised facts require new ways of 
thinking about inequality. Here, Kabur and Stiglitz (2015) highlight Piketty’s positive 
theory that when returns to capital exceed income growth, wealth inequalities become 
exacerbated. Since the publication of Piketty (2014a), economists have sought to cast 
Piketty’s inequality (r > g) as being entirely consistent with a neoclassical production 
function. (see for example, Mankiw (2015).  
 
Such attempts do not capture Piketty (2015) core idea on the role of the r – g 
relationship. In seeking to clarify the role of r > g, Piketty (2015) argues that, at most, 
the inequality equation represents merely a mechanism that can amplify wealth 
inequalities in any given period. Instead the issue is what model is better suited to 
explore the wealth dynamics if not standard capital accumulation models? Piketty 
(2015)7 and Piketty and Saez (2014) emphasise that a class of dynamic multiplicative 
                                                
6 A principal criticism along these lines relates to Piketty’s assumption that the return to capital can 
remain constant as the capital-output ratio increases. Summers (2014) strongly criticised Piketty (2014a) 
for failing to recognise that marginal models of capital would predict lower returns as the capital share of 
income rises.  
7 Along with Piketty (2015), Piketty and Saez (2014), Piketty and Zucman (2014b), and Piketty and Saez 
(2015) all demonstrate Piketty’s views in this regard. 
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stochastic models, emanating from the broader wealth accumulation family of models 
are the better approach to understanding the dynamics of wealth distribution and 
accumulation.  
 
2.2.4.2 Wealth Accumulation Models  
 
In a wide-ranging survey on the distribution of wealth, Davies and Shorrocks (1999) 
detail two broad empirical regularities that have been discovered in relation to the 
accumulation of wealth. Firstly, the distribution of wealth is positively skewed. 
Secondly, the extreme end of the top tail is well approximated by a Pareto distribution. 
Further, when wealth is transformed by the logarithmic function, it approaches a log-
normal distribution function.8 Therefore, a stochastic process itself is sufficient to model 
wealth distributions as empirically observed. Feller (1971) describes the process of a 
coin tossing game in which the short-term winner gains momentum and indefinitely 
maintains the lead, contrary to the layperson’s prediction that the lead would change 
roughly evenly. It is not difficult to see how a stochastic process can lead to situations 
where a winner-takes-all market emerges. Thurow’s (1975) theory of wealth inequality 
in the US is based upon notions of luck where prudence only takes one so far. Echoing 
modern theories of financial economics, Thurow (1975) argues that coupled with luck, 
modern financial markets provide the means for rapid capitalisation and, consequently, 
the path to large fortunes. In other words, adopting a financial economics perspective, 
the Efficient Market Hypothesis (Fama, 1970) provides a sufficient explanation for a 
given wealth distribution observed in a market. Although the Efficient Market 
Hypothesis can provide a clear framework for thinking about extreme wealth, testing 
whether observed extreme wealth accumulation is down to luck may prove exceedingly 
difficult (Canterbery & Nosari, 1985). The concept of ‘long leads’ initially filtered into 
the industrial organisation literature with Scherer’s (1980) simulation model in which 
without market frictions such as economies of scale or entry barriers, some firms 
managed to grow well above average and capture up to 30% market share. Furthermore, 
once in front, these firms maintained this lead.  
 
However, a simple random-walk model of wealth accumulation possesses a significant 
drawback when taken to a real-world context. Davies and Shorrocks (1999) point out 
                                                
8 A lognormal process suggests a random walk model, !"#$ = !"#$&' + )$ 
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there are no upper-bound to these models – therefore, they provide no explanatory 
power when confronted by decreasing wealth inequality. Empirically, the deficiency of 
these models is apparent when one considers that in the immediate post-World War II 
era, where a decrease in wealth inequality was observed.  
 
An alternative to the stochastic processes framework, is to introduce a myriad of 
mechanisms which can either accelerate or decelerate wealth accumulation. These 
models are micro-founded in their approach. Meade (1975) provides an accounting 
identity for analysing the distribution of household wealth distribution: 
 #$ = #$&' + *$ + +$#$&' − -$ + .$  (2.1) 
 
where #$ is wealth at time t, +$	is the rate of return on investments, *$ is earned income, -$is consumption and .$ are gifts and bequests received. Meade’s formulation can be 
rewritten to encapsulate an individual’s or family’s total lifetime experience (Davies 
and Shorrocks, 1999). Assuming zero wealth at age 0, the dynamics of wealth 
accumulation in equation 2.1 can be rewritten as follows: 
 #$ = *0 − -0 + .0 (1 + +3)$3506'$05'  (2.2) 
 
Therefore, per Meade (1975), a family’s wealth is determined by: 
 
i. age, and history of: 
ii. earnings; 
iii. savings rates; 
iv. rates of returns; and 
v. inheritances. 
In Chapter 4, a model developed by Saez and Zucman (2014) is used to decompose 
wealth accumulation across similar variables. An advantage of both models, is the 
capacity to cover different classes of individuals, and not just bifurcate classes to 
worker and the rentier capitalist. On a smaller incidental point, an advantage of the Saez 
and Zucman (2014) model is the incorporation of taxation as a mechanism for 
equalising or lowering the rate of wealth accumulation – but this can be easily 
accommodated in the Meade process. 
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Equations 2.1 and 2.2 identify general contributors to the process of wealth 
accumulation and are by no means representative of a general theory of wealth 
distribution. Attempts at constructing a general theory of wealth distribution have 
typically either adopted a life-cycle approach or a dynastic modelling approach. The 
Lifecycle Model (LCM) of Modigliani and Brumberg (1954) postulates that individuals 
save and accumulate wealth for financing consumption in retirement. From a wealth 
distribution perspective, this has two implications. Firstly, the relationship between age 
and wealth is humped shaped, with the peak of wealth accumulation near retirement. 
Secondly, and most importantly, wealth inequality is wholly an age-based phenomenon. 
The richest members of society are the ones near retirement, and the poorest those just 
entering the workforce. In the LCM approach, no allowance is made for the possibility 
of bequest motives but for which casual empiricism suggests becomes more important 
at the upper tail of the wealth distribution. Further, the wealth distribution produced by 
the LCM predicts too little wealth inequality, and simply reflects income distribution. 
This despite empirical evidence indicating that wealth is distributed more unequally 
than income. In addition, the LCM class of models are wholly incapable of explaining 
the rise of extreme wealth holders as exemplified by modern day billionaires. 
 
In opposition to the LCM, are models that emphasise wholly the intergenerational 
transmission of stocks of wealth. Such models assume that individuals seek to maximise 
dynastic utility functions with infinite time horizons. In contrast to the LCM, age, 
retirement and death are irrelevant; therefore, individuals’ wealth accumulation 
undertakes substantially different paths depending on initial inheritance (Piketty and 
Zucman, 2015). Empirically, the importance of inheritance in the distribution of wealth 
has received considerable attention. These debates have centred upon the level of 
inheritance. In the US, for example, the level of inheritance as a proportion of wealth 
has been estimated as low as 20% to a high of 80% (see e.g. Davies and Shorrocks, 
1999). The lower bound estimates used as empirical support of the LCM whilst the 
higher bound estimates are used as evidence supporting intergenerational dynastic 
models. 
 
A theoretical compromise between the two approaches can be found in random shock 
type models. These differ from simple random walk models through the incorporation 
of shocks which have multiplicative effects and propagate through time. Piketty and 
Saez (2014) adopt a dynamic wealth accumulation model to explain the dynamics of 
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wealth accumulation, and in doing so provide a micro context for the relation between 
the returns to capital and income growth. Depending upon the structure of shocks, these 
models amplify the effect of the Piketty (2014a) inequality, r – g. Further, a dynamic 
wealth accumulation model can be proven to give rise to wealth distributions with fat 
Pareto tails, thereby approximating empirical observations in the higher spectrum of 
wealth distribution (Piketty and Zucman, 2015). Piketty and Saez (2014) propose a 
simple dynamic model of wealth accumulation with multiplicative shocks to the 
distribution of wealth with the form: 
 78$6' = 98$78$ + :8$     (2.3) 
 
where 78$ is the position of individual i in the wealth distribution, 98$ is a multiplicative 
random shock and :8$	is an additive random shock.  
 
According to Piketty and Saez (2014), the random shocks of equation 2.3, can manifest 
in a wide variety of ways. What precisely these phenomena represent is not made 
explicit in the formulation. However, various forms can be speculated. These include, 
but are not limited to, Stiglitz’s (1969) primogeniture model to investment shocks and 
impact on the rates of return (Benhabib, Bisin, and Zhu, 2013). Alternatively, the 
structure of shocks can relate to changes in the share of labour or capital income or 
growth, or to shocks in the preferences of savings rates. These shocks ultimately 
emanating from broader socioeconomic forces, such as war or a major economic 
recession. The point here is that the models are wide enough to capture a variety of 
phenomena. In this thesis, the manner of how these shocks manifest themselves and 
propagate through time, it is argued in Chapter 4, are through wealth accumulation 
models of the sort shown in equations 2.1 or 2.2. These models provide a useful means 
of conceptualising the process of wealth accumulation to capture relevant shocks 
through different channels over time when analysing relevant empirical phenomena. 
 
2.2.4.3 What of Self-made fortunes? 
 
A primary objective of this thesis is to study the emergence of individuals and family 
dynasties that have amassed great fortunes, embedding them at the very apex of the 
wealth distribution. However, the aforementioned theories fail to account well for the 
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phenomena of the self-made ultra-rich (Davies and Shorrocks, 1999). These drawbacks 
manifest themselves in two ways. Firstly, bequest motives go beyond utility for terminal 
wealth or even for the survival of a dynasty for which current dynastic models and 
LCMs are inadequately equipped to analyse. Secondly, current theories cannot point to 
why large fortunes arise in the first place. Davies and Shorrocks (1999) argue that such 
an explanation must contain elements that incorporate entrepreneurial risk, dynastic 
considerations and institutional influences.  
 
Section 2.3 below devotes considerable space and attention to both early theoretical 
studies directed at understanding great fortunes and contemporary empirics in this 
domain. In the spirit of Piketty’s (2014a) call for a broader sociological attempt at 
understanding wealth, as emphasised in section 2.2.2, studies from the wider domain of 
the social sciences and political economy are also considered. For example, the ideas 
proposed by elite theory are reviewed as they can potentially shed some like on issues 
of wealth, power, and economic policy in general. 
 
2.3 Review of Scholarship on the Rich 
 
2.3.1 Theoretical Studies of the Rich 
2.3.1.1 Early Theoretical Approaches 
 
The absence of easily accessible data was not a deterrent to the classical political 
economists, whose spirit the present study follows. Perhaps the first to focus purely on 
the rich or wealthy as a sui generis was Richard Jones’ (1831) An Essay on the 
Distribution of Wealth. Jones’ study systematically sought to establish and categorise 
the system of rent or profit and how it differed across the globe during the early 1800s. 
Its significance for this thesis resides in the application of an inductive approach to 
understanding the interdependence of economy and society in producing the prevailing 
wealth distribution. In this approach, as described by Rashid (1979), the ‘primary 
concern was to try and extract some generally valid proposition from a study of facts, 
and then try and extrapolate, however cautiously, into the future’ (p. 166). Jones (1831) 
developed several key insights, including the centrality of both technological progress 
and the dissemination of knowledge in guiding wealth accumulation in some 
circumstances. Further, Jones (1831) made clear distinctions between social groups that 
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would point to significant differentiation between the organisation of societies and the 
way wealth is ultimately distributed according to law or custom.  
 
At the core of Jones’ (1831) approach was the accumulation of facts and observations 
from which universal or general propositions could be developed. This was very much 
in the tradition of Bacon’s inductionism that was found useful in biology and 
astronomy. Induction is defined as a process whereby one can ‘construct general 
propositions themselves from the contemplation of particulars, and attribute to them a 
universality which experience is incapable of warranting’ (Herschel, 1841, p. 193). 
Although Jones (1831) was not wholly against deduction in economics, often applying 
concepts such as diminishing returns and selfish man to analyse rent and wealth 
associated with British capitalism, he attributed more influence to institutional forces, 
particularly among despotic-type regimes that dominated the international system at the 
time (Rashid, 1979). 
 
In today’s parlance, Jones (1831) could be classified as an intuitionalist or of the 
historical school. The intuitionalist school of economics has typically been most open to 
examining the rich and wealthy. An early American intuitionalist, Commons (1893), 
sought to construct a theory of wealth distribution based upon the integration of legal 
and economic theory. Much like Jones (1831), Commons’ (1893) work suffered a 
legacy of scholarly neglect, largely due to the socialist radical tendencies perceived in 
his thesis by his peers (Häring & Douglas, 2012). 
 
Another work that has been neglected by both past and contemporary scholars is that of 
Watkins (1907), who drew upon legal, technological and even geographical concepts as 
the defining characteristics that gave rise to the great fortunes of the Gilded Age during 
the late 1800s and early 1900s. Watkins’s (1907) thesis remains highly relevant in its 
analysis and effectively foreshadows many of the key forces that are in play today. 
Watkins (1907) was concerned with the rise in the wealth of the Gilded Age 
entrepreneurs, or the Robber Barons, as they were later labelled by Josephson (2013), 
who presided over vast fortunes in an era not dissimilar to today in terms of both the 
rate of accumulation and the prevalence of technological development and economic 
shocks. Rockoff (2012) argues that many of the large infrastructure and energy changes 
(rail and oil) reflect the technological revolutions of today in transportation, 
communications, and energy.  
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Further, much like our era, Watkins (1907) viewed four primary forces as fostering the 
growth of great fortunes during the Gilded Age. Firstly, technological advancements in 
manufacturing ensured that corporations achieved unprecedented economies of scale. 
Secondly, the logistics behind commerce were revolutionised with the expansion of a 
vast railway network straddling the US, which created a market scale hitherto 
unattainable. For example, large meatworks in Chicago could quickly transport their 
cargo to the eastern US, leading to the emergence of the meat tycoons (Rockoff, 2012). 
The wealth of the oil tycoons John D. Rockefeller and his brother William Rockefeller, 
at Standard Oil, was only achieved by the vast railroad infrastructure built by the likes 
of Jay Gould, Jim Fisk and Russell Sage (Rockoff, 2012). Similarly, the fortune 
established by Henry Ford required the efficiency of the combustion engine that relied 
on oil for the automobiles, the transportation of vast materials to the Highland Park 
Ford Plant and the implementation of other nascent engineering technologies to enable 
the functioning of the first mass assembly plant (Bradley, 1999). Thirdly, the rise of 
what Watkins (1907, p. 15) terms ‘abstract property’, such as equities and bonds, 
facilitated the rapid capitalisation of entrepreneurs. For some modern scholars, this is 
the primary mechanism for rapid wealth accumulation (Thurow, 1975). Fourthly, 
Watkins (1907) viewed the process of urbanisation in the US as a further catalyst to 
rapid and large wealth accumulation, creating larger markets and the growth of property 
barons. The second and fourth points echo the theoretical and deductive argument by 
Rosen (1981) that the sheer scale of large cities results in a greater probability that 
extraordinary wealth will be created, given the ability to reach a large audience in a 
geographically concentrated area.  
 
Ultimately, however, Watkins (1907) appears to explain the rise of an ultra-rich 
economic class based on an underlying belief in institutions and the limited role of 
individual agency. That is, there is little room for either personal talent or natural 
endowment in explaining the existence of large wealth stocks into few hands. 
Behavioural or personality explanations are rejected for their lack of precision, as 
Watkins (1907) argues: 
 
A postulate of any scientific theory of the causes of large fortunes is that those 
causes are impersonal. That is, they must be such as permit of being made the 
basis of generalisations. ‘Pull’ and privilege are not such. Neither can the 
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causes of the change in the degree of development of riches lie in human 
nature or in inequality of natural endowment. (p. 5) 
 
This rejection of the ‘inequality of natural endowment’ is heavily opposed, too, in 
contemporary literature that has sought to explain wealth accumulation and inequality 
through a ‘plethora of capitals’ (Hodgson, 2014, p. 12).  
 
Although Watkins (1907) identified many relevant elements of wealth accumulation 
amongst the wealthy, his approach neglected or dismissed many key aspects of wealth 
accumulation. Of note is the rejection of privilege in sustaining large fortunes in the 
afore quoted passage from Watkins (1907, p. 5). The dismissal of inheritance or 
privilege may not be tenable in many parts of the world today and particularly not 
during Watkins’ (1907) own era, with inheritance playing a major role in wealth 
accumulation in the 1800s France, for example (Daumard, 1980). Further, Watkins 
(1907) missed the potential of entrepreneurs to create markets in goods and services for 
which there was no pre-existing requirement. For example, Rubinstein (1980) points out 
that Rockefeller rose to great fortune by creating market demand for his oil in China by 
providing oil lanterns to the Chinese. Nevertheless, Watkins’s (1907) overall thesis 
remains highly relevant today.  
 
2.3.1.2 Contemporary Theoretical Approaches to the Ultra-Rich 
 
Contemporary theoretical scholarship on the ultra-rich is scarce as discussed in section 
2.2.4.3. Although there has been a tremendous amount of theoretical modelling 
regarding life cycle considerations or dynastic considerations, there is little that deals 
with large wealth holdings and entrepreneurial activity. Two important but contrasting 
works that do consider these issues are those of Rosen (1981) and Shorrocks (1988). 
Rosen (1981) sought to determine how a small number of individuals can come to 
dominate the distribution of wealth given small differences in ‘talent’ or ‘ability’ in 
their chosen fields of enterprise. A central prediction of Rosen is that the relative minor 
variation in the distribution of talent at the top of a given sector will translate into 
substantial differences in revenues. Empirically, Kaplan and Rauh (2013) base their 
explanation for the rise of the US Forbes 400 on the basis of Rosen’s (1981) theoretical 
framework. 
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An alternative approach is one that incorporates notions of risk, initial wealth and 
entrepreneurial activity. Shorrocks (1988) develops a model in which two kinds of 
entrepreneurs are considered, who both face different entrepreneurial opportunities 
depending on their respective initial stocks of wealth. Firstly, there are those 
entrepreneurs who need not possess significant initial wealth; only time is required to 
search out for opportunities that can provide significant rewards. The second class of 
entrepreneur is already a highly successful entrepreneur and also searches out 
opportunities for large rewards. However, these opportunities require substantial access 
to both time and substantial wealth holdings to access due to markedly different risk 
profiles of the opportunities presented. Shorrocks model predicts two results. Firstly, 
entrepreneurs with little initial wealth will target or specialise in ‘single’ risk 
opportunities. Secondly, entrepreneurs possessing high budgets will instead seek to 
engage in projects where risks can be diversified as much as possible and in conjunction 
with other wealthy individuals. Targeting such projects ensures the perpetuation of 
wealth and one’s status. According to Shorrocks (1988), ‘the model developed in this 
paper bears little resemblance to any previous study of wealth holdings’ (p. 242). As far 
as I am aware, no recent study on the billionaire class has considered this aspect of 
wealth generation and accumulation. In Chapter 6, Shorrocks’ predictions are 
considered in the context of self-made entrepreneurs.  
 
A potentially interesting extension of Shorrocks (1988) theory is the implication of 
inheritance for the type of commercial and financial activities estate beneficiaries will 
engage in. A logical extension of Shorrocks’ (1988) is to argue that inheritance 
beneficiaries (in relation to billionaires) will also diversify their risks as much as 
possible just like self-made entrepreneurs with high wealth stocks. This might have 
macroeconomic implications. Standard financial economic theory would posit that with 
greater diversification, the risk premium would reduce. Piketty (2014a) and Piketty and 
Saez (2014) have shown that returns have fallen since the 1960s. In Chapter 3 and 
Chapter 6 the linkage between entrepreneurialism, risk and returns and inheritance are 
all considered.  
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2.3.1.3 Sociological Explorations of the Ultra-Rich 
 
Throughout the 1960s, several scholars tackled the issue of extreme wealth holdings 
from a sociological perspective. Lundberg (1969), in an eclectic exploration, argues that 
the rise of the ultra-rich in an economy is best viewed through the prism of a 
sociological theory such as elite theory. Following Lorenzian thought, Lundberg (1969) 
argues that society always produces and maintains an elite class who maintains 
substantial control over society’s resources and culture. Interestingly, he argues that the 
rich of the 1960s in the capitalist world were largely an evolution of the barons of the 
feudal system of the Middle Ages, who lorded over both land and peasants. This was a 
major departure from classical economists such as Jones (1831), Marx (1981) and 
Watkins (1907), who viewed capitalist wealth as distinct in both nature and source and 
possessing substantially different dynamics from the landed feudalist system that 
dominated Europe’s economic system prior to the Industrial Revolution. Moreover, 
Lundberg (1969) also argues that the existence of an economic elite is a natural 
outcome in any economic system not just in a capitalist system. Indeed, in the Soviet 
Union the emergence of the nomenklatura from the Stalinist era could be viewed as 
being the equivalent of Western elite establishments (Hosking, 1985).  
 
The issue of whether the emergence of economic elites is a natural outcome of any 
economic system has received attention in contemporary writings. Figueroa (2008) 
develops a simple model of how the economic elite maintains their position at the apex 
of society. The theory proposed by Figueroa predicts that, as the social equivalent of the 
economic monopolist that erects barriers to entry into an industry, the economic elite 
restrict entry to the highest echelons of the social milieu where economic power is held 
and wielded with considerable influence. How such barriers are erected is not made 
clear, but Figueroa (2008) uncovers empirical evidence that the Peruvian economic elite 
maintains a degree of control over who is admitted into their ranks. To an extent, 
Figueroa’s (2008) thesis echoes Shorrocks (1988) who argues that there are investments 
or projects that an economic elite are only able to access given the risks associated with 
those projects.  
 
Bodley (1999) argues, from an anthropological perspective, that economic growth is an 
elite-directed process. The elite undertakes economic growth only so long as it provides 
continuously increasing returns to them. The fundamental assumption of elite theorists 
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is that with increasing scale in any setting (e.g. market size, population or government), 
economic power tends to become more and more concentrated in the hands of the elite. 
The emergence of the elite is a natural outcome in any type of economic system, no 
matter how objectionable such a conclusion is. For example, Bodley (1999) refers to 
how property owners in the US assume greater roles in municipal governments, which 
encourages further growth and inevitably results in greater wealth for the elite, and the 
cycle continues. 
 
The argument that there always is an elite, particularly in settings where there is a large 
subordinate population is reminiscent of the randomness or luck hypothesis outlined 
briefly in section 2.2.4.2.9 
 
2.3.2 Contemporary Empirical Studies of Wealth 
 
The lack of a well-developed theoretical framework has not precluded fruitful empirical 
studies on the issue of where and how great wealth is generated. Such studies being 
highly relevant in the context of Piketty’s (2014a, 2014b) notion of the 
multidimensional nature of capital and wealth. Piketty (2014a) devotes significant time 
and effort to detail how aggregate national wealth has at times tended to be concentrated 
in a few areas. For example, the modern-day oil based kingdoms of the Middle East, or 
the rise of financial capital in the UK and the US, all illustrate this multidimensional 
nature of wealth. It is, therefore, highly relevant to review the literature on modern 
riches which particularly focus on the industrial sources of wealth. 
 
Canterbery and Nosari (1985) explore the determinants of “super wealth” among 
America’s Forbes 400, employing a cross-sectional regression framework to construct a 
model with various personal and economic variables. At the personal level, they find 
that age and inheritance are positively correlated with larger wealth levels in agreement 
                                                
9 It is worthwhile to emphasise, at this juncture, as to what is meant by an elite and elite theory in general. 
Contemporary elite theory defines “elites” as individuals who control real or symbolic resources, 
occupying key positions and relate to each other through power networks (Yamokoski and Dubrow, 
2008). Thus, power represents the central element of elite theory.  López (2013) argues that this is not 
very distant from Marxists conceptions of the capitalist class. Indeed, numerous Marxists have utilised 
elite theory themselves, including Mills (1956) and Domhoff (1967). However, it should be noted that 
elite theory is very much opposed to social class theory. The divergence in the two schools of thought 
was exemplified in the debates between structural Marxism and instrumental Marxism surrounding the 
nature of the state (Poulantzas and Miliband, 1972). 
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with both dynastic models and the LCM discussed in section 2.2.4.2. In terms of the 
industrial sources of great fortunes, they find that wealth is typically made in oil and 
shipping (Canterbery & Nosari, 1985). Contrary to previous eras (see Rockoff, 2012; 
Watkins, 1907) in the US, they do not find any significant wealth being generated in 
real estate. However, Canterbery and Nosari’s (1985) study just focuses on one year, 
1982, which means their model cannot capture by construction the dynamics of the 
economy over time and where a different time period may yield different findings as 
Piketty (2014a) emphasises. For example, Blitz and Siegfried (1992) examine the 
Forbes 400 for 1986 and find that most wealth is generated in oil, wholesale trade and 
property. Given the small time difference between these two studies, it is surprising to 
see how much of a greater role real estate has in generating wealth as observed in Blitz 
and Siegfried’s (1992) study, which highlights the importance of adopting a panel 
framework when exploring issues related to extreme wealth. Studies on the Gilded Age, 
however, have also found a significant surge of wealth generation in real estate during 
relatively short time frames (Watkins, 1907). 
 
Similar studies have been conducted for the rest of the Anglo-Saxon world. Siegfried 
and Round (1994) explore the sources of great wealth in Australia using the Business 
Review Weekly’s rich list, and find that new wealth was largely made and concentrated 
in finance, property development, and retail and wholesale trade in the 1980s. 
Australia’s rich typically have reflected the areas in which the country has been able to 
gain the greatest scale. For example, most of the ‘old wealth’ was generated in 
agriculture and manufacturing. Unsurprisingly, Siegfried and Round (1994) find that the 
majority of new wealth appears to be generated in competitive industries. On this basis, 
they argue that risk and uncertainty, returns to business acumen and strategic resources, 
and market dis-equilibria are the main drivers of great wealth generation, a finding that 
reflects Thurow’s (1975) thesis of the centrality of efficient markets.  
 
Stilwell and Ansari (2003) also examine Australia’s wealthy utilising the Business 
Review Weekly’s rich list for the years 1993 to 2003. They focus on three questions: to 
what extent has wealth at the pinnacle of the wealth pyramid increased; to what extent 
has the entry into the ranks of the wealthy been elevated; and what are the economic 
activities that have permitted the concomitant concentration of wealth? Much like 
Siegfried and Round (1994), Stilwell and Ansari (2003) find that retail, investments and 
property are the greatest wealth generators. Significantly, mining and resources are not 
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listed in their study. This provides a striking juxtaposition with the results in Chapter 6 
of this thesis, where mining magnates dominate the total wealth share and further 
illustrates the dynamic and stochastic nature of the creation and destruction of wealth. 
In addition, Stilwell and Ansari (2003) highlight the increased patrimonial nature of 
wealth accumulation at the time, observing that ‘6 out of the 10 wealthiest people in 
2003 attained a substantial basis for their affluence through inheritance: the comparable 
figure in 1993 was 4 out of 10’ (p. 151). Foreshadowing recent scholarship, Stilwell and 
Ansari (2003) also emphasise the role of financial assets in wealth accumulation, as 
‘share ownership is much more concentrated, with a staggering 86% being held by the 
wealthiest 10 per cent of families’ (pp. 154-155). Ownership of other assets (cash, 
business assets and rental properties) are also high, averaging in the 50 percentile range 
(Ansari & Stilwell, p. 155).  
 
The centrality of real estate and/or banking and finance is further reflected in the UK, 
where Siegfried and Roberts (1991) find that these sectors provided the greatest source 
of extreme wealth. Furthermore, they observe that where great wealth is found, most of 
it is concentrated in competitive industries and not in industries that can be classified as 
either oligopolistic or monopolistic by economists. Siegfried and Roberts (1991) find 
this surprising, as they assert that in the absence of barriers, new entrants should rapidly 
remove any dis-equilibria and restrict the number of wealthy.  
 
Hazledine and Siegfried (1997), who examine how New Zealand’s wealthy became so 
rich, also establish an empirical regularity: most wealth is made in property and finance. 
They also find the appearance of great wealth in industries that are characterised by 
intense competition which they concluded represents a paradox, as the greatest wealth 
was expected to exist in monopoly industries. However, the extent to which this is an 
empirical paradox has been challenged by, for example, Waldman (1991), who 
contends that, if anything, such extreme wealth is a natural consequence of capitalism 
and its associated stochastic nature.  
 
Other works have adopted a purely historical perspective but also consider the sources 
of wealth in a similar vein to the contemporary studies reviewed above. These 
historically focused studies analyse the 1800s in Europe or the Gilded Age of the US 
and utilising contemporary estate data, journalistic wealth lists or news media sources to 
analyse the sources of great fortunes. Rubinstein (1980) explores the social and 
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demographic characteristics of the rich in Britain at the turn of the eighteenth century, 
utilising estate data. For Rubinstein (1980), the defining characteristic of British wealth 
was the concentration of the rich in finance and property, and the absence of inheritance 
beneficiaries. Furthermore, there was a lack of wealthy industrialists in Britain, despite 
the technological, economic and social changes wrought by the Industrial Revolution. 
Rockoff (2012) explores the sources of wealth in the US during the late 1800s and 
discovers that finance and property again were the main engines of wealth growth. In 
contrast to the Anglo countries of the US and the UK, Daumard (1980) explores the 
wealth distribution of France in the 1800s and finds that wealth typically was 
patrimonial in nature.  
 
2.4 Summary 
 
To summarise, the nature of wealth and how it has been approached in economic 
discourse has changed substantially. The definition of wealth as proposed by Piketty 
(2014a) recognises the monetary and marketable value of all assets. This significantly 
differs from economists who have sought to focus on a limited notion of productive 
capital.  
 
Although contemporary mainstream economists ignored the study of wealth, there is a 
small strand from the early political economists to today that have tackled the issue 
from various frameworks and perspectives. Modern scholarship has developed wealth 
accumulation models which can be used to model a) the process of wealth accumulation 
across all individuals; and b) to produce a predicted distribution of wealth which have 
shown to closely mimic Pareto distributions observed in reality. Broadly, these wealth 
accumulation models fall into three broad categories, the Life Cycle Models, the 
dynastic models of wealth accumulation and the dynamic multiplicative random shock 
models. The latter provide the most applicability but are bereft in content as to what 
shocks are necessary to model wealth accumulation. The models stand in contrast to 
capital accumulation models that are macroeconomic in their focus and have typically 
been concerned with the distribution of income on economic growth. Despite the 
divergence in theoretical approaches, it was posited that Piketty (2014a) largely 
represents an attempt to bridge the different conceptual frameworks. 
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Studies that focus on the ultra-rich rather than the whole distribution have considered 
different questions and adopted different approaches to the deductive methods. An 
inductive approach was often utilised, seeking to situate the rise of great fortunes in 
sociological, political or technological change and transformation. For early political 
economists, such as Jones (1831), Commons (1893) and Watkins (1907), the main 
elements giving rise to great wealth included: 
 
• Social ordering and customs (Commons, 1893; Jones, 1831); 
• Rise of finance and the separation of management and control (Watkins, 1907); 
• Technological shocks (Jones, 1831; Watkins, 1907); and 
• The rise of the capitalist system over the feudal system (Watkins, 1907). 
 
Elite theory, which emerged in the 1950s and 1960s significantly departed from the 
classical political economy in two ways. Firstly, the emergence of an economic elite is a 
given in any economic system, with little differentiation between the feudal era and 
modern capitalism. The rise of an elite can be subsumed under a stochastic process 
hypothesis. Secondly, the economic elite direct economic growth only as far as it 
benefits them.  
 
Modern empiricism has focused on the sources of contemporary fortunes. Various 
explanations have been proposed for the rise of great fortunes. At the core of these 
studies though is the view that the industrial sources of great fortunes have an important 
explanatory role in understanding why the ultra-rich exist. These approaches echo 
Piketty’s (2014a) view that the history of capital or wealth is not homogenous in nature. 
Rather, it is a history of alternative forms of wealth, manifested in different industries or 
sectors of the economy, be it financial wealth, property, or oil capital. Further, modern 
empiricism views market efficiency, and abnormal returns to risk as important elements 
in the attainment of vast fortunes. Society, law and custom have little role in the growth 
of large fortunes in most modern empirical literature sans Piketty (2014a). 
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Chapter 3 Trends in Wealth and the Rise of the 
Billionaire  
 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide a description of the primary data and trends 
used in this thesis in relation to a study of the ultra-rich in the contemporary world. We 
begin by providing a preliminary overview of the data sources employed in the 
construction of a global billionaire database. To complement the latter, we also use 
various other data sources on income distribution and wealth and highlight some 
limitations regarding the data sources employed. Secondly, a general overview of the 
contemporary trends and patterns in the globe’s billionaire population is presented. 
These trends are nestled against the backdrop of aggregate wealth-income ratios for 
several advanced economies for which data is available. These trends and patterns are 
viewed through the prism of various characteristics at a global and regional level and at 
the sectoral and demographic intersection. 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter examines the trends in the accumulation of vast fortunes over the period 
1990 to 2013, focusing on individuals or families with an estimated net worth of USD1 
billion. As the title of the thesis suggests, many have claimed that the rise of great 
fortunes in our epoch reflects the process that was observed in the late 1800s and early 
1900s in the US. Much like our era, the Gilded Age was characterised by rapid income 
growth, rising inequality and the sudden onset of vast fortunes, and economic crises 
(Rockoff, 2012). This chapter details the rise of vast contemporary fortunes across the 
globe, hypothesise why some nations have been the more prolific in wealth creation, 
discusses the impact of the Global Financial Crisis on wealth creation and finally 
examines the extent to which inheritance represents a source of great fortune amongst 
the world’s economic elite.
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The analysis is based on lists of the world’s billionaires published between 1990 and 
2013. This is by no means the first study to use these lists, with recent examples 
including Saez and Zucman (2014), Cagetti and De Nardi (2006), Kopczuk and Saez 
(2004), and Klevmarken, Lupton and Stafford (2003). The present chapter builds on 
these works by extending the sample range and adding detailed information on the 
sectoral sources, by the application of the GICS classifications, of wealth and the extent 
of inheritance pervading the data. 
 
This chapter is divided into six sections. Section 3.2 discuss the methodology and 
database construction. Unlike previous studies, a regression framework is not adopted; 
rather, the data is directly analysed. Section 3.3 analyses the aggregate trends in wealth 
accumulation, including wealth to income ratios and the concomitant rise of the 
billionaires. Section 3.4 presents a regional breakdown of wealth accumulation in both 
developed and developing regions of the world. Section 3.5 presents data on the 
evolution of inheritance versus self-made wealth across time and space. Section 3.6 
summarises the main points of the chapter. 
 
3.2 Methodology and Data 
3.2.1 Analysing Trends and Assigning Causality 
 
Both Chapters 4 and 6 explore where current wealth came from and how it is being 
sustained among the advanced economies of the world. The Forbes data provides a 
starting point for establishing names, ages, industries and countries to construct a 
historical typology of the economic and political forces at play.  
 
In this chapter, enumeration plays an important role for detecting or signalling areas of 
systematic difference within a region or across regions, while the personal business 
histories provide the framework for developing generalisations across time and space. 
This approach is aligned with the works of Rockoff (2012) and Kaplan and Rauh 
(2013). Similarly, Jones (1831) argues that careful accumulation of historical facts is 
essential before the production of generalisations with regard to wealth can be made. In 
general, econometric analysis is kept to a minimum and utilised only to establish inter- 
and intra-regional differences based on various underlying drivers throughout chapter 3, 
4 and 6. One-way ANOVA tests are employed along with relevant post-hoc tests to 
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establish the key areas of differentiation between different regions or industries if 
necessary. 
 
A major problem with using such historical data is the risk of generalising from 
intuition (Jaher, 1980). To address this problem, the collective biography attempted here 
is guided by theoretical or conceptual rationales from past literature. Conceptually, the 
framework to analyse wealth borrows heavily from Piketty (2014a), Jones (1831), 
Watson (1907), Rubinstein (1980), and Shorrocks (1988). For example, technological 
shocks, government fiscal policy, rules on corporate governance and the benefits of 
diversification are sound economic ideas and theories utilised in this study to establish 
the key markers of differentiation in wealth generation across the globe, including: How 
is wealth made? Where was it made? When were the large fortunes first amassed? Is 
wealth creation being sustained?  
 
3.2.2 Constructing the Billionaires Database 
 
An immediate handicap encountered by any study of the state of extreme wealth is the 
scarcity of accessible and relevant sources. Broadly, the researcher has four sources 
from which to examine the upper tail of the wealth distribution: 1) journalistic lists of 
the rich, 2) wealth tax data, 3) estate data, and 4) investment income data. Of these, 
Davies and Shorrocks (2000) conclude ‘estate and wealth tax data probably yield more 
reliable information on the upper tail of the distribution’ (p. 605). This presents two 
problems for this study. Firstly, this study is concerned with the distribution of extreme 
wealth across both geography and industries. Wealth data is limited to those nations that 
have a wealth tax, and those with wealth taxes do not necessarily have the same 
definition of what constitutes wealth for taxable purposes (Atkinson, 2006). In addition, 
tax evasion or avoidance substantially plagues this type of data set (Atkinson, 2006; 
Spånt, 1987). Secondly, estate data does not reflect the contemporaneous evolution of 
industry dynamics in the present epoch analysed here. For example, to capture the 
source and evolution of Mark Zuckerberg’s or Sergey Brin’s net worth, one would have 
to wait until after their deaths. An impractical solution given the ages of these two 
Internet entrepreneurs. Furthermore, estate data typically neglects wealth tied up in 
large trust funds, which are often the favoured investment vehicle of the super-rich for 
concealing their net worth from the tax system (Lundberg, 1969).  
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In this chapter, we employ the Forbes World Rich List to generate a time and 
geographical distribution of wealth. Here we are mainly interested in the qualitative 
aspects of wealthy individuals rather than the recorded wealth figures per se.10 The 
study incorporates data on individuals from 1990 through to 2013, although the Forbes 
data only started including point estimates on individual wealth from 1996, which is 
when most quantitative studies begin (see Neumayer, 2004; Sanandaji & Leeson, 2013; 
Torgler & Piatti, 2013). Journalistic ‘rich lists’ have been utilised by a few prior studies. 
For Australia, Siegfried and Round (1994) utilise the Business Review Weekly Rich List, 
and for the UK, Siegfried and Roberts (1991) use the Sunday Times Rich List. 
Neumayer’s (2004) sample is restricted to a three-year period (2001, 2002, and 2003), 
while Torgler and Piatti’s (2013) sample covers 1996 through to 2003. In both 
instances, the lists were used in an econometric exercise where the number of 
billionaires recorded in each country was the dependent variable.  
 
The first Forbes world billionaire list was published on the 5th October, 1987, listing 
140 billionaires with an aggregate net worth of USD295 billion. The wealthiest person 
recorded on this list was Yoshiaki Tsutsumi, with an estimated net worth of USD20 
billion. His wealth was generated by inheriting the control of his father’s industrial 
conglomerate, Seibu Corporation, which had various business interests in tourism, 
railroads and finance (Downer, 1994). As of 2013, there were over 1,400 individuals on 
the list from across the globe. Forbes sources its data from both public and private 
sources some of which remain anonymous. This data is then used to construct a picture 
of individual wealth holdings. Although Forbes may go directly to the source, 
anonymous lawyers, financial advisors and accountants close to the listed individuals 
are often contacted (Kroll, 2014). 
 
Despite having access to the rich and their close associates, Forbes is compelled to 
follow certain valuation rules in instances where sources are not forthcoming 
(Canterbery & Nosari, 1985). Valuation of privately listed companies, which is often 
the case with the individuals in these lists, proves problematic. In the case of privately 
held business concerns, the firms are valued by estimating revenues and combining 
                                                
10 Estimates of wealth are intermittently utilised throughout Chapter 3 and Chapter 6. However, a 
significant caveat in the use of media sourced data is the accuracy of journalists’ wealth estimates. It is 
for this reason that reliance on these wealth figures are kept to a minimum. 
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them with price-to-earnings ratios of similar public companies (Kroll, 2014). For oil and 
gas companies, Forbes will often settle for placing a ‘fair estimate’ on oil reserves, for 
example. The worth of television networks or stations, which are not listed on a stock 
exchange, ‘is evaluated by reputable media brokers’ (Canterbery & Nosari, 1985, p. 
1056).  
 
Although this data set has been used successfully in the past, there are limitations 
associated with its use. Atkinson (2006) argues that liabilities often are not discovered, 
which artificially raises the net worth of some individuals. For example, the UK 
publishing mogul Robert Maxwell revealed extraordinary debts in the early 1990s that, 
in real terms, transformed him from a billionaire into a penniless pauper (Cohen, 1991; 
Wearing, 2005). 
 
A further problem with the Forbes list is in dealings with wealthy dynastic families 
such as the Rothschild and Rockefeller families. Although aggregate family wealth is 
often large, the Forbes lists focus mainly on individuals and, at most, the nuclear 
family. When business interests diverge significantly, as in the case of two siblings, 
they are counted as separate wealth holdings. For example, the brothers Karl and Theo 
Albrecht own and operate ALDI Sud and ALDI Nord, respectively. Due to the 
independence of the two business operations, Forbes maintains a separate listing, 
despite both inheriting their wealth from their father. In contrast, the French fashion 
billionaires, Alain and Gerard Wertheimer, who maintain a controlling interest in 
Chanel, are listed jointly by Forbes and would be counted as one individual and not 
two. Further, in the case of large, wealthy dynasties, the wealth is often far too diffused 
among the extended family, and this diffusion leads to substantial opaqueness making it 
difficult to arrive at an overall valuation or, more importantly for this study’s purpose, 
individual enumeration (Goff, 2010; Kroll, 2014). Rather than recode and aggregate 
family dynasties to individuals, this study strictly follows the Forbes approach and does 
not make any changes. 
 
A further complication is the treatment of location. Forbes magazine records, at times, 
both the citizenship and the residence of the individual. Given that billionaires 
encounter few if any liquidity constraints to consumption, they typically leave their 
country of origin and find an abode in one of the cosmopolitan centres of the world. 
Roman Abramovich, for example, made his fortune in Russia via its vast gas resources 
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but is listed as a resident of the UK. While it may seem logical to code citizenship as the 
home state of an individual, this would be disingenuous in the instance of billionaires as 
location confers substantial advantages to the billionaire. Watkins (1907) argued that 
the wealthy of his age who moved to New York City possessed significant commercial 
advantages over the older agrarian wealthy, for example. In contemporary times, 
Beaverstock, Hubbard and Short (2004) document the rise of a trans-global rich elite 
who cluster in a few globalised cities and their subsequent enormous impact on the local 
populations, both in terms of generating economic activity as well as exacerbating 
inequalities. To simplify the analysis, the place of primary business interests is assumed 
to be the primary geographical identifier. In the case of large diversified holdings with 
income sources across the world, citizenship is assumed here as the identifier. 
 
Further problems present themselves in relation to the coding of inheritances. Firstly, 
Forbes has on occasion changed the source of wealth of an individual from inherited to 
self-made, without explanation. Secondly, there is the issue of whether one should 
encode the degree of inheritance received per some respecified relative level. Kaplan 
and Rauh (2013) attempt this by applying a weighted inheritance score across a range of 
scales. For example, if individuals inherited a small business and built it into a larger 
enterprise then they would provide a weighting of 1.5 compared to 1, which indicates 
the wealthy individual founded the business. A score of 2 would then equate to 
inheriting a large enterprise and so on. The problem with this approach is judging what 
constitutes a small or large inherited business. Given that many of these business span 
generations, and the international nature of the database would require subjectively 
determining what constituted a relatively small business in, for example, immediate 
post-war ravaged Germany compared to the US. Under this approach, the Koch brothers 
are not considered to have come from a privileged background, according to Kaplan and 
Rauh (2013). Regarding the first point, the Forbes data is used in this study only as a 
starting point in determining whether to classify an individual’s source of wealth as 
inherited or self-made. All individuals’ biographical information is examined to ensure 
accuracy. Regarding the second point, this study maintains a simple dichotomy between 
the two groups, following past scholarship (Rockoff, 2012; Canterbery & Nosari, 1985).  
 
Lastly, a major undertaking in constructing the billionaire database was to assign each 
individual over time a relevant GICS identifier code. The GICS system of industry 
codes provides a convenient and consistent means of assigning individual billionaires to 
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various industries or sectors over time. This is extremely important for two reasons. 
Firstly, Chapter 6 requires detailed records of the industrial sources of great wealth. The 
Forbes data does provide similar such information but in a far from rigorous and 
consistent fashion. There were numerous instances in the data where Forbes would, for 
example, in one year list an individual’s industry as “diversified investments” and in 
subsequent years switch this to “diversified conglomerate”. To ensure an accurate 
allocation of individuals to GICS sectors, each individual’s personal business history 
was examined over time and allocated a GICS sector accordingly. In total, the sample 
consisted of more than 1,400 individuals over 30 years.  
 
In addition to the journalistic rich lists that play a critical role in quantifying and 
enumerating the billionaires of the world, the nature and approach of the study requires 
substantial use of both primary and secondary sources of information on individuals. 
Historical news articles, interviews and, where available, government reports, provide 
much of the evidence and context for developing the key themes throughout Chapters 5 
and 6. For example, although the Forbes list demonstrates a high proportion of 
inheritances in each region, it does not and cannot provide context as to why inheritance 
should constitute the main source of wealth in a given region. 
 
3.2.3 Macroeconomic Data on Wealth and Income Distribution 
 
The rise of the global rich is ultimately a product of purely economic phenomena. In 
Chapter 4, the amassment of great fortunes is analysed in the broader context of the 
dynamics wealth accumulation. Adopting such an approach requires the use of various 
data sources from various advanced economies. These data sources are varied, but 
include data on income shares, after-tax incomes shares, the structure of income (capital 
versus labour) and savings and consumption data. 
 
The main data source relied upon to this end is the World Wealth and Income Database 
(WWID) (Alvaredo, Atkinson, Piketty, Saez, and Zucman, 2015). The WWID is a 
database constructed from an accumulation and synthesis of several succeeding studies. 
The utility of the database is particularly apparent regarding the use of estimates in 
relation to income shares. In general, the income statistics are based upon income tax 
data rather than household surveys which are used by, for example, the Luxembourg 
Income Study (n.d.). The advantage of income tax approach of WWID is in furnishing 
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the researcher with longer estimates of income shares. In contrast, household surveys 
may only be undertaken every few years. 
 
The database is significant in scope and scale covering thirty-one countries. Despite the 
scale of the database, the analysis using this data is restricted to seven countries: 
Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Japan, the UK, and the US. Latin America is also 
considered, but with the caveat that data availability is very limited. In addition, some 
countries may simply be missing from the WWID. Brazil is one such example despite 
some recent studies appearing. The analysis is largely restricted due to the length of 
time series available and the availability of data for various percentiles and the structure 
of income. Despite having the most coverage, there are numerous gaps in what data is 
available for these countries. Table 3.1 summarises what type of data is available and 
what years are used in the study by country.  
 
Table 3.1 Income shares availability, World Wealth and Income Database 
  Top 1% Top 0.1% Top 0.01% 
Income 
Structure 
Australia 1960-2010 1960-2010 1960-76, 1985-98 Yes - partly 
Canada 1960-2000 1960-2000 1960-2000 Yes 
France 1960-2010 1960-2006 1960-2006 Yes 
Germany 1961,'65,'68,'71,'74,'77, 
'80,'83,'86, '89,'92,'95, 
'98,2001-'08 
1961,'65,'68,'71,'74,'77, 
'80,'83,'86, '89,'92,'95, 
'98,2001-'08 
1961,'65,'68,'71,'74,'77, 
'80,'83,'86, '89,'92,'95, 
'98,2001-'08 
Not 
available 
Japan 1960-2010 1960-2010 1960-2010 Yes - partly 
UK 1960, 1962-'79, 1981-
2007, 2009-'10 
1960, 1962-'79, 1981-'86, 
1993-2007, 2009-'10 
1960, 1962-'79 Not 
available 
US 1960-2010 1960-2010 1960-2010 Yes - partly 
Argentina 1997-2004  
Not 
available 
Colombia 
1993-2010  
Not 
available 
Uruguay 
2009-2012   
Not 
available 
Source: For all the countries in Table 3.1, the income share data was obtained from the World Wealth and 
Income Database (Alvaredo, Atkinson, Piketty, Saez, and Zucman, 2015). The data is accessible from 
http://www.wid.com/ 
  
In addition to the income statistics above, a wealth of data on taxation, consumption, 
savings, and debt were gathered from various statistical bodies across the globe. An 
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inherent problem in this data gathering process is that the data is not strictly comparable 
across countries due to substantial variation in what is recorded. For example, wealth 
may be defined differently. Alternatively, a common base such as wealth or income data 
on a given percentile might be missing, making direct comparisons on a certain factor, 
such as debt, across countries problematic.  
 
3.3 Exploring the Global Rich 
 
This subsection develops the empirical context for the subsequent chapters. It seeks to 
emphasise the growth of the number of billionaires within the context of a “wealthier” 
world. The reasons for the rise of accumulated wealth and the wealthy is then 
considered in subsequent chapters. 
 
3.3.1 Comparison of Wealth-Income Ratios Across Advanced Economies 
 
To set the context and differentiate the 1990s and 2000s versus the 1960s and 1970s, a 
broad overview of wealth accumulation is presented across advanced economies.  
 
Table 3.2 presents the aggregate ratio of wealth to national income across the major 
industrialised economies between 1960 and 2010, as estimated by Piketty and Zucman 
(2014a). The wealth to income ratio is a measure of the extent that wealth has 
accumulated relative to income and in effect represents a measure of wealth deepening. 
In addition, it provides the means to directly measure the extent to which the 
accumulation of wealth has increased over time and across countries (Saez and Piketty, 
2014).  
 
In aggregate, there is an overall upward trend in wealth to income ratios since the 
1960s. Overall, the mean wealth-income ratio is 3.729x (σ=0.995), although there has 
been substantial variation across decades. Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, the mean 
wealth to income ratio was averaging 3.011x to 3.068x, but a marked increase is 
observed during the 1990s when it rose by over 32.4% from the 1970s to 4.064x in the 
1990s. In the subsequent decade, 2000 to 2010, the wealth to income ratio further 
increased to 4.676x.  
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Table 3.2 Mean wealth to income ratios of advanced economies by decade 
Decade 
Wealth-
income ratio 
  
1960 - 69 3.011x 
1970 - 79 3.068x 
1980 - 89 3.528x 
1990 - 99 4.064x 
2000 - 10 4.670x 
Source: Piketty and Zucman (2014b). 
 
Which countries have driven the substantial increases in the wealth-income ratio? 
Figure 3.1 illustrates the trends across the seven industrialised countries of interest. The 
highest observed wealth-income ratio is observed in Japan in 1990, which coincides 
with that country’s property boom high. It is also the year when Japan dominated the 
global rich lists, with the two richest men of 1990 being Yoshiaki Tsutsumi (net worth 
of USD16 billion) and Taikichiro Mori (net worth of USD14.6 billion). This follows a 
precipitous increase throughout the 1980s in Japan’s wealth to income ratio. In 1979, 
Japan’s wealth to income ratio was 4.057x, the highest in the world at the time. 
However, by 1985 it reached 4.864x and peaked at 6.985x in 1990, an increase of 
approximately 72.2%. It then decreased to 6.073x in the 1990s and to 5.876x from 2000 
to 2010. The rapid wealth accumulation in the 1980s in Japan is not observed in every 
country. In Germany, a much more stable and slow growth pattern is observed. Its 
lowest wealth to income ratio was 1.723x in 1960, averaging 2.093x over the 1960s 
compared to the global average of 3.011x. It then grew at an average of 1.79% to 
3.135x in the 1990s, converging with global averages, and reaching 3.798x over 2000 to 
2010. 
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Figure 3.1 Wealth to income ratios of advanced economies, 1960-2010 
Source: Piketty and Zucman (2014b) 
 
The striking differences between the two former Axis powers after the Second World 
War reflect the dynamics of wealth accumulation in this era. It can be argued that the 
high values of wealth observed in Japan are tied to its real estate boom in the 1980s, and 
the subsequent collapse in property values reflects the trend observed in Figure 3.1. 
However, notwithstanding the decline in its wealth to income ratios in the 1990s and 
2000s, Japan still averages far above the ratios estimated for Germany. Germany did not 
experience a property boom during this period, but the divergence between the two 
nations may attest to substantial industrial or institutional differentiation affecting the 
manner and rate through which wealth might be accumulated. For example, Germany’s 
high rates of housing rent and rental price controls may have significantly reduced the 
degree of wealth accumulation. Moreover, the variance in the wealth to income ratios 
may partly be attributable to systematic differences in the policies of the Allied 
occupying forces towards commercial and industrial interests in the immediate post-war 
period. This is further explored and discussed in Chapter 6. 
 
The heterogeneity in wealth to income ratios is not restricted to vast physical or cultural 
distances, as demonstrated by the experience across the Rhine River, where France 
differs substantially from Germany. Starting from a relatively low mean of 2.7973x for 
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the 1960s, France’s wealth to income ratio barely averaged beyond 3 (mean of 3.039x 
over 1960 to 1989). Only in the late 1990s is a precipitous increase observed. By 2000, 
the ratio was 3.757x and by 2010 it had increased exponentially to 5.746x (compared to 
3.798x in Germany), equating to an annual growth rate of 4.38% compared to -0.0948% 
between 1960 and 1999. 
 
In contrast to the significant heterogeneity observed between the continental European 
powerhouses of Germany and France, and that of Japan, the economies of the Anglo- 
Saxon world tend to exhibit similar trends in their wealth to income ratios. By far the 
largest economy, the US, exhibits the most variation in the 50-year sample. Overall, the 
US mean wealth to income ratio is 3.785x (σ=0.4364). Figure 3.1 shows that it exhibits 
a J-shaped path over the sample. The trough arises in the 1970s, where the mean wealth-
income ratio decreased to 3.320x from 3.615x in the 1960s. By the 1990s, the ratio had 
increased to 3.571x. The increase in wealth accumulation coincides with an explosion in 
great fortunes in the US during the 2000s. The influx of new wealth is captured in the 
macro data, with the wealth to income ratio averaging 4.190x over the 2000 to 2010 
period, with the peak observed in 2007 at 4.940x. Although the ratio decreased after 
2007, if the general trends in billionaire individuals are to be viewed as a barometer of 
wealth accumulation, the US wealth to income ratio would be expected to increase 
again soon. Finance, IT and retail are the key drivers of this wealth creation and 
accumulation at the micro level in the US, which will be discussed in depth in Chapter 
6. 
 
Amongst the other Anglo-Saxon economies, the highest observed ratios are in Australia 
and the UK. In Australia, the highest wealth to income ratio was 5.552x in 2007, 
compared to the overall country mean (1960 to 2010) of 3.911x (σ = 0.6596). The 
history of this increase in wealth accumulation could be traced to any number of 
sources. One could point to the economic rationalisation programmes of successive 
Labor and Coalition Governments. Alternatively, the mining and property booms of the 
last 20 years have had a clear impact on Australian household wealth. Prior to the 
1990s, Australia’s wealth to income ratio averaged approximately 3.500x, which may 
have reflected the strong agricultural sector that dominated economic output in this 
period but was never a major producer of wealth. Similarly, the mean wealth to income 
ratio of the UK was 3.1 over the 1960s to 1970s. By the mid-1980s, an upward trend 
was established, increasing to over four in the 1990s and to the low fives by the 2000-
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2010 period. Similar to Australia’s experience, the increase in the wealth to income 
ratio of the UK tend to coincide with the implementation of increasingly pro-market 
government policies. The rise of London as a global centre for finance also acted as a 
strong catalyst in the rapid rise of wealth in the UK, particularly for self-made 
entrepreneurs. Indeed, as Chapter 6 demonstrates, peerage plays a minor role in modern 
Britain’s extreme wealth ranks, with only two notable names appearing in the property 
sector. Instead, in the UK, self-made financiers dominate the wealth rankings. 
 
3.3.2 The Return on Wealth and National Income Growth 
 
The trend towards very high wealth to income ratios or high wealth intensity does not 
necessarily say anything about the dynamics behind wealth concentration in and of 
itself. A useful consideration here is to examine Piketty’s (2014a) view that the high 
wealth to income ratios have been associated with the inequality between the return on 
capital or wealth and national income growth. As Pressman (2016) states, if there is one 
definitive manner of summarising Piketty’s (2014) Capital in the Twenty-First Century, 
it is the inequality r > g. Here, r is the return on wealth11 and g is the growth in national 
income.  
 
Empirically, the evidence does suggest that returns to wealth have tended to exceed 
income growth. The real rate of return to capital has, since the 1960s, tended to remain 
above the national incomes of the seven industrialised countries discussed here. Figure 
3.2 plots their national income growth and real rates of return based on Piketty and 
Zucman (2014b), although the authors do not provide real return data for the 1960s for 
the US, the UK, Japan or Canada. The figure reveals that the rate of return on capital, 
across all countries, is on average above contemporaneous national income growth 
rates. From the 1970s, the highest rates of returns are observed in Canada (9.03%) and 
Germany (8.44%). In contrast, the lowest returns are observed in Japan (5.62%) and 
Australia (6.14%), followed by France (6.53%), the UK (6.55%) and the US (6.89%). 
 
                                                
11 Piketty (2014a) defines and wealth and capital equivalently. The definition of wealth is discussed in 
Chapter 2. 
 60 
 
 
Figure 3.2 Income growth and real rate of return, 1960-2010 
Source: Piketty and Zucman (2014b) 
 
In contrast to the relatively high rates of return to capital, income growth rates (not 
returns to income) are less than real returns, and exhibit more volatility. Australia’s 
mean income growth has averaged 3.21%, which is the highest observed with the least 
variability (σ = 1.86%). France (2.26%), Germany (2.19%) and the UK (2.19%) all 
registered the lowest growth rate overall. Germany’s average growth shows a 
significant increase in income growth in 1991 at 12.7%, which was in no doubt spurred 
by the enlarged population of the newly unified German state. 
 
From Figure 3.2, it is observable that most countries have experienced decreasing or flat 
real returns. Japan and Germany both exhibit the greatest negative gradient. For 
Germany, the real rate of return averaged 10.4% during the 1960s and 1970s, before 
falling to 8.25% for subsequent decades. The decline in Japan’s real rate of return traces 
out a more precipitous decline. During the 1970s, Japan averaged 7.67%, one of the 
highest in the world. In subsequent decades, it had decreased to 4.96%, falling further to 
4.85% from 2001 to 2010. Conversely, France demonstrated considerable variability in 
r, with no clear trend early in the sample. During the 1960s and 1970s, the French mean 
r was 7.15%. Between 1975 and 1985, a large decrease is observed corresponding to a 
mean of 5.43%, followed by a reversion to levels above 7% from 1986 to 2001. In 
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2001, there is a dramatic decrease once again, and from 2001 to 2010, the mean real 
return to French capital was 5.21%. 
 
The Anglo-Saxon economies tend to exhibit decreasing real returns over the sample 
period. In the case of the US and the UK, this is not highly perceptible but it is there, as 
they have mean real rates of return of 6.89% and 6.55%, respectively. Between 1970 
and 1989, the average rate of return in the US was 7.12%, and from 1990 to 2010 it was 
6.67%. The UK’s experience was very similar. Between 1970 and 1989, the mean r was 
7.00% and by the 1990 to 2010 period it fell to 6.12%. Both Australia and Canada 
exhibit similar behaviour, although Canada had one of the highest rates in the Anglo-
Saxon world. Between 1970 and 1989, Australia’s and Canada’s mean r was 6.68% and 
9.85%, respectively. By the subsequent sample period, 1990 to 2010, a fall is once again 
observed to 5.63% for Australia and 8.35% for Canada. 
 
An interesting exercise is to consider the relation between returns to capital and the 
wealth to income ratios depicted in Figure 3.1. This exercise is relevant from one 
significant perspective. High returns to capital may be related to high risk factors such 
as high entrepreneurial risk. Conversely, lower returns may be indicative of a move 
from entrepreneurial activity in generating wealth to one based on diversification and or 
inheritance. The inheritor may prefer to diversify their portfolios thereby reducing 
overall returns and risk. Piketty (2014a) predicts that increases in β (wealth to income 
ratio) would ultimately be driven by falls in the realised real rates of return. Figure 3.3 
presents the relationship between β and r over time, with the coloured shapes depicting 
the sample decades in Piketty and Zucman’s (2014b) data. 
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Source: Piketty and Zucman (2014b) 
 
The negative relationship between β and r largely holds across the sample and is 
strongest among countries that demonstrate both the greatest changes in β and large 
changes in the annual real rate of return. The pattern tends to be repeated across the 
majority countries. In the latest decade, returns tend to be clustered at the lower end of 
the spectrum, whereas in the 1960s and, where applicable, the 1970s, they are typically 
clustered at lower levels of β. The only major exception to this general pattern is France, 
where the negative relationship between r and β does not hold over the 1980s and the 
US during the 1970s and 1980s. However, the 2000s largely confirms the observations 
across the general sample. Overall, the statistical strength of the relation is quite high 
for most countries, as presented in Table 3.3.  
 
Table 3.3 Correlation between b and r 
Australia -0.7849 
Canada -0.7514 
France -0.6139 
Germany -0.6344 
Japan -0.8582 
United Kingdom -0.5508 
United States -0.6629 
Notes: Author’s own calculations 
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Examination of the correlation coefficients for each country reveals that the strength of 
the association is moderate to high. Japan demonstrates the strongest negative 
correlation (-0.8582), followed by Australia (–0.7849) and Canada (-0.7514). The UK 
demonstrates the lowest correlation (-0.5508), while the US is slightly higher (-0.6629). 
The question that naturally arises is what relevance does such a negative relationship 
have for inequality. 
  
The negative relationship between returns and wealth-income ratios might be indicative 
of a transformation of capitalism in some economies from one based on entrepreneurial 
activity to one in which inheritor or rentier plays a greater role. Piketty (2014a) argues 
that any number of reasons can be provided for this relationship, but the preferred one 
resides in linking the amount of entrepreneurial effort expended during periods of high 
income growth and returns, as substantial entrepreneurial labour effort and energy are 
exerted to allocate capital. In contrast, during periods of low growth, the entrepreneur 
moves back and the rentier approach gains dominance as the latter requires less effort in 
allocating capital (Piketty, 2014a). Watkins (1907) also recognises the effect of a low-
interest income on entrepreneurial effort. Examining the impact of falling returns for the 
rich, Watkins (1907) argues: 
 
For them further accumulation is still easy and the low rate of interest puts 
others at a disadvantage, so long as the large incomes from property are much 
larger than the large incomes from personal effect. Family pride will sustain 
the effort of those already rich to keep their relative position in the fact of 
falling interest rate. (p. 125) 
 
This basic argument, along with the data on rates of return presented in Figure 3.3, 
provides an initial motivation for seeking to establish the origins of extreme wealth 
across the advanced economies. For example, many of the observations for the US in 
the 1990s are clustered in the high percentage return range (over 7%), with the recorded 
years coinciding with the influx of new wealth from internet start-ups and new finance 
industries (e.g. hedge funds) with relatively more youthful entrepreneurs dominate. The 
UK, too, experienced an influx of the new rich in the 1990s, which was associated with 
the emergence of a new elite financial. In contrast, Japan’s entrepreneurial renaissance 
in the immediate post-war era tapered off in the last two decades of the 1990s and 2010 
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with many of the wealthiest and their estate beneficiaries diversifying away from their 
dynasty’s traditional locus of entrepreneurial activity. Many of the wealthiest 
entrepreneurs in these countries found initial success during the 1960s to 1980s. This is 
further explored in a historical framework in Chapter 6. 
 
3.3.3 Trends in Billionaire Wealth Holdings 
 
Moving from the general macro wealth context, we now turn to another aspect of wealth 
for which this thesis is principally concerned; the rise of individuals with extreme 
wealth holdings. The enumerated list of billionaires covers a 24-year period from 1990 
through to 2013. As mentioned in Section 3.2.2, the Forbes global billionaire list only 
provides point estimates of net worth from 1996 and beyond. Although this study is 
ultimately interested in the historical processes and sources associated with large 
fortunes, it is still useful to examine the general trends in the actual wealth levels as 
reported by Forbes. Table 3.4 presents the descriptive statistics on the aggregate sample 
for both the number of billionaires and the average wealth of those listed on the Forbes 
global billionaire list. As Table 3.4. and Figure 3.4 indicate, there has been a 511% 
increase in the number of billionaires from 232 in 1990 to 1,417 in 2013. On a per 
annum basis, the growth rate in billionaires equates to a mean 10% growth rate in the 
billionaire ranks, although this varies considerably from year to year. Certain periods 
show little growth or a reversal in the fortunes of the rich. Between 1997 and 2000, 
there was little growth in the numbers, with 1998 showing the lowest number of 
billionaires of the past 24 years at 203.  
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Table 3.4 Global aggregate billionaire wealth (USD), 1996-2013 
  No. of 
Countries 
No. of 
Individuals 
 Total Wealth 
($'000)  
Median 
($'000) 
 Mean 
($'000)  
Max 
($'000) 
Standard 
Deviation 
('$000) 
Year 
        
1996 39 414  1,028,000,000  1,950,000  2,483,092  18,500,000  2,037,720  
1997 39 221  965,590,000  2,900,000  4,369,186  36400000  4,377,129  
1998 38 203  1,007,900,000  3,300,000  4,965,025  51,999,999  5,935,095  
1999 39 294  1,252,800,000  2,900,000  4,261,224  90,000,000  6,367,236  
2000 39 319  1,379,199,999  2,900,000  4,323,197  60,000,000  5,527,475  
2001 42 531  1,710,200,000  1,800,000  3,220,716  58,700,000  4,459,070  
2002 41 468  1,503,300,000  1,700,000  3,212,179  52,800,000  4,464,847  
2003 41 472  1,392,300,000  1,900,000  2,949,788  40,700,000  3,726,738  
2004 42 582  1,902,600,000  2,000,000  3,269,072  46,600,000  4,171,913  
2005 45 686  2,222,000,000  2,000,000  3,239,067  46,500,000  4,108,015  
2006 48 790  2,634,600,000  2,100,000  3,334,937  50,000,000  4,111,956  
2007 51 942  3,438,000,000  2,200,000  3,649,682  56,000,000  4,783,892  
2008 53 1122  4,370,400,000  1,800,000  3,895,187  62,000,000  5,437,303  
2009 51 790  2,407,900,000  2,000,000  3,047,975  40,000,000  3,761,497  
2010 51 1000  3,520,300,000  2,000,000  3,520,300  53,500,000  4,691,937  
2011 52 1205  4,483,100,000  2,000,000  3,720,415  64,000,000  5,206,276  
2012 55 1220  4,559,000,000  2,100,000  3,736,885  69,000,000  5,120,191  
2013 59 1417  5,411,260,000  2,100,000  3,818,814  73,000,000  5,392,871  
Source: Forbes (1990-2013) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Forbes (1990-2013) 
 
The middle of the last decade saw a substantial increase in the ranks of the world’s 
billionaires. From 2003 to 2008 an average 19% growth rate in the number of 
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first time, an extraordinary increase considering that only 10 years prior the number of 
billionaires languished at 202. The rapid rise is partly explained by the influx of 
nouveau riche from Russia, China and South America, with the new entrants’ impact 
being captured by the increase in the number of countries being represented in the 
Forbes list. In 1996, 39 countries were represented, increasing to 59 by 2013. 
 
It would be highly premature to draw inferences from these trends, and there is a 
potential problem in using journalistic lists without delving more deeply into the 
personal histories of these individuals. For example, it can be argued that the fall in 
billionaires observed between 1997 and 2000 is due to the economic downturn 
associated with the Asian Financial Crisis, as they perfectly coincide. However, there 
are problems in establishing such a causal relation regarding Western Europe, for 
example. Although the number of Western European billionaires fell from 84 in 1996 to 
48 in 1997 and to 40 in 1998, Western European policy makers and the markets were 
both much more sanguine about Europe’s economic position during 1998 despite the 
Asian Financial Crisis. In fact: 
 
European Commission President Jacques Santer could argue that the direct 
effect on the European economies of the Asian Pacific economic turmoil 
would be ‘slight’ and that he saw no need to revise downward growth 
projections for the European Union (EU) for 1998. (Bridge, 1999, p. 458) 
 
Market indicators were also quite healthy and did not signal any cause for concern for 
the rich of Europe. If the Deutscher Aktienindex (DAX), for example, is assumed to be 
a barometer for the financial health of Western Europe’s economic elite,12 the DAX 
closed at 4,693.50 in February 1998, 3,259.60 in February 1997 and 2,473.60 in 
February 1996. Taking another European index, the Euro STOXX 50 closed at 2,077.22 
in February 1997 and at 2,878.04 in February 1998. Given the relative health of 
Europe’s financial markets, one is either left to conclude that the European economic 
elite made terrible investments en masse compared to the rest of the market, or there 
were other factors at play. This might be explained by the data gathering process of 
Forbes, or substantial changes in wealth holdings through intergenerational transfers or 
divorce. 
                                                
12 As will be shown below, Germany produces the bulk of Western Europe’s billionaire economic elite, 
followed by the UK and France. 
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Although the number of billionaires may have plummeted in the late 1990s, the mean 
wealth of billionaires fortunate enough to maintain their position on the list reached the 
highest-ever observed levels at USD4.965 billion in 1999, compared to USD3.564 
billion over the entire sample. It is possible that the mean is influenced by extreme 
valuations. In 1999 the highest-ever recorded valuation by Forbes was made for Bill 
Gates at USD90 billion. To put this into perspective, Gates’s wealth exceeded the 
combined wealth of the next top three (all from the US and two from Microsoft): 
Warren Buffet (USD36 billion), Paul Allen (USD30 billion) and Steven Ballmer 
(USD19.5 billion). The greatest dispersion of wealth was also observed, with a standard 
deviation of USD6.367 billion during 1999. Given the sample incorporates extreme 
values, the median may provide a better measure of the central tendency of extreme 
wealth. Between 1998 and 2000, the median value ranged between USD2.9 billion and 
USD3.3 billion, compared to USD2.1 billion in subsequent years. Overall, the total 
wealth owned has since a fivefold increase from 1996 to 2013. In 1996, the total 
estimated net worth of the billionaires was USD1.028 trillion. In 2000, it had increased 
to 1.379 trillion. Finally, by 2013, it had almost quadrupled to USD5.411 trillion. On an 
annual basis, this equates to a wealth growth rate of 9.76% per annum and in excess of 
the average returns and national income growth rates outlined in section 3.3.2. 
 
The global industrial segmentation reveals that most industries have produced 
billionaires. Figure 3.5 presents a sectoral breakdown of billionaires over time. 
Reflecting on all sectors, there is a rapid increase in the number of billionaires 
throughout the life of the sample. Globally, both consumer discretionary and financials 
produced the bulk of billionaires and have also demonstrated the most growth. The 
growth is most pronounced after the year 2000. Next are industrials and consumer 
staples. Despite the media popularity of individuals in the sector, the number of 
billionaires in IT is far below these industries and had produced 90 billionaires by 2013. 
Perhaps even more interesting is the lack of representation of the telecommunications 
industry, with the number of billionaires barely reaching 20 in 2013, and typically 
averaging 15 throughout the period 2000-2010. At least on a global basis, the findings 
of Kaplan and Rauh (2013) that the ultra-rich will be typically found in industries 
requiring a high education premium does not, on casual observance, fit the global data. 
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Although the energy industry is often viewed as a constant stream of wealth generation 
in popular discourse, it is surprisingly under-represented in the sample. Just under 61 
energy billionaires appear in 2013 albeit showing an upward trend compared to 
previous years. Health care also exhibited a similar consistent and relatively smooth 
upward trend. Utility billionaires only made an appearance in 2012 and 2013, a far cry 
from the Gilded Age when 27 super rich were associated with this industry (Rockoff, 
2012). Except for telecommunication services, most industries exhibit very low 
volatility in billionaire numbers.  
 
Figure 3.5 Global distribution of billionaires by industry, 1990-2013 
Source: Forbes (1990-2013), Author’s compilation from various secondary sources 
 
The creation of much of the wealth in these industries, however, has a history stretching 
farther back than the figures would lead one to believe. Although Thurow (1975) and 
Hirsch (1911) argue that rapid capitalisation is an essential element of wealth creation 
(examples of which abound today), typically the road to extreme wealth spans decades. 
Indeed, for many in the billionaire rankings, the source of their wealth may appear in 
family histories spanning well over a century. These accounts are examined on a region-
by-region basis focused on individuals in Chapter 6. 
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3.3.4 The Impact of the GFC on Billionaire Numbers 
 
How did billionaires fare during the GFC? On a superficial level, not exceptionally 
well. In early 2009, world markets hit their lowest point. In 2009, there were 790 
billionaires across the globe, a decrease of 30% from 1,122 in 2008. Forbes records 
asset prices as at 14 February annually. Examining global equity returns in Figure 3.6, 
February 2009 had the worst recorded year-to-year returns since 2003, with yields 
falling by approximately 60% from 2008.  
 
 
Figure 3.6 Global equity performance: price history and returns, 1997-2013 
Source: Datastream (2015) 
 
Once again, however, a degree of scepticism should be maintained when seeking a 
correlation between aggregate macro statistics and rise or fall of billionaires. There is 
some evidence that the decline is not entirely attributable to the economic crisis. Table 
3.5 presents data on the estimated dropouts from 2008 to 2009, and those who managed 
to reappear in the wealth list in subsequent years.  
 
At the global level, the fall was more dramatic than that revealed by the 332 decrease. 
Table 3.5 shows that of the 332 net recorded decreases, 374 were from dropouts and 42 
were additions. The greatest number of dropouts came from North America (142), 
followed by Eastern Europe (61) and Western Europe (33). Of the 374 global dropouts, 
208 managed to re-emerge in subsequent years (2010 to 2013), while 166 have not 
reappeared at all. The absence could be due to any number of factors, including 
business and investment misfortune, death, prison or divorce. 
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Table 3.5 Impact of the GFC on billionaire population 
  2008 Drop outs Additions 
Net 
Additions 2009 Survived 
Fully 
disappeared 
Global 1,122 -374 42 -332 790 208 166 
 
North 
America 500 142 23 -119 381 76 66 
Western 
Europe 159 33 6 -27 132 18 15 
Eastern 
Europe 96 61 0 -61 35 19 42 
Middle East 78 30 4 -26 52 16 14 
East Asia 70 24 3 -21 49 8 16 
South Asia 53 29 0 -29 24 11 18 
China 46 23 4 -19 27 5 18 
Southern 
Europe 37 14 1 -13 24 9 5 
South 
America 26 7 0 -7 19 2 5 
South East 
Asia 26 5 0 -5 21 0 5 
Oceania 17 5 0 -5 12 3 2 
Central Asia 7 4 1 -3 4 0 4 
Sub-Saharan 
Africa 6 1 2 1 5 1 0 
Source: Forbes (1990-2013), Author’s compilation from various secondary sources 
 
An examination of the regional dynamics suggests at first glance that other factors are at 
work not purely associated with the economic crisis. The number or proportion of 
dropouts adheres to the general contribution of a region to the overall global number of 
billionaires. For example, in 2009, the Middle East contributed 6.6% of the world’s 
billionaires and 8% to the proportion of dropouts. Similarly, Australia contributed 1.5% 
of total billionaires and 1.3% to the share of dropouts. The correlation between dropouts 
and contribution to the wealth lists is very high at 0.92. However, three regions deviate 
from this trend in terms of both dropouts and additions. While both the US and Western 
Europe played significant roles in the GFC, the proportion of dropouts from this 
billionaire list is relatively less than in other regions. However, they contributed more 
additions during 2009 while still reeling from the economic crisis. The US contributed 
44.6% to the global billionaire ranks and 38% to the number of dropouts, while Europe 
only contributed 8.8% to dropouts and 14.2% to the overall population in 2009. Further, 
both regions contributed the bulk (US 54.8% and Western Europe 14.3%) of new 
billionaire additions in 2009, despite their respective populations suffering through a 
protracted economic contraction.  
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Figure 3.7 illustrates the ratio of additions to dropouts for every region for 2008 to 
2009. Apart from China (0.17), both North America and Western Europe appeared to 
have performed above the global average of 0.11.13 The only region that seemed to 
experience from substantial losses in the ranks of the ultra-rich was Eastern Europe, 
with 61 dropouts throughout the course of 2008-2009, decreasing the absolute number 
of billionaires from 96 in 2008 to 35 in 2009. In relative terms, Eastern Europe 
contributed 4.43% to the population of ultra-rich in 2009 but constituted a 
disproportionate 16.3% of its dropouts. 
 
 
 
Figure 3.7 Ratio of billionaire additions to dropouts, 2009 
Note: Author’s own calculations 
 
What is most significant is that for many individuals, 2009 was a momentary blip with 
many reappearing in 2010 and beyond to the status of wealth elite. The regional 
decomposition shows that for the US (76 survived and 66 disappeared) and Western 
Europe (18 survived and 15 disappeared), many billionaires managed to rapidly re-
establish their wealth beyond the one billion dollars. The personal circumstances of 
these individuals, health or the wellbeing of their marriages even, can have an impact on 
the number of representative individuals. Of the 166 who have remained absent from 
the lists, 21 died in 2008, and 11 died sometime between 2009 and 2013, with the 
                                                
13 Both Sub-Saharan Africa and Central Asia actually performed the best, although their absolute 
numbers are insignificant. 
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majority being in North America or Western Europe. A few fell from wealth’s grace 
due to divorce (Robert Johnson) or criminal activities (Timothy Blixseth and Robert 
Allen Stanford). The rest still appear to be in relatively good financial health despite not 
appearing in the ultra-rich lists mainly due to the truncated nature of the Forbes list. 
 
Another major element shaping the number of billionaires has been the influx of 
individuals from developing economies. The emergence of a new super-rich group from 
Russia and the People’s Republic of China as well as parts of Eastern Europe and South 
America, appear to be the primary drivers, although the Russian contribution has been 
reduced since 2009. Also, the rise of new industries in well-established economies has 
also continued to be an active contributor, with the US, for example, maintaining the 
mantle of the world’s factory for producing the most billionaires, far outstripping the 
numbers from both Russia and China due to new sectors of the economy emerging. 
Although new wealth from the developing world has played a significant role in many 
parts of the world, privilege and old wealth continue to increase both the number of 
billionaires and their absolute wealth. For both continental Europe and South Korea, 
inherited wealth forms the primary source of new billionaires. These points are 
developed further below.  
 
To summarise, a basic review of the data suggests that except for the late 1990s and 
2009, the world’s billionaires have managed to both increase their total wealth while 
also enlarging the club of the economic elite. In addition, the data suggests that 
distribution of wealth at these extreme levels is extraordinarily wide as evidenced by the 
large standard deviations listed in Table 3.4. During periods of expansion or recovery, 
more individuals attained high wealth status with large influxes swelling the number of 
global billionaires. The extent to which different regions contribute to this growth is 
explored below.  
 
3.4 Regional Trends 
 
This section discusses the regional trends in ultra-wealth. The relevance of such a 
geographical exercise has long been recognised in the literature relating to the rich. John 
Stuart Mill (1929), for example, once argued that the distribution of wealth is largely 
contingent upon the prevailing laws and social customs in a state. Further, the pace of 
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economic development and the strength of prevailing market institutions can have an 
impact on any regional variations in the number of billionaires. Given the sheer 
heterogeneity in the regions and industries represented in the billionaire database, only 
an overview of the various regions is provided here. Chapter 6 provides a more detailed 
exploration and sectoral analysis of these regions of the globe.  
 
Determining how to allocate individuals to countries and regions was discussed in 
section 3.2. Briefly, the process followed is to allocate an individual billionaire 
according to their residency. For individuals that hold significant commercial interests 
spanning the globe, this may be an issue due to the high mobility. In these situations, 
the residency of the individual billionaire is assumed to be, for this study, the 
headquarters of their business empires.  
 
The extent to which geography matters to the distribution of large fortunes can be 
inferred by tabulating the regional trends over the 24-year sample. Figure 3.8 presents 
the evolution across time and space in the number of billionaires on the Forbes list from 
1990 to 2013. What is immediately apparent is the extent to which all regions (except 
Central Asia and, to a lesser extent, South East Asia) exhibit the same upward trend in 
the number of billionaires observed at the global level in Section 3.3.2 and for the 
wealth to income ratios in section 3.3.1. This pattern is tied not only to the developed 
world but also to the emerging regions of the world, with both contributing heavily to 
the increase of the billionaire group.  
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Figure 3.8 Billionaire population, geographical distribution, 1990-2013 
Source: Forbes (1990-2013), Author’s compilation from various secondary sources 
 
In the developed world, the largest cohort of billionaires lives in North America where a 
significant increase in numbers is observed. From 1990 to 2013, the number of 
billionaires increased from 73 to 485, an increase of 664%, or an annual growth rate of 
27% compared to 10% for the global statistics. Although North America has seen the 
biggest increase in absolute numbers, the relative magnitudes and growth rates are just 
as impressive in other regions of the developed world. In Western Europe, the absolute 
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numbers of billionaires have lagged those of North America, with little substantial 
growth from the late 1990s to 2003. However, a large rise in the number of ultra-rich 
individuals is observed in Western Europe, from 93 in 2003 to 190 by 2013, with an 
associated annual growth rate of approximately 7.8%. The GFC appears to have had 
only a small transitory impact on wealth creation, with a fall to just 132 in 2009, but had 
largely stabilised to pre-GFC levels by 2010.  
 
The other great region of advanced capitalism, the Japanese-dominated East Asia, had 
an anaemic rise in the number of billionaires in the previous few years. From a low of 
21 in 2009, the number of billionaires has more than doubled in 2013 to reach 47. This 
growth, however, represents a marginal increase from the 1990s. Throughout the 1990s 
and much of the 2000s, the region showed barely any growth in the number of 
billionaires, typically averaging 31. The mean growth rate throughout the sample is 
7.4% closely aligned to that of Western Europe, though well below what is observed in 
North America. The bulk of the growth post-2008 is mainly tied to South Korea, where 
the fortunes of a few family dynasties have dramatically increased through inter vivos 
gifts. In contrast, Japan has not seen any dramatic increase during the sample period. 
 
Among the least-populated areas of the advanced industrialised world, there has been an 
impressive growth in numbers. In Oceania, the mining and property booms have seen 
the number of billionaires increase from only 1 in 1996, the Australian media mogul, 
the late Kerry Packer, to 25 by 2013. In southern Europe, which has endured protracted 
economic issues and recession since 2009, a similar upward trend can be observed in 
the number of billionaires, recording its highest number in 2013. Much of this growth 
came from Spain (20 billionaires in 2013) with an annual growth rate of 10% and Italy 
(23 billionaires in 2013) with a 5.8% growth rate. 
 
Next, Figure 3.9 depicts the mean wealth level across the 15 regions. Average net worth 
is within similar ranges across the globe. In North America, mean net worth peaked at 
$7 billion in 2000 and 1998 before settling between $3 and $4.5 billion between 2001 
and 2013. When read in conjunction with Figure 3.8, the drop is more likely due to an 
influx of new billionaires rather than a systematic decline in wealth levels. The Middle 
East has shown similar trends in mean net dropping from the $8 billion to $3 billion by 
2013. In East Asia and South East Asia, mean net worth peaked at approximately $4.5 
billion in 1997 before encountering a precipitous decline.  
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Source: Forbes (1990-2013), Author’s compilation from various secondary sources 
 
Clear economic or market facts immediately present themselves as candidates for the 
large falls. The falls recorded in North America closely parallel the falls in equity 
market valuations in 2001. In the Forbes data, a drop in mean net worth is recorded in 
2002, a full year after the bursting of the US equity markets. As the Forbes 
measurements take place in February for a given year, it is to be expected that a fall 
would become evident a year after the event. For Asia, the obvious candidate is the 
Asian Financial Crisis, which affected the region over 1997 and 1998.  
 
Returning to the number of billionaires, in emerging markets a similar upward trend is 
detected, with the exception that growth was delayed between the years 2005 to 2010 in 
many regions. However, for the People’s Republic of China, the number of billionaires 
has grown from just one in 2001 to 125 by 2013. The loosening of central government 
controls on ownership clearly had a dramatic but not surprising impact in China’s 
wealth landscape. A dramatic increase in the number of billionaires in Eastern Europe is 
also observed, peaking in 2013 at 120. The peak reflects the precipitous increase 
observed in China, with the first four Eastern European billionaires only appearing in 
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1997. The only depression in the trend was the GFC in 2009, which caused some 
billionaires to fall from the rich lists and not to reappear. Southern Asia, dominated by 
India, also shows substantial growth, albeit less than China or Eastern Europe. In the 
1990s, the mean number of billionaires was 2.4, and between 2000 to 2013 it had 
increased to 27.6, with the highest recorded number being 55 in 2011 and 2013.  
 
Significant increases are observed in South America, where the mean number of 
billionaires throughout the 1990s was 11, before more than doubling to an average of 25 
throughout the 2000s. The biggest increase is observed in 2013 when the population of 
billionaires reached 76, an increase of 204% on the average. Similarly, in South East 
Asia, the mean in the 1990s was 15, increasing to 25 for 2000 to 2013. Following global 
trends, the most growth occurred between 2008 and 2013. In 2008, the number of South 
East Asian billionaires was 18, and by 2013 it had increased to 64, an increase of 255%. 
 
What has caused the general upward trend across the developing regions of the world, 
particularly among former heavily centrally planned economies (India) and communist 
states (China and Russia)? Any explanation may be found in legal and political changes, 
technological developments, or access to large markets. As Chapter 2 discussed, older 
studies of wealth have typically fixated on these three avenues through which wealth 
can rapidly accumulate and develop into substantial concentrations. Although their 
degree of influence will vary, all can be seen to be at play. Indeed, any discussion needs 
to highlight the dramatic changes in the economic and geopolitical sphere that have 
arisen not only since the early 1990s but also from far earlier across these regions. 
When considering China, Russia and India, the interplay between politics and law have 
had just as much an impact as pure economics in elevating certain individuals to the 
status of economic elite. In legal terms, the primary concern is to what extent private 
ownership of modes of production would be distributed among the population. Each of 
these regions has experienced monumental changes to private ownership and policy-
maker discretion over directing commerce since the unravelling of the socialist state 
economy in the early 1990s. These issues are analysed in Chapter 6.  
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3.5 Inheritance and Self-made Wealth 
 
In studies of the wealthy, inheritance and, by extension, liberal inheritance laws, have 
long been recognised as having an important role in the prevailing distribution of wealth 
and on the economy in general. Some authors have argued from the view that it 
promotes an environment that stifles initiative, particularly among the beneficiaries. 
Andrew Carnegie (1901) argued that inheritance has a distortionary impact upon the 
incentives of a market economy, as ‘the parent who leaves his son enormous wealth 
generally deadens the talents and energies of the son and tempts him to lead a less 
useful and less worthy life than he otherwise would’ (p. 56). Similarly, Rubinstein 
(1980) finds that for the UK in the late 1800s, the lack of inherited wealth in the rich 
lists perhaps had to do with the lack of motivation on the part of beneficiaries who 
squandered their fortunes. Other authors have focused on the impact of inheritance laws 
and corporate laws that enable massive, intergenerational wealth transfers from 
generation to generation. Tuckman (1973) argues that death taxes would be an effective 
‘tool in the implementation of policies designed to limit the concentration of wealth’ (p. 
56). Lundberg (1969) argues that inheritance issues go beyond taxes and include the 
ability of family dynasties to maintain and expand their sphere of ownership and 
influence through holding companies and foundations, citing the Ford Foundation as an 
example.  
 
Typically, estate beneficiaries occupy positions of ownership at the very top of the 
wealth tables. For example, the Walton family is by far the wealthiest family dynasty at 
a global level, with an estimated combined wealth of USD125 billion in 2013. In South 
Korea, the Lee family possesses enormous economic power through its ownership of 
Samsung. In Europe, there are older family dynasties, such as the Grosvenors in the 
UK, the von Siemens and Quandt families in Germany, and the Dassault family in 
France, all of which often dominate the top of the wealth tables. In Australia, when 
measured by personal wealth, mining is dominated by Gina Rinehart, and media and 
gaming by the Packer family.  
 
When taking a regional view of the world’s ultra-rich, detection of systematic 
differences between the proportions of inherited versus self-made wealth across regions 
may point to underlying differences in either legal or cultural attitudes towards the 
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intergenerational transfer of wealth. Table 3.6 presents data on inherited and self-made 
fortunes as the sources of wealth. Overall, the proportion of individuals inheriting their 
wealth between 1990 and 2013 has averaged 45.1% (54.9% self-made). Dividing the 
sample into two periods, 1990-2001 and 2002-2013, reveals the trends clearly. 
Throughout the first half of the sample, there were more inherited billionaires, 
averaging 53.4%. Between 2000 and 2013, the mean proportion of inherited wealth had 
decreased to 36.8%.  
 
A regional decomposition, however, reveals substantial variation in the relative share of 
inheritance during different periods. Firstly, the regional breakdown of estate 
beneficiaries points to the influx of new wealth from the former centrally commanded 
economies. The share of inheritances has languished at a mean of 2.0% in China and 
1.6% in Eastern Europe. Similarly, in South Asia (India and Sri Lanka), the mean 
proportion of inheritances decreased from 92.3% throughout the 1990s to 59.2% 
between 2002 and 2013, following India’s dismantling of the License Raj system. 
Secondly, the fall in the frequency of the inherited billionaire is also in evidence in 
developed regions. In North America, despite the prominence of family dynasties such 
as the Waltons, du Ponts, Fords and Kochs, the mean proportion of inheritances has 
decreased in the 24-year sample, falling from 48.7% in the 1990s to 34.0% in the 
second half. Only Western Europe and Oceania record a mean proportion of greater 
inheritance than self-made wealth. In Western Europe, the mean proportion of 
inheritance across the entire sample’s time length is 62.5%. A large fall from 71.8% 
between 1990-2001 to 52.3% between 2002 and 2013 is registered, but this result may 
be driven by substantial variation at the sub-regional level, where inheritance appears to 
dominate in continental Europe. For Oceania, a similar dramatic fall is recorded with 
the number of inheritances falling from 78.5% to 41.9%, though the overall mean 
proportion of inheritances is 61.0%.  
 
It would be premature based on the preceding summary of inheritance trends to 
conclude that the data shows some convergence globally to less inheritance. A one-way 
ANOVA test between subjects found a significant regional effect on the proportion of 
observed inheritance at the p<.05 level across all 12 regions [F(12, 259)=302.16, 
p=0.000]. Post-hoc comparisons indicated that the mean score for advanced economies 
systematically differed, particularly when comparing North America (µ=41.3%, 
s=10.4%), Western Europe (µ=62.5%, s=12.02%), East Asia (µ=36.1%, s=5.13%) and 
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Oceania (µ=61.00%, s=27.8%) in terms of their impact on the proportion of 
inheritances. Rather, the results strongly point to the fact that the observed levels of 
inheritance are ultimately determined at a country or regional level wherein substantial 
heterogeneity is observed. Whether these are due to legal, cultural or economic factors 
is determined through an intra-regional analysis presented in Chapter 6. 
 
The relationship between age and inheritance is worth examining, too. Individuals may 
inherit their wealth at relatively young age; for example, Prince Albert von Thurn and 
Taxis appeared in the rich list at age 7 in 1991. Alternatively, inheritance between 
marital partners can occur and is often the most sizeable among the older individuals in 
the sample. Alternatively, inter vivos gifts may constitute an important channel through 
which inheritance flows. The age at which one inherits wealth can have a dramatic 
impact on one’s future success. As mentioned above, Rubinstein (1980) does not find 
much evidence for inheritance in British society despite the country’s peerage system 
and suggests that many who inherit an estate squander their fortunes. Table 3.7 provides 
some data on this issue. At a superficial level, there appears to be a slight inheritance 
effect. Although both subsamples follow very similar trends in the cohort perspective, 
the inheritance group tends to be slightly younger than the self-made group. Between 
1990 and 2003, the average age of the inheritance group ranged between 60 and 63, 
whereas the self-made billionaire, the average age ranged between 62 and 67. 
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Table 3.6 Mean net worth (USD) by region, 1996-2013 
  Global  Central Asia  China  East Asia  
Eastern 
Europe  
Middle East & 
North Africa  North America 
  No Yes  No Yes  No Yes  No Yes  No Yes  No Yes  No Yes 
1990   48.1% 51.9%               67.2% 32.8%         35.7% 64.3%   50.7% 49.3% 
1991  45.6% 54.4%        69.5% 30.5%     33.3% 66.7%  47.4% 52.6% 
1992  37.1% 62.9%        52.9% 47.1%     36.4% 63.6%  37.7% 62.3% 
1993  36.4% 63.6%        49.1% 50.9%     23.1% 76.9%  39.1% 60.9% 
1994  39.7% 60.3%        57.4% 42.6%     30.8% 69.2%  40.4% 59.6% 
1995  43.7% 56.3%        68.2% 31.8%     30.8% 69.2%  39.8% 59.0% 
1996  49.0% 51.0%        65.3% 34.7%     47.1% 52.9%  51.9% 48.1% 
1997  49.8% 50.2%        65.5% 34.5%  100.0% 0.0%  28.6% 71.4%  62.3% 37.7% 
1998  52.7% 47.3%        61.5% 38.5%  100.0% 0.0%  31.3% 68.8%  59.3% 40.7% 
1999  49.0% 51.0%        63.5% 36.5%     46.7% 53.3%  64.3% 35.7% 
2000  50.8% 49.2%        66.7% 33.3%     50.0% 50.0%  60.0% 40.0% 
2001  57.6% 42.4%     100.0% 0.0%  66.0% 34.0%  100.0% 0.0%  52.4% 47.6%  62.0% 38.0% 
2002  56.4% 43.6%     100.0% 0.0%  62.8% 37.2%  100.0% 0.0%  50.0% 50.0%  62.2% 37.8% 
2003  56.4% 43.6%        67.6% 32.4%  100.0% 0.0%  45.0% 55.0%  62.8% 37.2% 
2004  58.4% 41.6%     100.0% 0.0%  70.2% 29.8%  100.0% 0.0%  54.2% 45.8%  62.8% 37.2% 
2005  59.5% 40.5%  100.0% 0.0%  100.0% 0.0%  69.4% 30.6%  100.0% 0.0%  53.8% 46.2%  61.0% 39.0% 
2006  60.6% 39.4%  100.0% 0.0%  100.0% 0.0%  66.0% 34.0%  97.3% 2.7%  45.3% 54.7%  62.8% 37.2% 
2007  64.3% 35.7%  80.0% 20.0%  100.0% 0.0%  60.0% 40.0%  96.6% 3.4%  47.7% 52.3%  66.5% 33.5% 
2008  67.3% 32.7%  83.3% 16.7%  97.6% 2.4%  62.3% 37.7%  97.9% 2.1%  44.3% 55.7%  68.8% 31.2% 
2009  64.4% 35.6%  100.0% 0.0%  96.4% 3.6%  68.9% 31.1%  97.1% 2.9%  52.8% 47.2%  66.2% 33.8% 
2010  66.8% 33.2%  85.7% 14.3%  90.3% 9.7%  64.5% 35.5%  97.1% 2.9%  41.4% 58.6%  68.6% 31.4% 
2011  68.8% 31.2%  80.0% 20.0%  98.3% 1.7%  65.0% 35.0%  98.2% 1.8%  47.0% 53.0%  69.0% 31.0% 
2012  68.3% 31.7%  100.0% 0.0%  97.9% 2.1%  62.3% 37.7%  98.1% 1.9%  46.3% 53.8%  70.6% 29.4% 
2013   67.0% 33.0%   66.7% 33.3%   97.5% 2.5%   61.6% 38.4%   98.3% 1.7%   44.1% 55.9%   70.1% 29.9% 
µ   54.9% 45.1%   88.4% 11.6%   98.2% 1.8%   63.9% 36.1%   98.7% 1.3%   42.4% 57.6%   58.6% 41.3% 
s  10.1% 10.1%  12.2% 12.2%  2.8% 2.8%  5.1% 5.1%  1.3% 1.3%  9.0% 9.0%  10.6% 10.5% 
µ ('90 - '01)  46.6% 53.4%     100.0% 0.0%  62.7% 37.3%  100.0% 0.0%  37.2% 62.8%  51.2% 48.7% 
µ ('02-'13)   63.2% 36.8%   88.4% 11.6%   98.0% 2.0%   65.0% 35.0%   98.4% 1.6%   47.7% 52.3%   66.0% 34.0% 
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Source: Forbes (1990-2013), Author’s compilation from various secondary sources 
Table 3.6 (continued) Proportion of billionaires receiving inheritances - regional decomposition 1990-2013 
  Oceania  
South 
America   South Asia   
South East 
Asia  
Southern 
Europe  
Sub-Saharan 
Africa  
Western 
Europe 
  No Yes  No Yes  No Yes  No Yes  No Yes  No Yes  No Yes 
1990   0.0% 100.0%   75.0% 25.0%   0.0% 100.0%   60.0% 40.0%   54.5% 45.5%         28.8% 71.2% 
1991  0.0% 100.0%  50.0% 50.0%  0.0% 100.0%  44.4% 55.6%  50.0% 50.0%     23.8% 76.2% 
1992  0.0% 100.0%  53.8% 46.2%  0.0% 100.0%  37.5% 62.5%  46.2% 53.8%     20.6% 79.4% 
1993  0.0% 100.0%  52.9% 47.1%  0.0% 100.0%  50.0% 50.0%  42.9% 57.1%     19.5% 80.5% 
1994  0.0% 100.0%  55.0% 45.0%  0.0% 100.0%  43.5% 56.5%  53.3% 46.7%  100.0% 0.0%  20.0% 80.0% 
1995  0.0% 100.0%  52.2% 47.8%  0.0% 100.0%  54.8% 45.2%  53.3% 46.7%  100.0% 0.0%  24.7% 75.3% 
1996  0.0% 100.0%  41.7% 58.3%  0.0% 100.0%  59.1% 40.9%  50.0% 50.0%  100.0% 0.0%  27.7% 72.3% 
1997  50.0% 50.0%  53.3% 46.7%  0.0% 100.0%  47.8% 52.2%  71.4% 28.6%  50.0% 50.0%  26.9% 73.1% 
1998  50.0% 50.0%  66.7% 33.3%  0.0% 100.0%  53.8% 46.2%  75.0% 25.0%  100.0% 0.0%  36.4% 63.6% 
1999  33.3% 66.7%  52.6% 47.4%  16.7% 85.7%  40.0% 60.0%  64.3% 35.7%  50.0% 50.0%  32.0% 68.0% 
2000  33.3% 66.7%  41.2% 58.8%  50.0% 66.7%  50.0% 50.0%  73.3% 26.7%  100.0% 0.0%  33.0% 67.0% 
2001  25.0% 75.0%  38.5% 61.5%  33.3% 75.0%  52.9% 47.1%  70.0% 30.0%  50.0% 50.0%  36.9% 63.1% 
2002  66.7% 33.3%  40.0% 60.0%  25.0% 80.0%  50.0% 50.0%  65.2% 34.8%  50.0% 50.0%  37.5% 62.5% 
2003  33.3% 66.7%  55.6% 44.4%  16.7% 85.7%  50.0% 50.0%  70.0% 30.0%  0.0% 100.0%  33.3% 66.7% 
2004  40.0% 60.0%  58.3% 41.7%  50.0% 66.7%  53.3% 46.7%  68.0% 32.0%  0.0% 100.0%  35.4% 64.6% 
2005  50.0% 50.0%  64.3% 35.7%  100.0% 50.0%  55.6% 44.4%  72.7% 27.3%  33.3% 66.7%  42.2% 57.8% 
2006  55.6% 44.4%  61.9% 38.1%  76.9% 56.5%  55.0% 45.0%  76.9% 23.1%  33.3% 66.7%  46.2% 53.8% 
2007  60.0% 40.0%  69.2% 30.8%  89.5% 52.8%  61.9% 38.1%  77.8% 22.2%  33.3% 66.7%  50.3% 49.7% 
2008  66.7% 33.3%  65.4% 34.6%  103.8% 49.1%  69.6% 30.4%  75.6% 24.4%  60.0% 40.0%  52.5% 47.5% 
2009  53.8% 46.2%  68.4% 31.6%  71.4% 58.3%  66.7% 33.3%  75.0% 25.0%  60.0% 40.0%  48.5% 51.5% 
2010  57.1% 42.9%  65.2% 34.8%  80.8% 55.3%  70.8% 29.2%  73.1% 26.9%  50.0% 50.0%  53.9% 46.1% 
2011  75.0% 25.0%  52.6% 47.4%  77.4% 56.4%  61.8% 38.2%  63.9% 36.1%  66.7% 33.3%  53.9% 46.1% 
2012  71.4% 28.6%  52.9% 47.1%  65.5% 60.4%  61.9% 38.1%  62.5% 37.5%  66.7% 33.3%  55.5% 44.5% 
2013   76.0% 24.0%   50.6% 49.4%   66.7% 60.0%   61.2% 38.8%   59.6% 40.4%   60.0% 40.0%   52.6% 47.4% 
µ  39.0% 61.0%  54.9% 45.1%  40.2% 76.5%  54.4% 45.6%  64.8% 35.2%  58.2% 41.8%  37.5% 62.5% 
s  27.8% 27.8%  9.8% 9.8%  37.8% 20.3%  8.7% 8.7%  10.7% 10.7%  30.7% 30.7%  12.0% 12.0% 
µ ('90 - '01)  21.5% 78.5%  49.8% 50.2%  10.4% 92.3%  48.7% 51.3%  59.6% 40.4%  77.8% 22.2%  28.2% 71.8% 
µ ('02-'13)   58.1% 41.9%   60.4% 39.6%   72.6% 59.2%   60.7% 39.3%   70.5% 29.5%   42.1% 57.9%   47.7% 52.3% 
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Table 3.7 Age and cohort trends, 1990-2013 
Source: Forbes (1990-2013), Author’s compilation from various secondary sources 
 
3.6 Summary 
 
This chapter presented several findings on global and regional trends among billionaires 
and wealth in general. The following salient facts were established with possible 
explanations advanced in chapters 4, 5 and 6. Firstly, the secular trend in billionaire 
population has demonstrated a precipitous increase since approximately 2000. By 2013, 
the number of billionaires was at 1,417 with an estimated combined net worth of $5 
trillion. The growth in the super rich has to some degree arisen from a concomitant 
influx of billionaires from more countries, particularly from emerging markets. 
However, the advanced regions of the world, particularly North America, continue to 
represent the bulk of both the growth and proportion of billionaires. 
 
Significant economic events such as the GFC had, at most, a momentary impact on 
billionaire numbers. Even in the US, many who had lost their position in the rich lists in 
  Overall  Self-made 
Individuals 
  Inherited   
    Age  Birth 
Year 
  Age Birth 
Year 
Number   Age  Birth 
Year 
Number 
1990  64 1925  67 1923 112  61 1930 121 
1991  64 1915  67 1923 109  60 1905 130 
1992  64 1928  67 1925 101  62 1930 172 
1993  64 1918  67 1926 111  62 1910 195 
1994  64 1921  67 1927 136  60 1913 211 
1995  63 1924  66 1928 180  60 1919 233 
1996  62 1933  64 1931 203  60 1936 211 
1997  62 1935  63 1934 110  61 1936 111 
1998  63 1935  64 1934 107  62 1936 96 
1999  63 1936  64 1935 144  61 1937 150 
2000  61 1939  62 1938 162  61 1939 157 
2001  62 1939  62 1939 306  61 1939 225 
2002  64 1938  64 1938 264  63 1939 204 
2003  64 1939  64 1939 266  63 1940 206 
2004  67 1940  70 1940 340  64 1940 242 
2005  64 1941  64 1941 408  63 1941 278 
2006  63 1943  63 1943 479  63 1942 311 
2007  62 1945  62 1945 606  63 1944 336 
2008  61 1947  61 1947 755  63 1945 367 
2009  64 1945  63 1946 509  64 1945 281 
2010  63 1947  62 1948 668  64 1946 332 
2011  62 1949  61 1950 829  64 1947 376 
2012  63 1949  62 1950 833  64 1948 387 
2013   63 1950   62 1951 950   64 1949 467 
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2008 were back by 2009 or 2010. In Asia too, the late 1990s crisis appeared to have had 
only a temporary impact on the growth of the mega rich. Indeed, death or personal 
circumstances had just as big an impact as transient fluctuation in asset prices. Piketty 
(2014a) also argues this to be the case. 
 
Significantly, financial services and consumer discretionary are the two sectors 
producing the most growth in billionaires. Innovative industries such as IT are still 
relatively minor in terms of their relative numbers on the global scale despite their 
recognition in the general population’s mind. These results foreshadow the potential for 
alternative explanations to the human capital or skill based ones that have been typically 
advanced (for example, Kaplan and Rauh, 2013).  
 
Interestingly, the proportion of inheritance has diminished globally, particularly 
compared to the late 1990s, where inherited wealth represented the greater proportion of 
the super-rich. On initial review, this appears to contradict Piketty (2014a) who argues 
that capitalism is in the midst of a transformation toward a system based on patrimony. 
Closer inspection suggests that the trend toward self-made wealth may be transient in 
nature. Indeed, the influx of nouveau riche from China and Russia, and the rise of 
financiers amongst Western economies largely explains the declining share of inherited 
wealth in the present. A fuller exploration of the issues behind the structure of wealth, in 
terms of inherited and self-made, is provided in chapter 6.  
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Chapter 4 The Rise of the Dual Economy – Wealth 
Accumulation and Inequality 
 
The purpose of Chapter 4 is to study the determinants of wealth accumulation and 
inequality in the modern world. The conceptual framework adopted borrows heavily 
from Meade (1965) and Saez and Zucman (2014), but contextualises their framework in 
a grander socioeconomic context. The ultimate objective of Chapter 4 is to explain in 
depth the trends emphasised in Chapter 3, including wealth to income ratios, returns to 
capital and changes in the wealth distribution against the backdrop of significant 
changes in the economic systems of the advanced economies. Adopting an analytical 
approach, the chapter looks at the respective roles of consumerism, the financialisation 
of household balance sheets (both liabilities and assets), the role of capital income, and 
taxation policy in fuelling the rise of vast fortunes whilst concurrently ensuring the 
detachment of the fortunate few from the rest of society. To this end, various data 
sources are employed. The principal databases used include the WWID, and various 
estimates related to tax evasion. The Chapter focuses particularly on the advanced 
economies – due to data availability – however, some attention is paid to Latin America 
when data availability permits, particularly in relation to top income shares. 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
This Chapter explores the general changes and underlying forces associated with the 
accumulation of wealth and wealth inequality. It has become a well-established 
empirical regularity that both income and wealth exhibit increasing levels of inequality 
in contemporary times (one of the most recent studies from the International Monetary 
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Fund; see Dabla-Norris et al., 2015; also Alvaredo, Atkinson, Piketty, & Saez, 2013). 
Although income inequality has received considerable attention, wealth inequality has 
only recently received the same level of research interest. The emergence of wealth 
inequality, or as a corollary, the amassment of great fortunes into few hands does 
represent a significant departure from the experience of the post-World War II era. This 
era, roughly coinciding with the conclusion of the Second World War and the early to 
mid-1970s in the First World, had ushered in a golden age of unprecedented wealth and 
income equality, driven by robust income growth across the working and middle classes 
(Alvaredo et al., 2013; Piketty, 2014a).  
 
The 1940s had the most impact on income and established the egalitarian distribution of 
wealth for the next three decades. Goldin and Margo (1992) labelled this period “The 
Great Compression”. A term used to contrast with the Great Depression of the 1930s. 
The “Great Compression” had produced a wage structure endowed with significant 
equality beyond any period before or experienced since. Scholars writing in the 
immediacy of this era recognised this positive and socially progressive anomaly. 
Thurow (1975), for example, observed: 
 
After the wage differentials of the Great Depression and World War II had 
become embedded in the labour market for a number of years, they became 
the new standard of relative deprivation and were regarded as ‘just’ even after 
the egalitarian pressures of World War II had disappeared. Basically, the same 
differentials exist to this day, thirty years later. (p. 111) 
 
Contemporary studies, at both national and international levels, confirmed that the post-
war era was unique from an (income and wealth) equality perspective. In contrast, 
Alvaredo et al. (2013) document, for example, that since the ‘great compression’ the 
share of the top 1% has increased, but their growth has not been uniform across the 
advanced industrialised economies of the world. Although they do not find evidence 
that the wealth concentration, at least in the US, has significantly increased over the 
same period, they do find a significant relationship between the rise of the share of the 
top 1% and the growth in capital incomes, an area that has been under-explored. 
 
However, recent studies emphasise that wealth inequality has also re-emerged. Saez and 
Zucman (2014) document that in the US, just like the share of top incomes, the level of 
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wealth concentration has followed a U-shaped path since the early 1900s to 2012. Saez 
and Zucman (2014) challenge the view that wealth concentration has not increased in 
the US, finding that the top wealth holders now accumulate wealth at a more rapid rate 
than the rest of the populace, particularly over the last three decades. Significantly, the 
richest families increased their share of wealth from 7% in 1978 to 22% in 2012 (Saez 
& Zucman, 2014, p. 1). Interestingly, they find that their estimates of wealth 
accumulation by this group of the US population are consistent with other sources, 
including the Forbes billionaire wealth estimates. The question here is what forces have 
driven this process and not just in the US but across other First World economies? 
 
The purpose of this Chapter is to go beyond singular explanations and to find the 
potential causes for modern day wealth concentration in forces found in the 
socioeconomic changes that have transpired since the Second World War. Clearly, the 
immediate post war period was different. Although capital destruction in Europe 
effectively reset the wealth counter to zero, it can only represent part of the explanation 
(Piketty, 2014a). Therefore, this Chapter pursues several alternative explanations within 
the context of a wealth accumulation model. The changes associated with wealth 
accumulation are discussed within the context of larger societal changes and how 
society engages in economic activity, including consumerism and financialisation. 
Analytically, it examines these broad changes within a wealth accumulation framework 
in the spirit of Meade (1964, 1975) and Saez and Zucman (2014). In both, the growth of 
wealth is decomposed into the main constituent elements of savings, returns, 
investments, earnings, consumption and taxation. 
 
The chapter comprises three sections. Section 4.2 discusses the general conceptual 
framework that is followed throughout this Chapter. Section 4.3 examines the role of 
consumerism, financialisation, the structure of income, and taxation policy as possible 
channels through which inequality has eventuated. Section 4.4 provides a summary. 
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4.2 Conceptual Framework  
 
Of primary interest are the dynamics associated with wealth, income, savings and 
taxation policy across the entire wealth distribution encompassing seven advanced 
economies. These seven economies include Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Japan, 
the UK, and the US. The four forces provide the channels through which the process of 
wealth accumulation can initially be considered in a simple accounting identity. Further, 
they can act as a proxy for a number of explanatory variables to this end including 
consumerism, financialisation, investment behaviour, income structure, and taxation 
policy.  
 
In Chapter 2, the existence of models possessing dynamic random multiplicative shocks 
were considered. Piketty and Saez (2014) point out that for a given structure of shocks, 
such models best approximate the distribution of wealth in a given economy. As was 
argued in Chapter 2 too, what constitute these shocks is not determined by theory but 
through historical enquiry. Piketty and Saez (2014), for example, point to labour income 
shocks in the immediacy of the Second World War that enabled the propagation of low 
wealth inequality through to the early 1970s in Europe and the US.  
 
Determining what shocks to consider as relevant to the dynamics of wealth 
accumulation therefore require some structure as to what are the relevant factors to this 
process. Accounting identities of wealth accumulation were used by Meade (1965; 
1975) and more recently Saez and Zucman (2014). These models provide a convenient 
means of decomposing the constituent elements of wealth into basic components. Saez 
and Zucman’s (2014) model of wealth accumulation consists of five essential elements 
– current labour income, saving rates, rate of return, tax on labour and capital, and 
consumption – formally written as: 
 !"#$% = !"% ∙ 1 + *"% ∙ 1 − ,-% + ."% + /0"% ∙ 1 − 10% − 2"%  (4.1) 
 
Where, !"% is initial household wealth, *"% is the real rate of return, ,-%  is the corporate 
tax rate, ."%	is the asset price effect, /0"%  is labour income, 10% is the tax rate on labour 
income, and 2"%	is household consumption. The potential for wealth concentration arises 
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first from the existence of labour income inequality. The greater wealth accruing to 
higher incomes leads to greater capital income, assuming households elect to save more. 
In addition, ‘for a given distribution of income, wealth inequality will tend to grow if 
consumption 2"%	of poor households becomes larger and larger compared to their income 
while rich households keep saving’ (Saez & Zucman, 2014, p. 27). This emphasis on 
consumption and saving behaviour is one key element to understanding the dynamics of 
wealth accumulation. Equation 4.1 does not explicitly model for savings. To do so, 
savings, 4"%, are assumed to represent increases in net wealth prior to changes in asset 
prices: 
 !"#$% = (1 + ."%) ∙ (!"% + 4"%)  (4.2) 
 
Savings, 4"%, are assumed to be capitalised, and are equal to net capital income and 
labour income: (1 + ."%)4"% = *"% ∙ 1 − ,-% ∙ !"% + /0"% ∙ 1 − ,0% − 2"%  (4.3) 
 
An advantage of the Saez and Zucman (2014) models is that it permits the distribution 
to be decomposed into percentiles or quintiles as it makes no a priori assumption as to 
how a given class receives its income (capital or labour) or how it spends and saves. It 
does not, for example, rigidly assuming a two class society of workers and rentiers or 
capitalists as in capital accumulation models such as those of Kaldor (1960) or Pasinetti 
(1962). 
 
The general framework above captures the primary elements associated with wealth 
accumulation. In Section 4.3, a historical examination of the factors is made to 
determine the major changes that have impacted upon the dynamics of wealth 
accumulation.  
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4.3 The Socioeconomic Context 
4.3.1 The Role of Consumerism and Savings 
 
To begin, the role of consumerism in wealth accumulation is considered. In equation 
4.1, the last element C, represents a proxy for consumerism. In reality, the full impact of 
consumerism can also manifest itself through returns to capital (aggregate consumption 
would flow through to returns to capital), but to begin, consumption is first viewed as 
an expense on a household’s bottom line. Further, consumption is intimately tied to the 
savings of households, this aspect is also explored here. The role of savings being 
particularly important in Piketty’s inequality, r > g (Solow, 2014). In Piketty’s model, if 
savings were independent of income, then in the long run the wealth inequality 
distribution would converge to the wage inequality distribution, and the r – g 
differential would have little relevance. However, given that wealth inequality is greater 
than income inequality, greater savings can exacerbate inequalities particularly in terms 
of Piketty’s (2014a) inequality. 
 
Consumerism has long been noted as a major transformative force in capitalist society 
by Marxists and social scientists alike. Typically, it has assumed various definitions 
depending on the ideological strain of the writer. Marxists, for example, view 
consumerist society as the means to the valorisation of capital, with the proliferation of 
consumer goods a necessary means to this end. Further, consumerism is as an important 
social force through which entrepreneurs and, more generally, corporations can expand 
the scale of their markets. In general, consumerism is a set of values and techniques 
whose role is to develop the scale of consumer markets beyond what would ordinarily 
be necessary. For this thesis, the definitions of Ewen (1976) and Galbraith (1958) are 
adopted. Ewen (1976) defined consumerism as ‘mass participation in the values of the 
mass-industrialised market’ (p. 54). Perhaps more importantly, the rise of advertising 
and sales and the recognition of the desire for consumers to emulate their ‘neighbours’ 
enabled the transformation of society into mass consumer participation, which had a 
substantial impact in terms of market scale. Galbraith (1958) recognised the importance 
of both in his book, The Affluent Society. On the first, he wrote: 
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As a society becomes increasingly affluent, wants are increasingly created by 
the process by which they are satisfied. This may operate passively. Increases 
in consumption, the counterpart of increases in production, act by suggestion 
or may proceed actively to create wants through advertising and salesmanship. 
Wants thus come to depend on output.... [I]t can no longer be assumed that 
welfare is greater at an all-round higher level of production than at a lower 
one. It may be the same. (Galbraith, 1958, p.158) 
 
It is important to emphasise that consumerism was not necessarily created via the tool 
of advertising, but can emerge naturally without direction in a capitalist system.  
 
For Marxists, the development of consumerism is viewed strictly within the context of 
labour and capitalist relations. Marxists conceptualise consumerism as a process 
directed by corporations seeking to move labour discontent and resentment in the work 
environment and channel it into the desire for goods to escape the dissatisfaction and 
drudgery associated with mass production. Lane (1962) for example, argues: 
 
The more emphasis society places upon consumption – through advertising, 
development of new products, and easy instalment buying – the more will 
social dissatisfaction be channelled into intra-class consumption rivalry 
instead of interclass resentment and conflict. (p. 80) 
 
The element of social dissatisfaction is developed by Bauman (2007), stating that the 
‘subjective sense of insufficiency’ compared to the wealthier is then aggravated by an 
‘increasing relative (comparative) deprivation, both reinforced rather than mitigated by 
economic growth in its present, deregulated, laissez-faire form’ (p. 41). 
 
Whether consumerism is due to the growth of advertising or whether output creates a 
concomitant increase in wants diverts attention away from the most relevant aspect of 
consumerism, the notion of relative consumption. Relative consumption can be defined 
as the extent to which individuals or households observe their neighbour (however 
broadly neighbour is defined) and strive to emulate or surpass them in their display of 
material well-being.14  
                                                
14 At this point, it needs to be emphasised that this section is mainly concerned with the role of 
consumption in depressing wealth accumulation amongst working and middle-class households. The 
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To establish the role of consumerism in depressing wealth accumulation amongst the 
lower and middle classes, a range of statistics are considered. Since a measure of 
consumerism does not exist, alternative measures of consumption and associated ratios 
are considered. This is done through three avenues. Firstly, has the average propensity 
to consume (APC) increased since the 1960s or 1970s across the industrialised world? 
Secondly, have the incomes of the lower and middle classes grown enough to sustain 
rising consumption levels? Thirdly, what has occurred with the saving rates of the lower 
or middle class households relative to the rich?  
 
On the first question, the APC, defined as national consumption divided by national 
income, demonstrates substantial variance since the 1960s across all seven countries. 
The range of observations resides between 0.51 and 0.75, depending on the year and 
country, as observed in Figure 4.1. Of the seven countries included in the sample, four 
have shown increasing propensities to consume out of current income. The largest 
economy, the US, also shows a steep increase in the APC measure from the lowest 
observation in 1979 at 0.64 to approximately 0.75 over the last two years of the sample. 
Both Japan and the UK have also shown similar increases, but neither attains the 
absolute level exhibited by the US. Japan demonstrates a marked increase of 24% from 
0.48 in 1981 to 0.60 in 2009. The APC in the UK increased 22.1% from 0.57 in 1978 to 
a peak of 0.69 in 2003. France also shows a marked increase in APC during the 1980s 
and 1990s compared to the lows observed in the 1970s. In contrast, both Australia and 
Canada have exhibited downward sloping trends since the 1960s. Germany has had a 
relatively stable APC since the mid-1970s, with a mean of 0.6079, despite a precipitous 
increase in the 1960s and 1970s.  
 
 
                                                
issue of whether consumption in itself has driven up both the top wealth and income shares is partly 
considered in terms of entrepreneurial risk further below.  
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Figure 4.1 Average propensity to consume, 1960-2010 
Source: Piketty and Zucman (2014b) 
 
At what level of the distribution (wealth or income) has the increased propensity for 
consumption arisen. For Australia and the UK, there is enough statistical information at 
a disaggregated level to suggest that the less fortunate do consume much more than the 
wealthy (asset or income rich) relative to wealth or income. Table 4.1 presents the 
aggregate distributional patterns of consumption in Australia as a proportion of wealth 
and income from 2003 to 2011. Table 4.2 presents similar statistics for the UK from 
2008 to 2013.15 
 
Regarding the consumption to wealth ratio in Table 4.1 Panel A, the poorest Australian 
households consume, on average, 4.4 times their annual net worth in contrast to the 
wealthiest households, which only consume 0.04 times their net worth. Across the 
wealth distribution, there is a continuing downward shift in this ratio. The consumption 
to income and savings to income ratios in Panels B and C are less dramatic, but the 
relative disparity between the fourth wealth quintile and the highest wealth quintile 
demonstrates the extent to which the less fortunate, as well as the middle classes are 
                                                
15 Unlike Australia, household wealth holdings were not available. Further, the UK only produced 
distribution data relating to consumption, savings and income in 2013. 
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under greater budgetary pressures than the highest quintile households to sustain a 
lifestyle standard. 
 
Table 4.1 Australia’s consumption and savings ratios by quintiles, 2003-2011 
Panel A: Consumption to Wealth 
 Lowest Second Third Fourth Highest 
2003-04 5.136x 0.498x 0.201x 0.113x 0.049x 
2005-06 3.340x 0.444x 0.186x 0.112x 0.046x 
2007-08 5.682x 0.600x 0.242x 0.139x 0.052x 
2009-10 4.045x 0.449x 0.185x 0.107x 0.045x 
2011-12 3.885x 0.531x 0.207x 0.113x 0.049x 
      
Panel B: Consumption to Income 
 Lowest Second Third Fourth Highest 
2003-04 1.018x 0.908x 0.904x 0.899x 0.794x 
2005-06 0.989x 0.876x 0.929x 0.941x 0.766x 
2007-08 1.445x 1.044x 1.135x 1.142x 0.851x 
2009-10 0.942x 0.772x 0.873x 0.884x 0.712x 
2011-12 0.905x 0.759x 0.866x 0.848x 0.685x 
      
Panel C: Savings to Income 
 Lowest Second Third Fourth Highest 
2003-04 -1.8% 9.2% 9.6% 10.1% 20.6 
2005-06 1.1% 12.4% 7.1% 5.9% 23.4 
2007-08 -0.5% 18.3% 9.7% 7.6% 25.3 
2009-10 5.8% 22.8% 12.7% 11.6% 28.8 
2011-12 9.5% 24.1% 13.4% 15.2% 31.5 
Source: Australian Bureau of Statistics (2014) 
Notes: Panels A and B represent simple ratios of average consumption/average wealth and average 
consumption/average income, utilising current prices. Panel C provides the average savings rates of 
households across the wealth distribution, estimated as average household savings/average household 
income. 
  
The savings rates of the wealthiest tend to dominate the observations associated with 
lower income groups in Australia. In Panel C of Table 4.1, the Australian household 
savings rate of the highest wealth quintile ranges between 31.5% and 20.6% throughout 
the sample period, with a mean of 25.9%, in contrast to the average rate for the poorest 
wealth quintile at 2.8%. The second wealth percentile shows a substantial increase in 
the saving rate over the course of the sample, but also a considerable degree of variance 
relative to the mean (cv=0.37). Both the third and fourth quintiles reveal a substantially 
lower savings rate compared to the wealthiest households, averaging 10.5% and 10.1%, 
respectively. The most affluent households on average appear to exhibit greater savings 
rates while maintaining extremely low consumption levels relative to their wealth. 
According to the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) data upon which Table 4.1 is 
constructed, the average annual consumption level for the poorest quintile is 
AUD93,938 compared to AUD167,441 for the highest quintile. For the third and fourth 
quintiles, consumption is AUD133,799 and AUD133,600, respectively.  
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Turning to the UK consumption to income ratio, presented in Table 4.2, Panel A, a 
similar pattern is observed.16 The highest income quintile exhibits the lowest ratio. Over 
the years 2008 to 2013, it has averaged 0.749x compared to 1.207x and 1.017x for the 
lowest and third quintiles, respectively. As in Australia, there is a noticeable disparity 
between the fourth income and the highest income quintiles demonstrating once again 
the substantial advantages of the wealthier households, even between the two highest 
quintiles. The savings to income ratio better uncovers the extent to which savings 
diverge between the various quintiles. On average the lowest quintile savings rate is 
negative at 15.57%. Moving to the next quintile it only rises to 0.38%. The middle class 
(Fourth quintile) averages 9.07%. For the highest quintile an average of 29.33% is 
observed and closely mirrors the magnitude observed in Australia for the same quintile. 
 
Table 4.2 The United Kingdom's consumption and savings ratios by quintiles, 2008, 2012-2013 
Panel A: Consumption to Income 
 Lowest Second Third Fourth Highest 
2008 1.298 1.156 1.099 1.020 0.773 
2012 1.159 0.988 0.968 0.911 0.732 
2013 1.164 0.978 0.985 0.938 0.743 
Panel B: Savings to Income 
 Lowest Second Third Fourth Highest 
2008 -23.0% -9.6% -4.2% 3.4% 26.8% 
2012 -11.2% 5.9% 7.9% 13.6% 31.5% 
2013 -12.5% 6.2% 5.4% 10.2% 29.7% 
Source:		Office for National Statistics. Tonkin (2013).	
	 	
Notes: Panels A represents a simple ratio of average consumption to average income, utilising current 
prices. Panel B provides the average savings rates of households across the wealth distribution, estimated 
as average household savings/average household income. 
 
International data on the distribution of savings rates on a time series basis is lacking, 
but the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) has been 
driving an initiative to harmonise and produce such statistics.17 Figure 4.2 presents part 
of this effort and provides a cross-sectional depiction of savings rates across several 
countries between 2006 to 2008 (2010 for the US). For the highest quintile, the 
variation between countries’ savings rates is large, ranging between approximately 20% 
(New Zealand) and 41% (US). Progressing further down the income quintiles greater 
                                                
16 No data on the basis of wealth was available to make a direct comparison with Australia.	
17 Again, as with the UK, no OECD data based on wealth was available to make a direct comparison with 
Australia. 
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variation is revealed. At the lowest quintile, the majority countries exhibit a negative 
savings rate, with the US demonstrating the greatest negative saving rate at 80%. 
Conversely, France is the only country to show a positive savings rate, albeit close to 
zero. 
 
 
Figure 4.2 Saving as a % of adjusted disposable income, point estimates from eight countries 
Source: Reproduced from Fesseau and Mattonetti (2013), Distributional measures across household 
groups in a national accounts framework, OECD. 
 
What is driving the substantial savings rates of the wealthiest households in contrast to 
the poorest? Consumerism can partly explain the savings behaviour of the poor, but not 
of the wealthiest households. Given the finding of Carroll et al. (2014) that those with 
low wealth to income ratios (but high incomes from entrepreneurial activity) consume 
less, a natural issue to consider is how much more those receiving substantial income 
flows from entrepreneurial activities are saving and why. Dynan, Skinner and Zeldes 
(2004) explore whether there is any relationship between higher lifetime income 
individuals and the fraction that they save. Interestingly, they find that wealthier 
individuals faced with greater entrepreneurial risk will also exhibit a propensity to save 
in amounts higher than non-entrepreneurs. For example, ‘the estimated median savings 
rates that range from zero for the first quintile to 22 percent for the fifth quintile to 49 
percent for the top 5 percent of the sample’ (Dynan et al., 2004, p. 426). Dynan et al. 
(2004) conclude that ultimately, the wealthy save more because of the entrepreneurial 
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risk they face. Savings rates are not necessarily due to consumer preferences being 
different compared to lower wealth classes. 
 
The role of entrepreneurial income in wealth distribution has been examined by 
Quadrini (1999, 2000), Gentry and Hubbard (2004) and Hurst and Lusardi (2004). 
Quadrini (1999) finds that the key to upward mobility in the US is whether one is from 
a business family or an entrepreneur. More specifically: 
 
While worker families (both new and old), tend to stay in or move to lower 
positions of wealth, both new and old business families tend to stay in or move 
to higher positions. Therefore, the undertaking of an entrepreneurial activity is 
an important way through which families switch to higher wealth classes. 
(Quadrini, 1999, p. 8) 
 
These findings are reinforced by Gentry and Hubbard (2004), who, using the US Survey 
of Consumer Finances, find that both new and continuing entrepreneurs tend to exhibit 
greater savings and that business income is an important part of this saving and wealth 
accumulation process. Significantly, the act of exiting entrepreneurship appears to result 
in ‘dissaving’. Again, this finding suggests that savings by entrepreneurs are not 
necessarily tied to preferences but are due to chance associated with business or market 
processes instead. Dynan et al. (2004) argue that the observation that savings increase 
across the wealth distribution due to entrepreneurial activity signifies that savings (and 
as a corollary, wealth) are a matter of chance: 
 
Our finding that differences in saving behaviour across income groups are also 
an important source of the overall variation in wealth of the US population 
suggests a diminished role for choice. For example, wealth accumulation 
because of government or private policies that differentially affect saving 
(such as asset-based means testing or the availability of 401(k) plans) cannot 
be readily attributed to tastes or preferences. (p. 438) 
 
Such a finding contradicts the view that the ultra-wealthy are solely a product of 
prudent decision making in savings. Rather, it is the risks of business and the associated 
stochastic process of free enterprise that have the most impact upon their consumption 
and savings behaviour. 
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Returning to the original issue of a potential link between the lack of upward mobility 
among the middle and lower classes and the greater propensity for the poorer to 
consume rather than save, two questions can be posed. Firstly, if diminishing savings 
rates (and increased consumption) are observed amongst poorer households, is this 
driven by disincentives to save? Secondly, are high consumption rates among the poor 
simply fuelling increased income growth among the rich, entrepreneurial classes? 
Bertrand and Morse (2013) allude to the possibility of ‘reverse causality, where higher 
consumption by middle and low income households in a [US] state raise top income 
levels in that state’ (p. 27). The existence of such a reverse causality could potentially 
be determined through an indirect channel via statistics on credit growth and the 
financialisation of household balance sheets. 
 
4.3.2 Household Financialisation: Fuelling the Poor Consumer 
 
The phenomenon of financialisation has often been used to describe a variety of 
observed economic outcomes in recent times. For example, financialisation is often 
observed at the corporate level where remuneration of upper management is tied to 
financial contracts. Alternatively, financialisation has been viewed as a process through 
which commodities typically outside the realm of financial markets have been packaged 
into investment vehicles that are actively traded on secondary markets across the globe.  
 
Krippner (2005) provides one of the first formal definitions. Financialisation is defined 
as the ‘pattern of accumulation in which profits accrue primarily through financial 
channels rather than through trade and commodity production’ (Krippner, 2005, p. 174). 
This definition is formed from a broad body of studies on the changing nature of 
corporate activity, through any number of mechanisms. For example, Fligstein (1990) 
presents evidence on the increasing influence of finance in the organisation of corporate 
governance control structures for large enterprises in the US. The broadest definition, 
however, is provided by Epstein (2001) and encapsulates the multi-faceted nature of the 
phenomenon: 
 
Financialization refers to the increasing importance of financial markets, 
financial motives, financial institutions, and financial elites in the operation of 
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the economy and its governing institutions, both at the national and 
international level. (p. 1) 
 
Given the scope of financialisation, attempts to recast it as an element behind one of the 
variables in equation (4.1) may appear an intractable exercise, but there are aspects to 
which one can infer the impact of these developments on the dynamics of the wealth 
equation on households over recent history.  
 
Here, it is posited that the increasing financialisation of household balance sheets (either 
the wealthy or poor) is having an impact in both reducing the potential for upward 
mobility and fuelling the substantial growth of wealth by the globe’s richest citizens, 
including those in the finance industry. The ability of financialisation to impact 
household finances through wealth is not only tied to the capacity to generate greater 
returns through financial advice but also to enhance consumption beyond one’s means. 
In equation 4.1, the two channels via which financialisation can impact is consumption 
(credit growth) and capital income (*"%).  
 
The growth of credit demonstrates a remarkable association with the degree of wealth 
accumulation across the advanced economies. Figure 4.3 depicts the relationship 
between the average borrowing rate in an economy and its wealth to income ratio since 
the 1960s. The strongest association between borrowing rates and wealth to income 
ratios is to be found in Canada (0.95) and the UK (0.94), followed by Australia (0.93). 
The US exhibits the lowest degree of association between the variables (0.79), followed 
by France (0.87), Japan (0.86) and Germany (0.870). The link between credit growth 
and macroeconomic activity has been explored in a recent study. The findings of 
Stockhammer and Wildauer (2015) establish that economic growth across the OECD 
has largely been a debt fuelled process – rather than being driven by productivity 
growth by itself. The question is at which level of the wealth distribution this is being 
driven. 
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Source: Piketty and Zucman (2014b) 
 
The impact of debt on households can be viewed from both the consumption side of the 
equation or from the investment returns perspective. The first view posits that the rise of 
financial products aimed at households is largely emblematic of the rise of the type of 
consumerism briefly explored in section 4.3.1. Cynamon and Fazzari (2013) examine 
the possibility of either in their study of the U.S. Survey of Consumer Finances and 
whether the growth in U.S. aggregate demand through household consumption is due to 
the rise of household credit. Adopting a Minsky perspective, Cynamon and Fazzari 
(2013) find that: 
 
With financial innovation and greater access to debt, the year-by-year budget 
constraint has become soft.... [H]ouseholds mimic the behaviours they observe 
around them, from both real people and media models, assuaging their 
uncertainty in the perceived comfort of acting like others in their social 
reference group. (p. 25) 
 
Given the growth of an economic elite who made their fortunes in finance, the 
‘softening’ of the budget constraint may provide an inkling as to why wealth to income 
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ratios have increased to such an extent in the US. There are, however, alternative 
perspectives. Trumbull (2012) argues that the liberal use of credit by poorer or low-
income households was largely a cultural development in which easy access to credit 
was construed as a form of welfare substitution. Indeed, Trumbull (2012) rejects the 
notion of consumerism or materialism per se as a catalyst for increasing borrowing 
rates, arguing that, for the US, at least: 
 
the link that came to be made in the United States between credit access and 
social welfare was not a product of wage stagnation and welfare exhaustion in 
the 1970s, but instead traces its roots to the early years of the twentieth 
century in the United States. (p. 14) 
 
In contrast, he argues that in France, access to credit was seen in a different light, with 
both the left and right historically rejecting the notion of easy access to credit markets 
for households (Trumbull, 2012).  
 
The existence of different attitudes toward household borrowing rates across the seven 
countries would seem to imply differing patterns of household behaviour. Figure 4.4 
shows the historical trends of private household debt to income ratios across the five 
countries. In every instance, the household debt to income ratios have demonstrated 
substantial growth rates. The four Anglo-Saxon economies have in the past decade 
exhibited the highest debt to income ratios in excess of 1x, with both Australian and US 
households exhibiting the greatest propensity to assume debt. France exhibits the lowest 
propensity to assume debt below those of the Anglo-Saxon economies, but has 
exhibited a dramatic increase since the mid-1990s. 
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Figure 4.4 Debt to income ratio of advanced economies, 1960-2010 
Source: Piketty and Zucman (2014b) 
 
The aggregate increases in debt to income ratios may be fuelled across the whole wealth 
distribution, but the evidence suggests different dynamics across different percentiles, 
particularly amongst poorer and lower-income households. Fligstein and Goldstein 
(2015) find that poorer households in the US avail themselves of credit products more 
readily than wealth accumulation assisting products: 
 
For the 40% of households living at the bottom … life chances have declined 
dramatically in the past 20 years. Their income growth is negative, they are 
vulnerable to not having enough money to survive.... When they borrow, they 
tend to use their borrowing for routine household expenses such as paying 
bills, medical expenses or financing education. The rapid expansion of credit 
availability to those in the bottom 40% has not produced a finance culture. (p. 
23) 
 
The recent publication of household debt distribution data by the US Congress Budget 
Office reveals the extent of debt levels among the lower wealth percentiles. Debt here is 
defined as nonmortgage debt. Table 4.3 Panel A provides some details on the evolution 
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of average debt levels to average wealth across the three broad wealth percentiles. 
Beginning with the bottom 25th percentile, the debt to asset ratio averaged 92.13% 
(s = 17.4%) over the 1989 to 2007 period. By 2010 and 2013, however, the debt to 
asset ratio had exponentially increased to 300x times total assets. The process driving 
this has not only been an accumulation of debt, but enormous falls in the value of home 
equity and a corresponding rise in credit card and student loan debt. In contrast, the 50th 
to 90th percentile exhibit very little variation over the entirety of the sample provided. 
Overall, the 50th to 90th percentile’s average proportion of debt to assets was 4.99% with 
little variation (s = 0.40%).  
 
Table 4.3 Debt to total assets, US households 
Year 
Bottom 
25th 
Percentile 
25th to 
50th 
Percentile 
50th to 
90th 
Percentile 
Panel A, Debt to total assets: 
    
1989 110.0% 18.3% 5.5% 
1992 65.0% 15.5% 4.4% 
1995 83.3% 17.2% 5.1% 
1998 117.6% 19.4% 5.4% 
2001 89.5% 17.5% 4.6% 
2004 87.5% 18.3% 5.0% 
2007 92.0% 20.2% 4.9% 
2010 1600.0% 26.7% 5.5% 
2013 3300.0% 28.3% 6.1% 
    
Panel B: Average debt levels of US households 
    
1989 $11,000 $11,000 $14,000 
1992 $13,000 $9,000 $10,000 
1995 $15,000 $11,000 $12,000 
1998 $20,000 $14,000 $16,000 
2001 $17,000 $14,000 $17,000 
2004 $21,000 $15,000 $20,000 
2007 $23,000 $19,000 $21,000 
2010 $32,000 $16,000 $19,000 
2013 $33,000 $17,000 $21,000 
Source and Notes: Congressional Budget Office (2016). Trends in 
Family Wealth, 1989 to 2013. Assets consist of financial assets, 
home equity, and other assets. Other assets are defined as 
including real estate (non-residence) and business equity net of 
loans. For home equity, mortgage debt is subtracted from the 
primary residency. Debt in the table refers to nonmortgage debt, 
and includes a household’s consumer debt, and other debt 
(primarily student loans). 
 
 
The ratio approach may obscure some of the dynamics in relation to debt. Panel B Table 
4.3 shows the average amount of household debt in dollar terms. Across the three 
percentile ranges for which data are provided, debt levels have systematically increased 
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since 1989. However, the largest debt burden is on average upon the poorest 
households. For example, in 2013 the average debt burden was USD33,000 for the 
bottom 25th percentile, compared to USD21,000 of the 50th to 90th percentile. The mean 
growth rate of debt for the poorest 25th percentile is 15.9% since 1989, compared to 
6.8% for the 50th to 90th percentile. 
 
The phenomenon of poorer households being unable to increase their income and 
accumulate wealth, and consuming out of credit, is not restricted to the US. As 
mentioned above, Australia exhibits the world’s highest household debt to income ratio. 
Have the record levels of household borrowing led to a greater concentration of 
household debt by the lower classes as in the US? Table 4.4 presents the distribution of 
household debt in Australia across wealth percentiles. Home loans are mainly held by 
households in the 40-59% and 60-79% wealth percentiles, with the proportion 
increasing from 47% and 42% in 2002 to 50% and 46% by 2010, respectively.  
 
Table 4.4 Distribution of Australian household debt 
  Share of household debt from 
    home loan credit card other 
Percentile of net worth   
  2002 
Less than 20  6 28 37 
20-39.9  37 49 41 
40-59.9  47 32 26 
60-79.9  42 29 27 
80-100  33 22 25 
     
  2006 
Less than 20  5 28 51 
20-39.9  40 37 46 
40-59.9  48 30 31 
60-79.9  45 28 31 
80-100  36 18 30 
     
  2010 
Less than 20  6 50 67 
20-39.9  42 46 78 
40-59.9  50 34 69 
60-79.9  46 28 67 
80-100   38 27 63 
Source: Reserve Bank of Australia (2012) 
 
Significantly, the two lowest wealth percentiles have credit card debt as the largest 
proportion of debt, which rose over the years for which the Reserve Bank of Australia 
provides data. In 2002, 28% of the poorest households had credit card debt, which 
increased by 2010 to 50%. In contrast, only 22% of the wealthiest households held 
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credit card debt in 2002, increasing marginally to 27% in 2010. Other personal debt 
increased across all wealth percentile ranges from 2002 to 2010, and especially among 
the lowest two percentiles. 
 
The UK also acutely demonstrates the impact of financialisation upon the poorest of 
households. Figure 4.5 plots the ratio of debt to income against average income for UK 
households. Between GBP4,500 and GBP15,000 the level of debt held ranges between 
1.2x for the poorest households to approximately 0.2x for those on GBP15,000. Beyond 
this point, the average level of debt to income ratio gradually decreases.  
 
 
 
Figure 4.5 Distribution of household unsecured debt to income, UK 2011-2013 
Source: Bank of England, NMG Consulting Survey 2011, 2012 and 2013. 
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4.3.3 Income Inequality – The Rise of the Top 1% 
 
Under equation 4.1, a key element in the wealth accumulation process is the size of 
income. Obviously, ceteris paribus, higher incomes result in greater wealth 
accumulation. Here, the degree of wealth inequality is thus highly contingent upon the 
degree to which the highest income percentiles can increase their income shares. 
Further, the structure of income at the top is of major relevance. Piketty’s (2014a) 
inequality relationship, r > g, suggests that the returns to capital (capital income) are of 
paramount import to any analysis of wealth distribution. As a first step, it is necessary 
to first establish the level of income inequality. 
 
The evolution of income inequality has received considerable attention in the literature 
since the 1960s. Quantifying income inequality can take two approaches in general. One 
approach that is often employed to determine the level of income inequality in the 
economy is the Gini coefficient. An alternative approach is to examine the distribution 
of income via various percentiles or fractals of the income distribution. A significant 
advantage of this method is that it effectively accounts for the extremities in a 
distribution. In contrast, Gini coefficients place weight on the median observations, 
potentially under emphasising the amount of inequality present in the tails of a 
distribution (Piketty, 2014a). 
 
The approach used here is the share of national income accruing to the top income 1% 
percentiles. The WWID (Alvaredo et al., 2016) provides various country by country 
data across different income share percentiles as discussed in Chapter 3, section 3.2.3. 
For some countries, the database provides a structural division between the share of 
income from either labour or capital. This aspect of the database is particularly 
important considering the growth of income generating financial products. If, in 
Western economies, credit growth has been a defining characteristic of the impact of 
financialisation on household balance sheets for the poor, the increase of income 
generation from wealth holdings is the defining characteristic on the right-hand side of 
the wealth distribution. Saez and Zucman (2014) document that income derived from 
capital has consistently and increasingly accrued into the hands of the wealthy. This 
structure of top incomes is explored in section 4.3.3.1. 
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To begin, income shares for the top 1% are depicted for the six advanced economies in 
Figure 4.6. Income here is defined as pre-tax income, combining income derived from 
both labour and capital. In all instances, the top 1% income share is observed as 
increasing across all countries since the late 1970s. For the US, the 1960s and 1970s 
show approximately 8.07% of income being captured by the top 1% income group. This 
period in part corresponds to the “great compression” mentioned in section 4.1. The 
lowest share over these two decades is observed for Australia at 6.08% followed by the 
UK at 7.2%, while the highest is observed in Germany at 11.2%.  
 
 
Figure 4.6 Top 1% income share, 1960-2010 
Source: Income shares were obtained from the World Wealth and Income Database (Alvaredo, Atkinson, 
Piketty, Saez, and Zucman, 2015). The data is accessible from http://www.wid.com/ 
 
From the 1980s, there is a precipitous increase in the income shares of the top 1% 
across the sample. Both the US and the UK exhibit significant increases. Over the two-
decade period, 1990 to 2010 the mean income share going to the top 1% share in the US 
increased to 15.35% from 8.07% (1960 to 1979). No less steep is the observed increase 
in the UK, where the income share rose from 7.2% (1960 to 1979) to 12.52% over the 
1990 to 2010 period. On average, the majority of other countries reveal increased 
income shares for the top 1% albeit less than those observed in the US and the UK. In 
Australia, the mean income shares over 1990 to 2010 increased to 8.20% compared to 
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6.08% over the 1960 to 1979 period. Canada demonstrated an increase of similar 
magnitude, increasing from 8.84% to 10.69% across the same two periods. France and 
Germany exhibit little variation across the span of the two periods. Germany’s top 1% 
share increased only marginally to 11.21% from 11.20%. France’s top income share 
decreased to from 8.83% to 8.20%.  
 
Increasing levels of income concentration at the top income percentiles across the globe 
have varied explanations. Neoclassical economists emphasise the increasing returns to 
skill and education. Keynesians or institutionalists point to a shift in the bargaining 
power of high-income earners or managers over those further down the income (or 
wealth) distribution.  
 
The most recent econometric study on the determinants of income inequality is by 
Dabla-Norris et al. (2015). Their study utilised a cross-country longitudinal approach 
and examined the drivers of income inequality along various dimensions with a focus 
on the top 10%. These drivers encompass a variety of elements, including: 
 
• Trade openness; 
• Financial openness and deepening; 
• Technological growth; 
• Skill and education premiums; 
• Labour market institutions; and 
• Government spending. 
 
Their regression estimates found that of the above, three features appear to have had the 
most dramatic impact upon income inequality over the past 30 years. These include 
labour market institutions, technological growth, and financial deepening.  
 
The role of labour market institutions is measured as degree of regulatory control over 
firing and hiring, collective bargaining, and the setting of minimum wages. Dabla-
Norris et al. (2015, p. 15) find that labour market flexibility has been particularly 
beneficial to the top 10% income decile and conclude that ‘labor market flexibility 
benefits the rich and reduces the bargaining power of the lower-income workers’. 
Similarly, Jaumotte and Buitron (2015) view the decline in unionisation across the 
globe as giving rise to higher shares in the top 10% - once again achieved largely 
through the bargaining power of workers and top income shares. The weakening of 
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unions and the commensurate decrease in the bargaining power of workers has largely 
increased the proportion of capital income received by capitalists (Jaumotte & Buitron, 
2015, p. 31). This shift, however, has been brought about by governments shifting 
support to capital over labour. This process is particularly evident in the radical labour 
market policy shifts with the elections of Margaret Thatcher in the UK in 1979, Ronald 
Reagan in the US in 1980, and the Howard Government in Australia from the mid 
1990s. In the UK, the ‘The Thatcher government’s union reforms of the 1980’s included 
limits on closed union shops, secret ballots, … weakened labor unions and led to a 
decline in union membership’ (Bronars, 2013, para. 5). Similarly, in the US, ‘President 
Reagan fired PATCO strikers and replaced them with non-union workers, sending a 
strong message that government would not support labor’ (Pressman, 2016, p. 233). 
 
The causal link between flexible labour markets and, or, de-unionisation and the growth 
of top income shares, although recognised as important, is not the only policy force in 
increasing wealth inequality. Piketty (2014a) stresses this point by arguing that it is 
wealth inequality to begin with that drives income inequality – through the returns to 
capital. Here taxation can have a substantial impact on reducing capital returns. In 
equation 4.1, capital income is reduced by the rate of capital income tax: *"% ∙ 1 − ,7 . 
As will be shown in section 4.3.5, tax shifting between wage and capital represents a 
real issue via which the wealthy can minimise tax paid given that capital is taxed lower 
than wage income.  
 
Further, enhanced bargaining power of top executives or management enhances 
remuneration of this class. In this context, Piketty, Saez, and Stantcheva (2014) 
emphasise the impact of tax policy on pre-tax incomes in which unions have little if any 
role. The correlation between decreasing top marginal income tax rates and top wage 
incomes is not merely a statistical association but demonstrates a causal link. This 
causality story essentially argues that senior executives (and presumably, the owners of 
capital), with lower top tax rates, demanded greater compensation. Emphasising the role 
of incentives, Piketty (2014a), and Piketty, Saez, and Stantcheva (2014) argue that top 
income earners were prepared to fight now for greater income, since they got to keep 
more of the money they received. Labour unions, however, have little role in these 
empirical specifications whereas other institutional forces come to the fore. 
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These “institutional” factors primarily appear to be associated with the economic power 
found in the highest echelons of the corporate hierarchy. For example, corporate 
governance practices, in reality, tie remuneration packages of top executives to 
prevailing social norms rather than performance. The argument goes that with a shift in 
taxation policy, it is now permissible for executives to gain higher salaries as society 
permits this implicitly through government taxation policy. Performance does not 
provide an adequate explanation itself as the marginal productivity story would 
maintain. For example, empirical evidence suggests that executives receive large 
bonuses for increased sales or profit during periods of high economic growth (Bertand 
& Mullainathan, 2001).  
 
The second major force according to the Dabla-Norris et al. (2015) is the impact of 
technological growth. The advancement in technology can affect income inequality 
through two mechanisms. Jan Tinbergen’s (1975) provided the main impetus for this 
viewpoint proposing that to a significant extent income inequality was the outcome of 
the race between education and technology. There are two channels through which 
technology can impact upon income inequality. Firstly, a required tertiary qualification 
to utilise the technology may demand a premium for the worker’s skill set, thereby 
increasing incomes for those possessing the requisite skills. In the second channel, 
technological progress replaces unskilled workers or reduces their incomes. The first of 
these channels is the standard neoclassical marginal productivity story. Piketty (2014a) 
argues that although technological change or growth certainly has an impact, the 
strength of this effect is not as pronounced as ordinarily expected. Advanced economies 
which have demonstrated significant technology progress or growth, such as Sweden, 
have not shown a concomitant increase in income inequality. Empirically, the evidence 
shows that income inequality is not as pronounced in other societies or economies (such 
as Sweden) compared to, for example, the US or the UK despite sharing similar levels 
of technological growth. Pressman (2016) summarises Piketty’s argument as follows: 
‘The fact that there are large national differences [in income inequality] shows that 
marginal productivity is not driving the sharp rise in top incomes in Anglo-Saxon 
nations. The problem appears to be institutional rather than economic’ (p. 301). 
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4.2.4.2 The Structure of Income at the Top – Inequality of Capital Income 
 
According to Krugman (2014), research into income inequality has largely neglected or 
missed the emergence of an economic elite whose income is derived not from labour 
but capital. As Krugman (2014) points out, the general thrust of inequality research 
focused upon the rise of large managerial and chief executive officer compensation 
packages since the mid-1980s. Capital income though was largely neglected. Capital 
income here is defined as comprising capital gains, dividends, interest receipts, rents 
and business profits. Here, findings on the distribution between capital and labour 
income at the highest income percentiles are examined. The significance of capital 
income in the compensation structure of the wealthy is particularly important for the 
distribution of wealth, in so far as the Piketty (2014a) framework contends. Capital 
income, through the return to capital, r, is the main driver of inequality by amplifying 
initial disparities in accumulation models such as that presented in Equation 4.1. In 
societies where high wealth concentration prevails it represents a particularly important 
mechanism through which inequality is maintained.  
 
There are some a priori reasons to expect that capital income may represent a 
substantially greater element of total income for the wealthiest income groups. In 
previous sections, the increasing financialisation of household balance sheets was 
viewed as depressing wealth accumulation for the poorest households through the 
accumulation of credit. Financialisation might be playing a similar role on from the 
asset side for the wealthy households. Fligstein and Goldstein (2015) find evidence that 
the upper and upper middle classes in the US from 1989 through to 2007 ‘adopted a 
more aggressive attitude towards risk and engaged in more financial activities to 
support their lifestyles’ (p. 23). The greater risk tolerance among wealthier households 
is tested on Australian households in Chapter 5, but it is sufficient to note here that such 
risk taking enables rapid wealth accumulation by the upper classes compared to the 
lower classes in the long run through capital gains, dividend or interest receipts so long 
as the return to capital is greater than national income growth.  
 
By way of a brief introduction, the extent to which the wealthy dominate capital income 
shares is presented in Figure 4.7. The data is sourced from the Luxembourg Income 
Study (n.d.), which provides a distributional breakdown of income up to the 95th 
percentile in monetary terms. At the highest income tier, mean capital incomes have 
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remained relatively stable, ranging between USD13,750 (Canada) and USD17,372 
(US), but from 2000 there is a noticeable increase in Canada and Australia. Among the 
middle classes, the range is considerably lower, with the highest mean being USD545 
(Canada) and the lowest USD389 (US). At the 75 percentile, it increases to 
approximately USD2,330 for all countries. For the 95th percentile it increases 
dramatically to USD20,000 for Australia, Canada and the US.  
 
 
Figure 4.7 Distribution of capital income across the Anglo-Saxon economies by wealth percentiles 
Source: Luxembourg Income Study (n.d.). 
 
Although useful as a guide, the Luxembourg Income Study data stops at the 95th 
percentile and does not provide further information on the structure of incomes at the 
very highest echelons of the income distribution. Examining the structural breakdown 
between labour and capital income by income group percentiles at the very top provides 
a better examination of the shifting changes utilising data sourced from the World 
Income and Wealth database. Below, the structure of top incomes, the proportion of 
income derived from capital or income, is presented at three different percentiles: top 
1%, top 0.1% and the top 0.01%. By examining the data across the three percentiles, the 
shifting predominance or composition between income classes over time can be 
observed, and the reasons for the shifts can be explored.  
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The income structure decomposition for the Top 1% is presented in Figure 4.8. Since 
the late 1970s to early 1980s, the top 1% earners have increasingly earned their income 
from “non-capital” income sources. The shift is most acutely observed in Australia, 
Canada, and the US. In the US, the proportion of earned income has averaged 59.10% 
since 1975 to 2010. Australia has a similar average at 59.62%. Canada has similarly 
exhibited a relatively high portion of earned income, averaging 61.03%. Japan is well 
ahead with the 79.67% of the top 1% sourcing their income from non-capital labour. 
Only France deviates from the patterns observed in the other sample countries. There, 
although capital income demonstrates a decreasing trend since the 1960s, it has on 
average represented the majority source of income to the contemporary period for the 
top 1%. Taking a similar time frame from 1975 to 2005, 51.77% of the top 1% income 
earners in France received income from capital sources. Although labour income did at 
one stage constitute the majority of income for a brief period between 1996 to 2001, it 
subsequently reversed.  
 
 
Figure 4.8 Capital and labour income shares, top 1% 
Source: Income proportions were obtained from the World Wealth and Income Database (Alvaredo, 
Atkinson, Piketty, Saez, and Zucman, 2015). The data is accessible from http://www.wid.com/ 
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part of the professional and managerial classes. Saez (2006), for example, contends that 
the increasing income share of the top 1% observed in the Anglo countries is being 
driven not by increasing or higher capital incomes, but ‘highly paid executives [who] 
seem to have replaced the capitalists and rentiers of the early part of the century at the 
top of the income distribution’ (Saez, 2006, p. 238). In contrast, the French experience 
shows the dominance of capital income. This may, in part, be driven by the high rate of 
inheritance observed in France relative to the Anglo-Saxon countries, as identified in 
Chapter 3.  
 
Advancing to a smaller more prosperous income percentile group, the top 0.1%, reveals 
significant differences compared to the top 1% in the income dynamics of the wealthy. 
The relative proportion of income sources for the top 0.1% are presented in Figure 4.9. 
Two important observations can be made regarding the data. Firstly, except for Canada, 
income derived from capital income sources now dominates. In the US and Australia, 
there were brief periods throughout the 1980s and 1990s where this observation does 
not hold. However, by 2002 the relative pre-eminence of capital income holds. Further, 
the observed proportion of capital income appears to be approaching the levels in the 
early observation period, from 1960 to the late 1970s. In the US, there is a degree of 
overlap between capital and non-capital income. For non-capital income, the highest 
spike occurs in the year 2000, which coincidently corresponds with the largest influx of 
new entrepreneurs from the fields of information technology and finance as presented in 
Chapter 3. However, since then capital income has once again become the dominant 
source of income.  
 
In France, capital income continues to dominate the income structure. Between 1960 
and 2005, the average proportion of income from capital, was 66.01% (s = 2.2%), with 
no discernible trend up or down. Inheritance potentially explains the large role of capital 
incomes in France at both the 1% and 0.1% level. Daumard (1980) demonstrates that 
inheritance has always played a significant role in French economic life. Prior to the 
World War 1, the annual inheritance flow as a fraction of national income in France 
averaged 24%. The destruction wrought by the two World Wars had pushed this portion 
down to 4% by 1945. However, by 2010 the inheritance flow had increased to 
approximately 14% (Piketty, 2014, p. 378). Australia’s experience largely follows that 
of the US, where the relative proportion of the two income sources converge between 
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1985 and the early 2000s before the ascendency of capital income becomes established 
again. 
 
 
Figure 4.9 Capital and labour income shares, top 0.1% 
Source: Income proportions were obtained from the World Wealth and Income Database (Alvaredo, 
Atkinson, Piketty, Saez, and Zucman, 2015). The data is accessible from http://www.wid.com/ 
 
Further advancing along the income distribution, to the top 0.01%, reveals trends 
similar to those presented in Figure 4.9 for the top 0.1%. Figure 4.10 shows the 
evolution of the top 0.01% income structure across the four countries for which data are 
available. The trends and relative contributions of capital and non-capital income to 
overall income for the top 0.01% mostly follow those observed for the top 0.1%, though 
capital income dominates for a greater length of the period. In the US, only between 
1998 and 2001 is there a sharp but momentary increase in labour income, such that it 
dominates income derived by capital income. Beyond 2001, capital income once again 
dominates rising toward the proportions observed in the 1980s. For Australia, data on 
the top 0.01% is only available up to 1998. At least up until this point, a downward 
trend in the proportion of capital income emerges but is still well above non-capital 
income. Assuming Australia’s relative proportion shares follow those of the US, it is 
reasonable to expect these levels to be maintained throughout the 2000s. Both France 
and Canada largely show patterns that are similar to those observed in Figure 4.9.  
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Figure 4.10 Capital and labour income shares, top 0.01% 
Source: Income proportions were obtained from the World Wealth and Income Database (Alvaredo, 
Atkinson, Piketty, Saez, and Zucman, 2015). The data is accessible from http://www.wid.com/ 
 
In Section 3.2, the relationship between return to capital and national income growth is 
discussed. The greater returns to wealth relative to income growth invariably result in 
greater wealth concentration. At least in the Piketty (2014a) framework, capital income 
represents one of the major forces driving wealth accumulation and concentration at the 
top of the wealth pyramid. At the very highest income levels, this appears to be an 
accurate representation of economic reality. Capital income, at least for those countries 
that data exists, dominates at the top. 
 
4.3.3.2 Income Shares in Latin America 
 
Before proceeding into a discussion on taxation policy, it is worthwhile to briefly focus 
on Latin America. Although Latin America is one of the most unequal regions of the 
globe, since early 2000s it has been observed that inequality has declined, albeit from a 
high base (Gasparini & Lustig, 2011; Tsounta & Osueke, 2014). Estimates from 
Gasparini and Lustig (2011), for example, show that income inequality, as measured by 
the Gini coefficient, across Latin America has fallen. In 2002, the mean Gini coefficient 
was 53.7 and by 2008 had fallen to 50.9 approximately. Assigning causality to the 
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reduction in Gini coefficients has resulted in little consensus (Tsounta & Osueke, 2014). 
One favoured explanation is that stronger economic growth and a concomitant increase 
in the demand for unskilled labour reduced the wage differential compared to skilled 
labour (Gasparini & Lustig, 2011). In addition, expansion in the provision of education 
has also seen a reduction in the education wage premium throughout the continent. 
Lastly, and perhaps most significantly, the decline in Gini coefficients has been 
associated with large targeted cash transfers to the poor. In Brazil, for example, the 
Bolsa Familia program provides cash transfers to poor families, on the condition 
children are sent to school and vaccinated.  
 
The extent of reduced inequality in Latin America has been countered on the basis that 
the Gini coefficients may be overstating the decrease in inequality. Alternative 
measures, such as the top income shares, may reveal differences in inequality trends 
compared to those based on the Gini coefficient estimates. 
 
Figure 4.11 presents data from four Latin American countries for which income share 
data is available. One significant finding based on this data is that the absolute levels of 
top income shares are exceptionally high, rivalling or surpassing the observations in the 
US, and surpassing most of the advanced economies depicted in Figure 4.6. These 
trends suggest that reductions in the Gini coefficient might be overstating the reduction 
in income inequality. Argentina shows a steady increase in inequality, with the income 
share of the 1% increasing from 12.39% in 1997 to 16.75% by 2004. Colombia tends to 
exhibit the greatest income concentration in Latin America, rivalling the US 
observations. Over 1993 to 2010, the average income share of the top 1% was 19.57% 
for Colombia. Data for Uruguay is only available for 2009 through to 2012. Over this 
period the average income share going to the top 1% was 14.4%.  
 
The Latin American data is perhaps too short to identify any prevailing trends. Only for 
Brazil is a longer time series available. Although there was a spike in inequality during 
the 1960s and early 1970s with the coming to power of the Brazilian junta in 1964, the 
spike proved to be only a temporary situation. A noticeable decrease is evident in the 
top 1% share of income from the mid-1970s.  
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Figure 4.11 Top 1% income shares, selected Latin American countries 
Source: The income shares for Argentina, Colombia and Uruguay were obtained from the World Wealth 
and Income Database (Alvaredo, Atkinson, Piketty, Saez, and Zucman, 2015). The data is accessible from 
http://www.wid.com/. For Brazil, top income shares were sourced from Souza and Medeiros (2015). 
 
Souza (2014) argues that there are no abrupt changes or clear trends throughout the life 
of the sample since the 1990s for Brazil and that has settled into levels observed across 
the advanced countries. Significantly, Souza and Medeiros (2015) find that once 
controlled for the income shares of the top 1%, the observation of decreased Gini 
coefficients in Brazil effectively disappear. Further, they argue that:  
 
Different from what sample survey data alone shows, there are no major changes in 
the Gini coefficient when tax and sample survey data are combined to form a 
complete distribution of incomes among adults.  The reduction of inequality in the 
bottom of the distribution was offset by the slight rise in top income shares revealed 
by the tax data. 
 
Inequality therefore does not appear to have decreased in any meaningful sense.18 There 
may be numerous reasons for this, but taxation policy might be a key element. Taxation 
is one area which has not been adequately addressed in Latin America. Byanyima and 
Ibrarra (2016) state that tax evasion in Latin America (personal and corporate) costs the 
                                                
18 This is not to imply that poverty has not been reduced. 
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region approximately USD190 billion in lost revenue in 2014 alone. In Brazil, 27% of 
corporate taxes are never received by the state. Progressive taxation systems are needed 
to raise the resources for the continued provision of public goods and services that have 
lifted many out of poverty.  
 
In the next section, the role of taxation is considered in the context of advanced 
economies. 
 
4.3.4 Tax and Inequality 
 
The role of taxation policy in suppressing the amassment of great fortunes is now 
considered. The relationship between taxation policy and wealth accumulation arises 
through three channels, as presented in Equation 4.1. There is, of course, the direct 
impact on labour incomes which becomes more pronounced with progressive taxes. 
Secondly, there are taxes on capital income flows (corporate taxes, dividend taxes or 
capital gains taxation). Thirdly, there is the potential for direct taxes on the stock of 
wealth via estate or inter vivos gift taxation. This section explores the evolution of all 
three channels since 1970s. Further, the role of tax evasion via off-shore financial 
centres are considered. 
 
4.3.4.1 Top Marginal Income Tax Rates 
 
To begin, a comparison of the changes in the top marginal income tax rates for labour 
are examined since 1960. The impact of income taxation can either be direct in the 
sense of after-tax incomes or indirect on pre-tax incomes (see e.g. Piketty, Saez, & 
Stantcheva, 2014; Leigh, 2009). Both aspects are explored here.  
 
Overall, all countries demonstrate a fall in the top marginal income tax rates as 
presented in Figure 4.12. The overall trends across all seven countries seem to follow a 
path that can be divided into through three different epochs. In the first epoch, roughly 
corresponding to 1960 to the early 1970s, top marginal rates were high. Except for 
Germany (in relative terms), all countries exhibited significantly higher top income tax 
rates during the 1960s. The maximum income tax rate was in the UK at 90.0%, 
followed by the US (78.7%) and Japan (74%). The second epoch begins in the mid-
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1970s. By the mid-1970s, the average top income tax rates had fallen substantially, with 
some decreasing by more than 10%. France and the UK registered the largest decreases, 
dropping by 11.2% and 11.6%, respectively. The third epoch in tax policy changes 
across most countries manifests in the late 1980s through to 2010. On average, all 
countries exhibited significant falls in the top income tax rates over the 1990 to 2010 
period. The lowest average top marginal income tax rates were to be found in the US 
(39.89%) and the UK (40.45%). Australia also imposed significantly lower marginal tax 
rates on the highest incomes, now averaging 46.63%. Continental Europe also enforced 
lower tax rates on top incomes during this period but maintained these at levels higher 
than the Anglo countries in the sample. France decreased its top tax rate to an average 
of 54.44%. Germany somewhat goes against the behaviour of other states in 
maintaining a stable top income tax rate over the sample period. From 1960 to 2010, the 
average top income tax rate was 56.45%. Over the 1990 to 2010 period, it had barely 
changed at 56.08%. 
 
 
Figure 4.12 Top marginal income tax rates, 1960 - 2010 
Source: Top marginal income tax rates from Piketty, Saez, and Stantcheva (2012). 
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Income Tax Progressivity, Kakwani Index Estimates 
 
Measuring the impact of income tax policy changes upon after-tax income distribution 
can involve the use of various measures of tax progressivity. Two well-known measures 
are those developed by Kakwani (1977) and Reynolds and Smolensky (1977). The use 
of tax progressivity measures has been used in income distribution studies previously 
(see, for example, Leigh 2004). The Kakwani (1977) measure of income tax 
progressivity is estimated as: 
 
 9 = :;:∗=/ $;=   (4.3) 
 
where G is the pre-tax Gini coefficient, G* is the post-tax Gini coefficient, and , is the 
average income tax rate. According to Kakwani (1977), when P > 0 the tax system is 
progressive, when P = 0 it is proportional and when P < 0 it is regressive.  
 
Figure 4.13 presents the Kakwani index across the advanced economies. Some facts 
emerge from the trends across the economies. Firstly, most countries appear to follow a 
U-shaped pattern in income tax progressivity. For example, in Australia, tax 
progressivity peaked in 1974 under the Whitlam Government, before undergoing a 
precipitous decline until the late 1980s before slight increases in the index throughout 
the 2000s, peaking in 2009. The shape of the Australian Kakwani Index calculated here 
follows that of Leigh’s (2004) own calculations with a different index. Leigh (2004) 
applied the Suits Index measure of tax progressivity, who also noted an increase in tax 
progressivity from the 1990s to 2000s. The United States tends to follow a similar 
pattern, although the U-shape is more delineated compared to Australia. Enhancements 
in tax progressivity per the Kakwani Index are also observed in the UK, Canada, and 
Germany. The only country that deviates from the observation of increased tax 
progressivity is Japan; wherein the index decreased from a high of 0.55 in 1969 to 
approximately 0.20 in 2010 converging to the average observed for other countries. It 
should be noted that Japan demonstrated enormous entrepreneurial activity during the 
1960s and 1970s.  
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Figure 4.13 Kakwani income tax progressivity, 1960-2010 
 
The observation that tax progressivity has increased since the 1980s and 1990s across 
the advanced industrialised economies ostensibly conflicts with the observed decrease 
in top tax rates depicted in Figure 4.12 and the increase in top income shares as 
reviewed in section 4.3.4.1. Numerous studies have shown a causal link between 
taxation rates and income shares. Piketty, Saez, and Stantcheva (2012) demonstrate that 
for the countries discussed here, the reductions in top marginal tax rates were highly 
correlated with a surge in top income shares (at the 1% level). DeLong (2002) points 
out that the United States generated hardly any billionaires from 1930 to 1980. The 
existence of a highly progressive taxation system in the United States constituted one of 
the strongest counters to the emergence of billionaires. The reversal in tax policy 
coincides with the almost immediate reappearance of the American billionaire.  
 
Four explanations may partly conciliate the contradictory observations. Firstly, the 
estimation of the Kakwani Index utilised the after-tax and transfer income Gini 
coefficient. Transfers can, potentially, have a significant impact on inequality beyond 
taxation.19 Secondly, it was noted in Section 4.3.3.1 that the ultra-rich, particularly the 
top 0.1% and above derive the majority of their income from capital (dividends, interest 
                                                
19 The discussion in section 4.3.3.2 mentions the impact of cash transfers to Brazil’s poor and the 
reduction in the Gini coefficient. 
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receipts, or capital gains). These forms of income will not be impacted upon by changes 
in top marginal income taxes rates. Thirdly, the Gini coefficient tends to be less 
effective in capturing the extreme tails of the income distribution, placing greater 
emphasis on the median (Piketty, 2014a). Fourthly, the data on top income shares 
examine before-tax income shares. Very few studies have considered after-tax income 
shares which may permit a better estimate of progressivity of income tax rates. 
 
Implicit Tax Rates Derived from Top Pre- and Post-Tax Income Shares 
 
An alternative to the tax progressivity indexes is to estimate the direct impact of income 
tax on top incomes. The arithmetic impact of income tax on the top income shares is 
hard to assess across the all seven countries given a lack of data in this area. Previous 
studies by Atkinson and Salverda (2005) on the UK, Veall (2012) on Canada and the 
US (Piketty and Saez, 2006) permit some assessment of the arithmetic impact of 
taxation on the top shares. Figure 4.13 presents the “implicit tax rate” of the one 
percent. It is calculated as: 
 ,?@ = 1 −	 ABCDEB	"FG	HIFEB	DC	"IB	"DJ	$%JDH"	"FG	HIFEB	DC	"IB	"DJ	$%                              (4.4) 
 
where ,?@is the implicit tax rate.  
 
For the United Kingdom and the US, the implicit tax rate on the top 1 percent shows a 
dramatic between fall from 1960 through to 1980. The implicit tax rate for the two 
countries went from a mean of 28.9% (UK) and 27.6% (US) in the 1970s to 21.4% and 
13.4% in the 1980s, respectively. The subsequent two decades experienced slight 
reversals to this trend. By the 1990s, both the UK and the US had converged to implicit 
tax rates of 20%. In contrast, the Canadian experience somewhat reverses the 
observations in the UK and US. In the 1980s the mean implicit tax rate was 19% 
increasing to 26.4% in the 1990s and 24.7% in the 2000s. In contrast to the Kakwani 
Index, these estimates do suggest that the tax burden has systematically decreased 
across the UK and US, but data limitations limit the inferences that can be made. 
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Figure 4.14 Implicit income tax rates, 1970-2006 
Source: UK estimates from Atkinson and Salverda (2005), Canadian estimates from Veall (2012), and US 
estimates from Piketty and Saez (2006). 
 
Response of Pre-Tax Top Income Shares to Income Tax Rate Changes 
 
Numerous studies have econometrically examined the relationship between marginal 
tax rates and top pre-tax income shares.20 Cross-country studies have typically found a 
correlation between the two, but the strength of the relationship is highly varied. Roine, 
Vlachos, and Waldenström (2008) found that countries that experienced substantial 
reductions in the top marginal top income tax rates only experience modest increases in 
top income shares. Numerically, a 10% decrease in the top marginal tax rate was found 
to be associated with a 0.4 percentage point increase in the share of the top one percent. 
However, Roine et al. (2008) also conclude that high marginal tax rates have an 
equalising effect beyond the direct impact of taxation such as societal norms briefly 
discussed in section 4.3.3 on executive pay. Another cross-country study finds a 
stronger effect. Atkinson and Leigh (2013) analyse the impact of a reduction in top 
marginal tax rates on top income shares across five Anglo-Saxon countries. They 
                                                
20 It is important to note that a reduction in the progressivity of income tax rates does not mean lower 
income tax collection. As Piketty and Saez (2007) show, lower tax rates for the wealthy have seen a 
commensurate increase in the level of tax collected for the US. 
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determine that a reduction in the top marginal rate can explain between one third and 
one-half of the rise in the income share of the top percentile.  
 
Country-specific studies of the impact of changes in the top marginal tax rate upon top 
income shares largely corroborate the findings of cross-country studies, though some 
results establish no clear relationship. Dilnot, Kell, and Webb (1988) analysed the US 
1979 top income tax reduction. They found that the level of tax receipts remained 
mostly constant from 1978 to 1985. The stability in tax receipts implying that incomes 
increased following the tax cut. The Canadian experience ostensibly reflects that 
exhibited by both UK and US. Saez and Veall (2005) find top income shares largely 
track income tax reductions, but this may represent a spurious correlation between the 
two variables. Instead, they argue that Canadian income shares more closely track US 
income shares. The authors suggest this is due to the competitiveness of the US after-tax 
regime relative to that of Canada. Workers with highly marketable skills move(d) to the 
US if after-tax compensation was more attractive there compared to Canada. 
 
Studies on Europe reveals that the relationship between pre-tax income shares and tax 
rates may be somewhat ambiguous. Piketty (1998) and Landais (2008) both consider 
the relationship between income taxes and top income shares in France over time. Both 
find that personal income tax rates have had an insignificant impact on income shares. 
Piketty (1998) finds that the elasticity of taxable income with respect to taxation is far 
lower than what is observed in the US. Evidence from Germany shows evidence more 
in line with that of the US. For Germany, Gottfried and Schellhorn (2004) find that the 
elasticity of taxable income to changes in the tax regime is quite substantial for 
Germany, estimating an elasticity of approximately 1 – far higher than 0.4 for France.  
 
A significant outlier is Japan. Moriguchi and Saez (2008) do not find any surge in top 
income shares in recent decades. As Figure 4.11 depicts, Japan has demonstrated a 
significant reduction in top income tax rates. In their conclusion, Moriguchi and Saez 
(2008) contend that neither changes in technology nor tax policies alone can explain the 
relative stability of top Japanese incomes shares, despite significant variations in both. 
Instead, economic policies beyond tax to those such as institutional arrangements 
surrounding corporate governance, and the lasting influence of occupation reforms of 
the US in the post-war era constitute greater influences on top income shares. Tax 
evasion and avoidance are, for the case of Japan, also largely dismissed as an 
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explanation for its low-income inequality trends (in recent decades). For countries 
beyond the focus of this study, empirical results demonstrate a clear relationship 
between falls in the top marginal income tax rates and increase in top income shares. 
For Sweden, Roine and Walenström (2008) find a significant inverse relationship 
between the two variables over the twentieth century. Similarly, in Finland the same 
causality is established.  
 
The differing impact of reductions of the top marginal tax rate on pre-tax income shares 
could be explained by any number of alternatives as advanced in the literature. Leigh 
(2009) argues that there are two channels: 1) an immediate work disincentive effect and 
2) a lagged effect via capital accumulation. Piketty, Saez, and Stantcheva (2012) argue 
that the impact of a reduced tax rate on pre-tax top income shares can be affected via 
three potential channels. These include: 
 
1. An increase in hours of work supplied due to a fall in the income tax rate.  
2. Increased rent seeking activity by executives or owners of enterprises. The 
increased rent seeking manifests through bargaining power. 
3. Decreased tax avoidance.  
 
On decreased tax avoidance Morelli, Smeeding, and Thompson (2014) state that the: 
 
reduction in top marginal tax rate could indeed reduce the propensity to evade 
taxation, increasing the tax collection and therefore income reported at the top. 
Hence, the increase in inequality may be due to a reduction in tax avoidance due to 
lower tax rates for richer groups. (p. 86).  
 
Similarly, Reynolds (2007), for example, argues that the large growth in the top 1% 
income share, particularly during the 1980s, is owed to a shift in the tax base from 
corporate to personal income tax. Piketty, Saez, and Stantcheva (2012), empirically 
examine all three hypotheses. They argue that impact of changes in the top marginal tax 
rate upon pre-tax income shares are largely emblematic of greater institutional changes 
that favour the bargaining positions of executives. Decreased tax avoidance and 
increases in hours of work supplied (the marginal productivity story) are found to have 
little explanatory power.  
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4.3.4.2 Capital Income Tax and Base Shifting Between Income Sources 
 
In Section 4.3.3.1, capital income was shown to be the dominate form of income 
amongst the highest earners. Therefore, it may be taxes related to capital income that 
might bear the clearest impact on capital income shares. Stilwell and Jordan (2007, p. 
155) articulate the ultimate impact of this when stating that ‘[t]he unequalising effects 
of government policy have been further compounded by cuts in company taxes, 
dividend imputation and reduction of the effective rate of capital gains tax’ (p. 155).   
 
The evolution of statutory corporate tax rates and tax rates on dividends since the early 
1980s are presented in Figure 4.14. Across all countries, there is a marked downward 
trend in both rates. In the 1980s, Australia’s average corporate tax rate was 
approximately 45%. By 1999, this had decreased to 37%, before falling again in the 
2000s. Throughout the 2000s, the average tax rate remained at 30%. The other sample 
countries largely mirror the Australian experience. In the 1980s, Japan’s, the UK’s and 
the US’s average corporate tax rate was 42%. Germany exhibited the highest average 
through the 1980s at 56%. By the 2000s, all countries maintained corporate tax rates at 
or below 35%. The largest decrease is observed for Germany down to an average of 
23% throughout the 2000s compared to 56% in 1980s.  
 
The dividend tax rates also underwent significant falls across the sample. Since the 
early 1980s, taxes levied on dividends ranged 45% to 80%. In line with reductions in 
the corporate tax rate and top marginal income tax rates, the dividend tax rate was 
systematically decreased across all the countries in the sample. By 2010, most of the 
advanced economies taxed dividends between 10% to approximately 30%. The lowest 
tax rates in 2010 are observed in Japan (10.00%) and the US (19.99%). Australia, 
Canada, France and Germany all exhibited taxes ranging between 26.38% (Germany) to 
30% (Australia).  
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Figure 4.15 Dividend and corporate tax rates, 1980-2010 
Source: OECD Tax Database. Retrieved from http://www.oecd.org/tax/tax-policy/tax-database.htm 
 
Focusing solely on income taxes negates the various means via which the wealthy can 
circumvent or hide their large incomes from tax authorities by alternating between 
different income sources as required to exploit tax rate differentials (whilst also 
benefitting from decreases in the actual rate of taxation). Being wealthy permits routing 
earnings through other channels that are taxed effectively lower. The most obvious 
example of shifting between tax bases is that of executive compensation alternating 
between the use of wage compensation to stock options.  
 
Directly measuring the impact of taxation on capital income is vastly more challenging 
due to the ways the wealthy can shift earnings between wages, dividends or capital 
gains. Piketty, Saez and Zucman (2013) recognize the potential for shifting income 
between different sources when stating: ‘Sometime [sic] it is not all obvious to 
decompose these flows into a pure labor component (payment for labor services) and a 
pure capital component (compensation for capital ownership)’ (p. 2). The point which 
Piketty, Saez and Zucman (2013) are conveying being that there is tremendous scope 
for the wealthy to shift income bases depending upon which provides the most 
favourable tax treatment. 
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The impact of changes in capital income taxes relative to wage income taxes can be 
observed through even casual empiricism. In Australia, dividend tax policy till 1986 
implemented a classical tax approach to dividend payouts. In 1987, Australia abandoned 
the classical approach to dividend taxation and adopted a dividend imputation system. 
The change in policy also implemented a concomitant and drastic decrease in the tax 
payable on dividends. Dividend tax rates fell from 58.23% in 1986 to 18.4% in 1987. 
Commensurately, the top 0.01% share of capital income went from 59.94% in 1986 to 
68.6% in 1986, and 82.64% in 1988. Throughout the 2000s, the dividend tax rate 
hovered at approximately 25%, while the capital income share of the top 0.1% averaged 
at 73%. Similar falls are observed across other countries in response to changes in the 
dividend tax system. The US registers one of the largest decreases on dividend tax. 
Throughout the 1980s the average tax rate on dividends was 52%, in the 1990s it fell to 
43% before another precipitous fall to 26%. The large fall was met with a 
commensurate shift in the structure of top incomes in the US to that of capital income. 
Empirical studies on tax base shifting is sparse, though Gordon and Slemrod (2000) 
provide one of the best examples. Utilising time series data, they found that a one-point 
increase in the differential between the corporate tax rate and labour income tax rate 
‘raises reported personal labor income by 3.2%, and results in a fall in the reported 
corporate rate of return of 0.147 percent’ (p. 46). 
 
4.3.4.3 Wealth and Estate Taxation 
 
Wealth and estate taxes have long been considered as a means of addressing perceived 
inequalities (Kopczuk, 2013). Taxation on stocks of wealth can take two forms, taxes on 
intergenerational transfers (after death of inter vivos) and taxes on an individual’s net 
worth. For Piketty (2014a) a tax on the stock of wealth represents a key proposal to 
emerge from his treatise on wealth. In this subsection, the historical trends in both are 
considered as well as a brief review of the predictions of theoretical models and 
empirical studies that consider the impact of taxes in either form. 
 
Intergenerational and Estate Taxes 
 
To begin, intergenerational transfer and estate transfers are considered. For brevity, both 
are referred to as inheritance taxes from this point. Figure 4.16 depicts the top tax rates 
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on inheritances across the seven economies. Across all countries, with the exception of 
France, there has been a systematic decrease in the rate of taxation applicable to estates. 
Both Canada and Australia abolished their respective estate taxes in the 1970s. The 
abolition of the Canadian federal estate tax in 1971 was viewed in the era as being 
‘important in terms not of revenue but of what it symbolized: a retreat from decades of 
attempts to alter wealth distribution through taxation’ (Bird, 1978, p. 134). In Australia, 
the Estate Duty Amendment Act 1978 abolished estate duties that had been in place 
since 1915. Just as in Canada, the abolition of inheritance taxes had little impact on state 
revenues but represented a signal that Australia, as a nation, now appeared unconcerned 
by the concentration of wealth (Pedrick, 1982).  
 
 
Figure 4.16 Top inheritance tax rates % 
Source: Plagge, Scheve, and Stasavage (2010). Comparative Inheritance Taxation Database  
 
In contrast to Australia and Canada, the other Anglo countries, the US and UK have 
both maintained inheritance taxes to the present day. In the US, the Revenue Act 1940 
had set top tax rates on inherited estates at 77% with a threshold of USD20,000. The 
rate remained stable until 1976, though the threshold had increased to USD40,000. In 
line with the observations in relation to income tax rates, and capital incomes, the 
inheritance tax rate underwent a substantial transformation. The Economic Recovery Act 
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to 55% and the threshold exemption to USD325,000 in 1984 and further increasing to 
USD675,000 in 2001. The largest shake up in US inheritance taxes occurred in 2001 
with the passing of The Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001. 
The new act provided for a ten-year schedule in decreases to the top tax rate to 45% in 
2009 with the goal to repeal estate taxes, but was overturned by Congress. At the time 
of writing the top tax rate had been further reduced to 40%. The UK has also 
demonstrated similar falls to the US, with the top inheritance tax rate of 80% in 1960 
decreasing to 40% with the passing of the Finance Act 1987. Roach (2003) finds that 
despite the falls in estate and gift tax rate, it remains the most progressive tax 
component in the US federal system. 
 
Since the mid-1980s, the highest inheritance tax rates have been enforced by Japan. In 
2003, tax rates fell to 50%, but remained above the rates observed in other countries. 
Figure 4.16 shows inheritance tax revenues in Japan have trended down since the 1980s. 
In addition, the proportion of estates taxed have also decreased significantly. This 
outcome appears primarily to be driven by an increase in the exemption threshold from 
70 million Yen in 1988 to 275 million Yen. Further, the dramatic falls in Japanese real 
estate values would have had an impact in the number of estates meeting the minimum 
threshold. 
  
 
Figure 4.17 Percentage of Japanese estates taxed and revenues from estate and gift taxes 
Source: Ministry of Finance, Japan. Retrieved from http://www.mof.go.jp/english/index.htm 
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Turning to continental Europe, both France and Germany have maintained modest 
levels of inheritance tax, but the progressivity of it has increased since the 1970s and 
1980s. In contrast to the US and UK where the progressivity of inheritance taxes has 
declined significantly, for the two continental economic powers, it has increased. 
Piketty and Saez (2006) argue that the overall impact of the increase in estate and gift 
taxes is to have improved the overall progressivity of those nations’ tax systems relative 
to the UK and US. 
 
The review of inheritance tax rates only considers the progressivity of inheritance taxes 
and not their impact upon the wealth distribution. The relationship between inheritance 
taxes and the wealth distribution is ambiguous. Pedrick (1982) and Bird (1978) when 
advocating the reintroduction of death taxes were themselves sceptical of their overall 
direct impact on moderating wealth inequality. Pedrick (1982), for example, states that:  
 
In both countries [the UK and the US] there are still family fortunes of huge size 
notwithstanding that these family fortunes have passed through several 
generations with death taxes featuring rates that reach to seventy per cent. 
Plainly death taxes in the United Kingdom and the United States have been 
avoidable with expert guidance. (p. 453) 
 
As mentioned in the above quote, much of these great fortunes escaped taxation through 
the rise of the professional family offices and trusts. Tuckman (1973) long recognised 
taxes directly on wealth, at least in the US, could be readily circumvented even in 
periods of high tax progressivity. Large family foundations such as the Ford Foundation 
or similar schemes by the Du Ponts largely rendered the effectiveness of estate taxes 
blunt (see e.g. Tuckman, 1983, pp 60-61). 
 
A scarce number of theoretical papers have analysed the impact of changes in estate 
taxation on the distribution of wealth, with ambiguous results. Stiglitz (1978) utilising a 
general equilibrium framework finds that estate taxes may increase inequality. In the 
general equilibrium framework, estate taxes reduce capital accumulation and increase 
returns to capital21. Assuming that the elasticity of substitution between labour and 
capital is less than one, it will result in a greater amount of capital income than is 
                                                
21 This relationship is largely rejected by the empirical data presented by Piketty (2014a) that has shown a 
high degree of capital or wealth deepening and relative high returns to capital. 
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ordinarily received by the wealthy in the main. Dynamic general equilibrium models 
which have been augmented by more assumptions in relation to certain risks largely 
conclude that repealing estate taxes (or implementing them) will have minor impact on 
overall wealth distribution (Castaneda, Diaz-Gimenez, and Rios-Rull, 2003; Cagetti and 
Di Nardi, 2008).   
 
Empirically, there is little contemporary work the considers the impact of estate and gift 
taxes on inheritance flows. Atkinson (2012) finds that the proportion of the UK 
population liable for estate taxation has fallen considerably today compared to the first 
half of the 20th century which may have significant implications for equity. For the US, 
Blinder (1976) found that even estate taxes of up to 60% had very little impact on 
distribution. Similarly, Verbit (1978) finds had no impact on the distribution of wealth 
from the 1920 to 1970 in the US. 
 
Net Wealth Taxes 
 
An alternative approach to tax estates is a net wealth tax. In Section 3.3, it was shown 
that wealth to income ratios have substantially increased across all the advanced 
economies since the 1960s. According to Joumard, Pisu, and Bloch (2012), a wealth on 
tax even at a modestly low rate could generate significant revenues for the state. Despite 
the mounting evidence of large increases in wealth to income ratios, national 
governments have largely ignored this as both a potential source of redistributing wealth 
or raising revenue. At the time of writing, only France, Norway (up to 0.7% at the 
municipal and 0.4% at the national level), and Switzerland (varies at the cantonal level) 
continue to levy a wealth tax. Germany abolished their wealth tax in 1998 as it was 
ruled unconstitutional. Australia, Canada, Japan, the UK and the US have never 
imposed an overall net wealth taxation (Price and Dang, 2011).  
 
The French net wealth tax was introduced in 1981 by the Socialist Party. Labelled the 
solidarity tax on wealth (Impôt de solidarité sur la fortune) the tax was briefly repealed 
in 1986 but once again reinstated in 1989. The purpose of the scheme was to finance the 
minimum income scheme aimed at assisting those who could not find work and were 
not entitled to unemployment benefits. In terms of direct economic effectiveness, the 
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tax is a significant generator of income for the French state. Piketty and Saez (2006) 
estimate that the solidarity tax pushes the average tax rate in France up to 60%, and 
approaches the progressive tax regimes observed in the Anglo-Saxon countries in the 
1950s and 1960s. 
 
The impact of the solidarity tax on France’s wealth distribution is difficult to assess. 
Much like other taxes, the behavioural response of individuals and households typically 
does not always accord with the intended purpose of the tax. Amoils and Read (2015) 
tracked the movements 323,400 French high net worth individuals from 2000 to 2014. 
During this period, they found that 42,000 high net worth individuals emigrated from 
France. Further, it was found that the majority of these individuals moved to countries 
that offered favourable tax treatment, including Luxembourg, Switzerland and the UK.  
 
The ability of the wealthy to either move to more favourable locations due to tax 
advantages or to just shift wealth into jurisdictions with favourable tax treatment is 
considered in the next section. 
 
4.3.4.4 Tax Avoidance and Evasion – Emergence of Off-Shore Financial Centres 
 
Amongst the wealthy, a preferred method of minimising the effects of tax is via tax 
minimisation schemes through off-shore financial centres (OFC). What precisely are 
off-shore financial centres? The definition of an OFC has undergone substantial 
revision, particularly over the past two decades. At one end, the term off-shore financial 
centre is largely just a synonym, or a contemporary spin, for tax haven. Desai, Foley, 
and Hines (2004) define: ‘Tax havens are low-tax jurisdictions that provide investors 
opportunities for tax avoidance’ (p. 1). International governmental bodies have typically 
expanded the boundaries of OFC’s roles beyond the strict tax evasion definition. For 
example, the 1998 OECD report, Harmful Tax Competition, is significantly more 
expansive than that of Desai et al. (2004). For the OECD (1998, pg. 23), a tax haven is 
defined as a jurisdiction that imposes or possesses:  
 
1. No or only nominal taxes; 
2. Lack of effective exchange of information; 
3. Lack of transparency; and 
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4. The absence of a requirement that the activity be substantial. 
 
Point (4) was an important inclusion as it recognised that these jurisdictions are typically 
synonymous with the “booking device” term, wherein transactions are not related to any 
real-world activity such as the creation of a shell company.  
 
The term “tax haven” has subsequently become much more inclusive. Working towards 
an operational definition of off shore centres, Zoromé (2007) argued that the surveyed 
literature typically compromises three core definitional elements if aggregated. 
According to Zoromé (2007, pg. 4): 
 
Three distinctive recurrent characteristics of OFCs have emerged from these 
definitions: (i) the primary orientation of business toward nonresidents; (ii) the 
favourable regulatory environment (low supervisory requirements and minimal 
information disclosure) and; (iii) the low-or zero-taxation schemes. 
  
Another definition provided by Di Nicola (2006, pg. 3), provides a similar meaning:  
 
An offshore centre is a country which provides to the residents of other countries the 
opportunity to establish companies and to use its financial services for activities 
outside this centre, offering in most of the cases some advantages such as low 
taxation rates. In other words, the aim of the users of the offshore centres is to take 
advantage of the lower tax rates offered by the offshore centre which is not 
synonymous to tax evasion as is the general perception…. 
 
The importance of an operational definition is essential from three aspects. Firstly, there 
is, of course, the taxation dimension, and the associated lost taxation revenue due to tax 
avoidance related of off-shore centres. Secondly, there are substantial anomalies in 
international payments data of which offshore centres play a significant role. Thirdly, 
establishing a more inclusive definition of an offshore centre necessarily permits a wider 
context on how ultra-high net worth individuals can hide their wealth, often in plain sight, 
in jurisdictions not necessarily associated with tax havens in the popular mind.  
 
Exploring the full impact of OFCs wealth accumulation is beyond the scope of this 
study. A recent Zucman (2014) presents numerous estimates as to the wealth hidden in 
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these centres and the tax revenue lost. Wealth here is taken to mean financial wealth and 
does not incorporate assets such as yachts. Table 4.5 presents the estimates produced by 
Zucman (2014). Notable in the estimates is the dominance of Europe, with an estimated 
$2.6 trillion held in OFCs, representing a tax revenue loss of $75 billion. Although the 
advanced economies hold the most wealth in absolute terms, developing regions 
maintain the highest proportions of their respective wealth in these centres. Both Russia 
and the Gulf countries maintain up to and over 50% of their financial wealth in OFCs. 
Wealthy individuals in Latin America and Africa also hold a large proportion of their 
wealth in these centres.  
 
Table 4.5 Statistics on offshore wealth and associated tax revenue losses 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Reproduced from Zucman (2014) 
 
Estimates of the amount of wealth held in off shore financial centres or tax havens vary 
substantially depending upon the methodology employed. Zucman (2014) derives the 
$7.5 trillion estimate via the presence of anomalies in the national accounts of countries. 
Henry (2012) furnishes vastly higher estimates, valuing the total wealth held in tax 
havens between $21 trillion and $32 trillion in financial wealth. More recent estimates 
by Henry (2016) further present divergent estimates particularly for the developing 
world. Henry (2016) estimates that flows into OFCs from the developing world total 
approximately $12.1 trillion compared to Zucman’s (2014) estimate of $3.5 trillion. The 
major variations occur concerning Russia (Zucman estimate of USD200 billion, Henry 
estimate of USD1.3 trillion) and Asia (Zucman estimate of USD1.3 trillion, Henry 
estimate of USD4.5 trillion). 
 
  Offshore wealth 
($ bn) 
Share of 
financial wealth 
held offshore 
Tax revenue 
loss ($ bn) 
Europe 2,600 10% 75 
USA 1,200 4% 36 
Asia 1,300 4% 35 
Latin America 700 22% 21 
Africa 500 30% 15 
Canada 300 9% 6 
Russia 200 50% 1 
Gulf countries 800 57% 0 
Total 7,600 8.0% 190 
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Previous estimates have tended to align with Zucman (2014) or been more conservative 
in their estimates. For example, the IMF estimated $1.7 trillion in wealth was held in 
OFCs (IMF, 2000). The IMF estimate was based on the portfolio flows through off 
shore financial centres. In the same year, the NGO Oxfam (2000) estimated that OFCs 
held in custody between $6-$7 trillion in financial wealth. In 2007, the Boston 
Consulting Group estimated the wealth hidden in tax havens at approximately $7.3 
trillion.  
 
Notwithstanding the divergent estimates of wealth in OFCs, the cost to societies and 
their national governments in the form of lost tax revenue are substantial, even when 
assuming the conservative estimates of Zucman (2014). Zucman (2014) estimates that 
being able to tax the top 0.1% of the population’s wealth would impact significantly not 
only on government revenue but reduce global wealth inequality to a material degree. 
Zucman (2014, p. 53) argues that assuming ‘all unrecorded offshore wealth belongs to 
the top 0.1%, eradicating offshore evasion would thus raise as much revenue as 
increasing the top 0.1%’s federal income tax bill by close to 18%.’  
 
The revenue loss estimates of Zucman (2014) do make some simplifying assumptions 
that potentially overestimate the losses from OFCs. The US estimated revenue loss 
assumes that income tax is paid at the dividend rate of 30% and an estate tax of 40%. 
Clarke (2016) points out that the effective tax rates paid by the top 1% are below both 
these estimates, and that, further, the return on capital that Zucman (2015) assumes at 7% 
is historically high.  
 
International Effectiveness – A Note on the Political Economy of Tax Treaties and 
Havens 
 
Thwarting the returns to wealth by reducing the level of tax avoidance and evasion in 
tax havens has received policy attention on a global and regional scale. At an 
international level, the core mechanism through which personal capital incomes can be 
taxed is via the implementation of an information exchange between two countries. The 
two primary forms of information exchange entail automatic exchanges or direct 
information requests by a government to another national government. Although the 
former is viewed as the more effective means of detecting tax evasion or avoidance, it is 
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often the latter that is enshrined in bi- and multi-lateral treaties (Keen and Lighart, 
2006).  
 
The primary international institutional framework for dealing with tax evasion is 
through the OECD (Hanlon, Maydew and Thornock, 2015). Beginning with a working 
group on tax havens in 1998 (OECD, 1998), the OECD issued a report listing 35 
jurisdictions as tax havens. According to Hanlon et al. (2015, p. 8), 
 
By 2002, 31 of the countries had agreed to cooperate with the OECD, though 
implementation in some cases took much longer. By 2009, there were no countries 
on the OECD blacklist and only four countries on the grey list… and those were 
labelled as “other financial centers” rather than tax havens. 
 
The decision by tax havens to cooperate with OECD seemingly has had a positive 
impact if considered from the viewpoint of the number of treaties signed. Table 4.6 lists 
the number of double tax treaties (DTCs) and tax information exchange agreements 
(TIEA) since 2008. The turning point was the G20 London Summit where states 
proposed a four-tier system of blacklisted havens. Since then the number of treaties has 
increased from 65 to 725 by October 2011. Although the growth is on the surface 
impressive, it potentially masks two problems. Firstly, a proportion of the treaties would 
be DTCs. Double tax treaties have been criticised as being ineffective in the instance of 
tax havens as they permit a requested party to remain concealed behind bank secrecy. 
Sheppard (2009) argues that this is particularly present in the treaties signed by 
Luxembourg and Switzerland. The provision to permit bank secrecy and confidentiality 
effectively provides a mechanism for Switzerland and Luxembourg to rebuke requests 
for information on the basis of the secrecy clauses. Secondly, the use of direct tax 
agreement between a country and a tax haven country may not be appropriate as the 
latter may have very low or no taxes on income or profits to begin with. 
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Table 4.6 TIEAs/DTCs signed between G20 summits 
Summit Signed Treaties 
G20 Washington DC Summit (15 Nov, 2008) 44 
G20 London Summit (2 Apr, 2009) 65 
G20 Pittsburgh Summit (25 Sep, 2009) 229 
31 Dec, 2009 364 
G20 Toronto Summit (26 Jun, 2010) 524 
G20 Seoul Summit (12 Nov, 2010) 606 
13 Oct, 2011 725 
Source: OECD, http://www.oecd.org 
 
By contrast, TIEAs are meant to provide a more effective legal mechanism of reducing 
tax evasion. Tax information exchange agreements are far less broad in scope than 
DTCs as they are specifically designed to focus on information exchange. The 
effectiveness of TIEAs can be considered both from a legal efficacy perspective and 
from an economic perspective where the portfolio responses of individuals can be 
observed. 
 
Legally, numerous problems have been identified with the efficacy of TIEAs in their 
current form. Firstly, a tax haven may not possess the information in a form to be useful 
to tax authorities (Sullivan, 2009). Often this may be due to the tax haven not requiring 
clear identification when individuals set up accounts or shell companies. For example, 
the British Virgin Islands do not require any identification of shareholders or directors 
despite being home to thousands of registered corporations. Therefore, a request for 
information may not give rise to any genuinely useful information. Secondly, tax 
information exchanges only take place on a request basis (Munizer, 2009; Sullivan, 
2009). For tax authorities, this presents two significant impediments to persecuting 
cases of tax evasion. First, requests for information require significant effort on the part 
of tax authorities involving the use of detailed evidence and case arguments. Assuming 
such an application is made, the matter would likely be tied up in courts for years – 
beyond that provided by the statute of limitations in each jurisdiction (Sheppard, 2009). 
The onus upon tax authorities is such that use of TIEAs is low. In the US, only 894 
information requests were made between 2006-2010. Contrast this with the estimated 
19,000 US residents who maintained bank accounts at a single Swiss bank. 
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The empirical evidence on the economic efficacy of tax treaties is small, and that which 
does exist is mixed. A recent study by Hanlon, Maydew and Thornock (2015) 
investigate a form of tax evasion termed “round-tripping” where individuals conceal 
funds in offshore tax havens and plough those funds back into the US securities 
markets. Specifically, they test whether foreign portfolio investment into the US from 
tax havens decreases with information exchange initiatives covering the period 1984 to 
2008. Hanlon et al. (2015) report that their regression model estimates show reduced 
inbound foreign portfolio investment from tax haven countries after the OECDs 
initiatives to combat tax evasion since 1998. However, a potential issue of the Hanlon et 
al. (2015) analysis is that it does not model for the possibility that the decrease in 
inbound foreign investment via tax havens is compensated by an increase in investment 
flows from other havens that have not signed a treaty with the US.  
 
The analysis of geographical portfolio shifting between tax havens largely reveals that 
the effectiveness of tax treaties is mostly rendered ineffective due to the bilateral nature 
of said treaties. Gorea (2015) specifically explores this possibility for US investors for 
the period 2002 to 2013, a period that saw greater tax treaty formulation activity than 
the period covered by Hanlon et al. (2015). Two findings of significance emerge from 
Gorea (2015) study. Firstly, no statistically significant evidence is found that the 
amount of debt and equity held by a tax haven is reduced by the signing or 
implementation of a tax treaty between the US and a tax haven. Secondly, and most 
importantly, the signing and or implementation of a treaty is found to have a statistically 
significant impact on the flow of equity and debt funds into havens that have not signed 
a bilateral treaty with the US. 
 
Alternative investments in the form of bank deposits also represent an important aspect 
of offshore tax haven services. The evidence on the response of bank deposit flows to 
tax treaties is limited but mainly signals the problems inherent in bilateral tax treaty 
arrangements. A recent investigation by Johannesen and Zucman (2014) analysed the 
response of bank deposit flows in a panel setting, covering 52 tax havens and 220 
potential country partners for the period 2004 to 2011. In line with the findings of Gorea 
(2015), Johannesen and Zucman (2014) find that in response to the establishment of a 
tax treaty, deposits invariably flow to the least compliant tax havens. Hence, although 
there have been shifts in the allocation of deposits, global levels of deposits held in off 
shore accounts have largely remained stable.  
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While the TIEAs represent a multilateral approach (in so far as it is designed by the 
OECD), unilateral attempts have been made at increasing tax compliance. These have 
largely emanated from the EU in the form of the EU Savings Directive and from the US 
in the shape of the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA). The EU Savings 
Directive was introduced in 2005 and provided that Swiss banks withhold tax on 
interest income on the accounts of EU residents. As an incentive to EU resident savers, 
‘… [s]avers can escape the withholding tax if they voluntarily declare their income to 
their home country tax authority’ (Johannesen and Zucman, 2014, p. 87). Although the 
EU directive has not provided a major increase in revenues, Johannesen and Zucman 
(2014) do attribute it improving tax compliance modestly. A major factor of 
differentiation between the EU Saving Directive and TIEAs was that the former 
incorporate elements of automatic information exchange.  
  
4.3 Summary 
 
The purpose of this chapter was to place the accumulation and distribution of wealth in 
the context of broader socioeconomic mechanisms.  
 
The chapter adopts the framework of Saez and Zucman (2014) who decompose wealth 
accumulation per an accounting identity. The disparity in wealth accumulation was 
explored in the context of the great consumerist and financialisation forces that have 
had an impact on households. The degree of consumption has increased since the 1960s 
across most countries. However, the propensity to consume decreases with household 
wealth in both the US and Europe. In Australia, too, the extent of consumption as a 
proportion of wealth diminishes with wealth percentiles, and the highest wealth 
percentile exhibits the lowest relative consumption to wealth. 
 
Financialisation has also enhanced wealth accumulation for the wealthiest households, a 
point that will be tested in Chapter 5. It was found that capital income is increasingly 
becoming an important source of wealth accumulation relative to labour income for the 
wealthiest households. Conversely, the poorest households are increasingly assuming 
greater debt levels, as demonstrated by the Australian, UK and US data, to sustain 
consumption levels. 
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In addition, for countries that data is available, capital income was found to constitute 
an increasing share of income for the wealthiest households. The exception to this 
observation is Canada where labour income dominates even at the highest income 
percentile. 
 
The reduction in the level of taxation was also advanced as a contributory factor to the 
process of wealth accumulation. Since the 1980s, the level of top marginal tax rates has 
systematically declined across most advanced countries. Pre-tax income shares have 
also increased, in line with less rigorous oversight from tax authorities. Further, tax base 
shifting potentially has had an impact on wealth accumulation with the wealthy shifting 
their main sources of income between capital and labour whenever it is advantageous to 
do so. Calls to mitigate the impact of tax evasion were considered. The considerable 
amounts of wealth held in off-shore financial centres makes it an important aspect of 
taxation policy. However, the political will to deal with these issues may mitigate the 
effectiveness given the adoption of bilateral framework.  
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Chapter 5 The Role of Wealth in the Risk Aversion of 
Australian Households Portfolios 
 
Chapter 5 purpose is to econometrically test to what extent wealth impacts household 
portfolio allocation. In Chapter 4, it was shown that the increasing financialisation of 
household balance sheets has resulted in an increasing shift toward higher returns 
generating assets by wealthier households. In this Chapter, this is further empirically 
tested in the framework of utility theory and relative risk aversion. Standard 
neoclassical economics often assumes no relationship between wealth holdings and an 
individual’s asset allocation. This hypothesis is used as the benchmark in Chapter 5. To 
test the hypothesis, the analysis utilises a sample of Australian households from the 
HILDA longitudinal survey.  
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
The objective of this chapter is to empirically determine whether household risk 
aversion is a function of wealth. Providing evidence for the distribution of risk aversion 
has relevance not only to issues relating to finance such as the equity risk premium, but 
potentially also to those relating to wealth accumulation and distribution. Saez and 
Zucman (2014), in their work on the inequality of wealth in the US, emphasise the 
importance of risky assets as a channel through which large wealth can accumulate. 
Baranzini (1991) formally recognise the importance of risk aversion to both wealth 
accumulation and distribution, arguing that assuming the existence of decreasing 
relative risk aversion (RRA) with the amount of wealth, a two-class society can emerge 
in which the wealthiest end up with very high capital stock per capita. 
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In Australia, the debate has added complexity with powerful structural and institutional 
changes seeing an equity revolution over the last 15 years. These changes have 
seemingly released risky investing opportunities from the purview of the rich to the 
masses. In 1998, the then Australian Prime Minister John W. Howard sought to 
establish Australia as the ‘greatest share owning democracy’ in the world (Howard, 
1998). Becoming the linchpin of conservative Coalition policy, Australia did indeed 
experience a dramatic upward shift in equity ownership across all levels of society. 
Donoghue, Tranter and White (2003) find that in 1991, one in seven Australian adults 
allocated a part of their wealth to equities. By 2004, this had increased to over half of 
the population (Australian Stock Exchange, 2005, p.6). In many ways, the financial risk 
tolerance now displayed by Australian households more closely reflect the predictions 
of standard utility theory where risk aversion is assumed to be constant across all wealth 
levels. Although the equity revolution ostensibly has seen a shift in the portfolio 
structures of the average household, there may exist substantial wealth effects, which 
this research aims to unveil.  
 
Still, the rise of the Australian wealth management industry suggests that, for those who 
can afford it at least, households are increasingly holding riskier portfolios than has 
previously been observed. From 1988 to 2013, the funds under management have 
grown at approximately 10.4% per annum. By December 2013, $2.3 trillion in wealth 
was being managed by the wealth management industry (Australian Bureau of 
Statistics, 2013). A substantial portion of the growth is associated with Australia’s 
compulsory pension contribution scheme, superannuation. However, the increases in 
funds under management have seen a concomitant increase in the financial planning 
sector and private banking. According to the Boston Consulting Group (2013, 2014), 
the number of millionaire households in Australia, spurred by a booming economy, has 
increased from 178,000 in 2013 to 195,000 in 2014. Private banks, both Australian and 
foreign, have been the beneficiaries of this immense growth and are increasingly 
courting and offering their services to high net worth individuals (Dunn 2013). In 
Europe, Hackethal, Haliassos and Jappelli (2012) find that wealthier investors tend to 
make more use of financial advisors than the less wealthy households do. Commercial 
research reports that of the Australian mass affluent, those earning AUD150,000 or 
more, 25% use financial advisors compared to 10% of the less affluent (BlackRock, 
2013). Despite much anecdotal evidence that the wealthier Australian households 
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exhibit DRRA preferences, as manifested in their greater demand for wealth 
management services, there is scant direct evidence of this.  
 
The revolution overtaking Australia during the Howard Government years seemingly 
reconciled household portfolios with the standard preferences story in financial 
economics. An assumption of most asset pricing theories is that utility functions exhibit 
constant RRA in wealth. The modern approach to portfolio theory predicts investors 
select portfolios that maximise the expected utility of their final consumption when 
assuming decision making under uncertainty (von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1947). 
Uncertainty or risk is the constraining factor on how much utility is gained from 
marginal increases in wealth. The degree of RRA is assumed to be constant at any given 
level of wealth, consumption or life-cycle stage. Alternative preference specifications to 
the standard utility model have been formalised and advanced wherein wealth has a 
great impact on RRA levels, including: (i) habit formation (Constantinides, 1990); (ii) 
direct preferences over wealth (Gong and Zou, 2002); and (iii) loss aversion preferences 
(Tversky and Kahneman, 1991).  
 
In Chapter 1, section 1.2, the utilisation of neoclassical models is heavily criticised. The 
purpose of this Chapter, is to test the empirical validity of a key neoclassical 
assumption, that of constant relative risk aversion. The assumption regarding risk 
aversion plays a significant role in the estimation of wealth distributions and the process 
of wealth accumulation. Several studies that calculate, for example, aggregate wealth 
holdings, assume CRRA preferences (see for example, Skinner, 1988; Hubbard, et al 
1994; Aiyagari 1994; and Hugget 1996). While there has been extensive theoretical 
work in this area, empirical evidence to support the existence of nonconstant RRA 
preferences, particularly in the Australian context, is still relatively scarce. This study 
presents results on the distribution of risk aversion across Australian households and the 
concomitant influence of wealth and other socioeconomic characteristics that 
households exhibit. 
 
A potential avenue that has not been fully explored is the impact of financial advice on 
risk aversion. More recently, with the publication of Thomas Piketty’s (2014) book, 
Capital in the Twenty First Century, the issue of wealth inequality among societies of 
advanced Western economies has been highlighted in both academia and popular 
media. An important argument made by Piketty (2014a) is that wealthier households 
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can generate greater returns on capital. Typical financial economic models often assume 
that households exhibit constant RRA, which implies that the return on capital is the 
same for all households. Piketty (2014a) argues, however, that this does not necessarily 
reflect common sense, for two reasons: 
 
[a wealthier person] has greater means to employ wealth management 
consultants and financial advisors. If such intermediaries make it possible to 
identify better investments, on average, there may be ‘economies of scale’ in 
portfolio management that give rise to higher average returns on larger 
portfolios. A second reason is that it is easier for an investor to take risks, and 
to be patient, if she has substantial reserves than if she owns next to nothing. 
(pp. 430-431) 
 
The chapter contributes to the literature in three ways. Firstly, it focuses on risk 
aversion, in contrast to Cardak and Wilkins (2009) and Worthington (2009) who focus 
on background risk and diversification levels, respectively. Cardak and Wilkins (2009) 
found a negligible relationship between wealth and risk aversion. Further neither of the 
previous papers provided a direct estimate of Australian households’ risk aversion. This 
study uses a measure of risk tolerance based on the methodology developed by Bucciol 
and Miniaci (2011), where risk tolerance parameters are derived from the observed 
mean-variance space of the portfolios held by households. Secondly, the measure of risk 
tolerance can be used to estimate the overall levels of risk aversion in the Australian 
economy. To the researcher’s knowledge, this is the first study to do so in Australia 
using a micro panel dataset.  
 
Lastly, the chapter presents cautious preliminary results on the relationship between risk 
aversion, wealth and financial advice. Unfortunately, there are two significant 
limitations on using this data with the estimate RRA parameters. Firstly, the question 
posed in the HILDA survey focuses on retirement advice and not on general financial 
advice. Secondly, is the issue of timing and what period the question covers. Wave 7 
questions were conducted in late 2006, a full year after wave 6 from which the RRA 
parameters are estimated. In addition, no information is provided as to what year the 
actual financial advice was sought and may have occurred in the early part of the 
decade. 
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Section 5.2 surveys the theoretical and empirical literature on risk preferences. Sections 
5.3 and 5.4 introduce the empirical framework and describe the HILDA survey (waves 
2, 6 and 10) and financial time series data. Section 5.5 reports on the magnitude 
distribution of RRA across the Australian sample and various wealth quartiles, 
presenting the results of various pooled and fixed effects regressions involving the 
derived estimate of risk tolerance from the construction of mean-variance portfolios. 
Preliminary results on the relationship between financial advice and risk aversion are 
also presented. Section 5.6 concludes and discusses possible future research avenues. 
 
5.2 Literature Review 
5.2.1 Theoretical Review 
 
The modern approach to portfolio theory predicts investors select portfolios that 
maximise the expected utility of their wealth, not their expected wealth itself. 
Uncertainty or risk here is the restraining factor on how much utility is gained from 
marginal increases in wealth. Arrow (1971) and Pratt (1964) developed a number of 
hypotheses in which RRA is either decreasing, increasing or constant in wealth: 
decreasing relative risk aversion (DRRA), increasing relative risk aversion (IRRA), and 
constant relative risk aversion (CRRA). 
 
These hypotheses have received considerable theoretical attention. Meyer and Meyer 
(2006) state that the literature numbers well into the hundreds, with most offering strong 
support. One of the earliest is Cass and Stiglitz (1972), who build on Arrow’s (1971) 
and Pratt’s (1964) work, exploring the impact of wealth fluctuations on portfolio 
changes by utilising three characterisations: 1) Portfolio characterised as the proportion 
of wealth invested in risky and riskless assets; 2) The statistical properties of the 
portfolio; and 3) Portfolios characterised in terms of certainty equivalents. Under all 
three scenarios, DRRA is found to be the optimal hypothesis. 
 
Latter models have introduced more realistic economic phenomena. A related strand of 
literature examines how risk aversion alters according to investors’ life cycles. 
Stochastic life-cycle models approach the problem of portfolio choice by either 
incorporating income or consumption risk. Significantly, these studies assume that the 
coefficient or RRA is constant in wealth. Changes or shocks in wealth, for example, do 
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not have an impact on risk tolerance. Consequently, as Carroll (2002) argues, the 
standard stochastic life-cycle model predicts that wealthy households are essentially 
scaled-up versions of the rest of the populace, that is, risk aversion is assumed to remain 
constant with wealth fluctuations. Instead, any variation in risk aversion is typically 
explained by income or business risk held by investors. Wachter and Yogo (2010), for 
example, build a consumption-based model in which households with high permanent 
incomes are less risk averse and, therefore, allocate a higher share of their wealth to 
equity. The key insight of Wachter and Yogo (2010) is that transitory wealth variation is 
less (if it has any effect at all) important in determining portfolio allocation than 
permanent income. Heaton and Lucas (2000) argue that in the presence of business 
income, households with entrepreneurs will be more risk averse and reflect this in their 
portfolio holdings. 
 
The strong assumption of CRRA in wealth has been criticised. Carroll (2002) points 
out, for example, that under such models, counterintuitive predictions emerge. It can be 
argued that as wealth grows, future consumption is more likely to be financed out of 
wealth rather than income. Thus, financial risk tolerance would be expected to decline 
with wealth, as consumption levels are vulnerable to risk. This counterintuitive outcome 
is at odds with the view that the wealthy often have more exotic portfolio structures 
(Carroll, 2000). 
 
Before launching into a discussion of alternative theories, it is worth stating what 
standard theory has to say about age effects on financial decision-making. Earlier 
models of portfolio choice assumed that even life-cycle considerations did not produce 
heterogeneity in risk preferences. Intuitively, one would expect that portfolio decisions 
will be constrained by the time horizon of the investor, as would be evident in the 
context of investors planning for their retirement. For example, given the existence of 
an equity premium, one would expect, in particular, younger investors to allocate the 
majority of holdings to risky equity holdings to maximise capital growth. Papers by 
Mossin (1968), Merton (1969) and Samuelson (1969) provide theoretical predictions as 
to the relationship between life-cycle and portfolio structure. According to each, an 
optimal static portfolio is also dynamically optimal; therefore, portfolio allocations can 
be decoupled from life-cycle considerations. Such a conclusion, therefore, demonstrates 
that risk aversion preferences should not only be constant in wealth, but also in life-
cycle stages. All papers assume, however, that risk aversion is constant in wealth. 
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Theoretically, accounting for the possibility that the rich are indeed different in terms of 
attitudes to risk lends itself to two alternative explanations. The simplest explanation is 
that risk tolerance is ex ante immutable and heterogeneous across households. Under 
this framework, households that possess a higher risk tolerance allocate resources to 
higher expected return portfolios. In the long run, high-risk portfolio holders are 
rewarded with higher returns, hence generating more wealth than households with lower 
risk tolerance, resulting in a compound effect. 
 
Alternatively, a number of theories have been advanced under the collective heading of 
The Spirit of Capitalism paradigm. Although these models may not necessarily share 
the same motivations, they do share the notion that wealthier individuals will exhibit 
DRRA in wealth. The Spirit of Capitalism was first articulated by Weber (1958) and is 
the foundation upon which more formal models with DRRA preferences rest. Weber 
(1958) argues that: 
 
Man is dominated by the making of money, by acquisition as the ultimate 
purpose of his life. Economic acquisition is no longer subordinated to man as 
the means for the satisfaction of his material needs. This reversal of what we 
should call the natural relationship, so irrational from a naive point of view, is 
evidently a leading principle of capitalism. (p. 53) 
 
Bakshi and Chen (1996) formalise Weber’s (1958) thesis by assuming that wealth 
enters directly as a luxury good into the utility function of an investor. Whereas the 
standard life-cycle approach restricts the utility of wealth to the implied consumption 
benefits it provides, Bakshi and Chen (1996) argue that wealth in itself confers 
substantial social status advantages upon households beyond that for which 
consumerism alone can provide. For Bakshi and Chen (1996), preferences can be 
expressed as LMNΣP;J"QR[T(2", 4")Δ1], where C and S represent consumption and 
social status, respectively. Bakshi and Chen (1996) assume that S is strictly increasing 
in wealth and, therefore, wealth can be incorporated directly into the utility function 
instead. It should be emphasised that for Bakshi and Chen (1996), it is the relative 
social standing that increases risk taking, which protects or enhances their social status 
against a reference group. The intensity of this drive increases at higher wealth levels 
where social referencing is more acute. In a somewhat similar vein, Carroll (2000) 
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develops a framework to explain why wealthier households tend to save more and 
consume less without reference to social status. Carroll (2000) develops a bequest 
motive in which risk taking is increased to bolster wealth levels over the investor’s life 
in a bid to maximise terminal wealth. Here, consumers decide how to allocate resources 
between current consumption or end-of-life wealth, with bequeathing fortunes to future 
generations being the primary motive. All else being equal, both Bakshi and Chen 
(1996) and Carroll (2000) predict that the wealthy will have greater risk tolerance. 
 
5.2.2 Empirical Review 
 
Empirically, a number of studies have used the availability of micro panel data to 
establish the level of risk aversion and the extent to which risk levels change with 
wealth. Typically, the majority of studies estimate models in which the ratio of risky 
assets to total assets or net wealth is used as a proxy for risk tolerance. In this vein, 
Cardak and Wilkins (2009) utilise the HILDA survey to explore the risk tolerance of 
household portfolios across a range of variables. Their principal focus is on determining 
the roles of different sources of background risk, although they do investigate wealth 
effects. Using a censored Tobit model, Cardak and Wilkins (2009) find that the 
proportion invested in risky assets is determined by a range of socioeconomic factors 
that show a stronger effect than net wealth. Cultural heritage, age and education all have 
a positive impact on the degree of risk that investors are prepared to assume. A 
limitation of Cardak and Wilkins (2009) is that they do not provide estimates on the 
level of risk aversion in the economy. Further, given the possibility that risk aversion 
and wealth are potentially endogenous, their estimates may be biased. Chiappori and 
Paiella (2011) argue that the wealth and risk aversion relationship is difficult to 
establish a priori. For example, more risk-averse individuals may choose investments 
with lower expected returns, therefore generating less wealth relative to risk-tolerant 
individuals. A pooled regression may not be able to disentangle the relationship 
between the two. 
 
Reflecting the availability of data, the relationship between wealth and risk tolerance 
has received more empirical attention internationally. One of the earliest studies is that 
of Blume and Friend (1975), who measure how risk varies with wealth by using the 
proportion of wealth allocated to risky assets and dividing their sample of US 
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households across five wealth categories. Further, they use various definitions of 
wealth. Under none of the categories do they find that risk aversion (risky assets to 
assets) systematically varies with wealth, concluding that CRRA preferences hold. In 
addition, they find that risk aversion hovers between 2 and 3 (Blume & Friend, 1975). 
Mankiw and Zeldes (1991) utilise data from a 1984 US survey, Panel Study of Income 
Dynamics, to explore how consumption levels vary between stockholders and non-
stockholders with a view to testing the empirical validity of the consumption with the 
Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM). In contrast to Blume and Friend (1975), Mankiw 
and Zeldes (1991) found that consumers demonstrated little risk tolerance with only 
47.7% holding equity, with the RRA coefficient at approximately 21, but the wealthier 
did demonstrate less risk aversion. Barsky, Juster, Kimball and Shapiro (1997) use the 
US Survey of Consumer Finances and establish an RRA estimate of approximately 12, 
finding evidence that this is decreasing in wealth. Here, it should be emphasised that the 
lower the RRA coefficient, the lower the risk aversion. 
 
With the increasing abundance of longitudinal data, it is surprising that very few studies 
have exploited the advantages that panel data can confer to the modeller. An exception 
is Chiappori and Paiella (2011), who study whether Italian households possess CRRA 
preferences using the Bank of Italy’s Survey on Household Income and Wealth. 
Utilising a first differences model, they find little evidence to support the existence of 
DRRA preferences, concluding that, at least for Italian households, CRRA preferences 
hold. They argue that the level of household mortgage debt and whether the household 
is engaged in business ventures are the main drivers of risk preferences. Like Blume and 
Friend (1975), risk preferences are measured as the proportion of risky assets to net 
wealth. Age also was found to have a strong, concave relation to risk preferences, with 
middle-aged households exhibiting less risk aversion. Further, the RRA coefficient was 
found to average approximately between 2 and 4 depending on the year, which are 
levels similar to those of Blume and Friend (1975) but well below those found by 
Mankiw and Zeldes (1991). 
 
An alternative approach to measuring risk preferences is provided by Blake (1996) and 
Bucciol and Miniaci (2011), who derive risk preferences assuming a mean variance 
framework. Using aggregate UK data, Blake (1996) finds strong evidence of very high 
DRRA when dividing across five wealth quintiles. The magnitude of risk aversion was 
found to vary substantially, but averaged approximately 29.8 across the whole sample. 
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These values are substantially higher than those of Blume and Friend (1975) and 
Chiappori and Paiella (2011), who found risk aversion levels averaging between two to 
eight. Bucciol and Miniaci (2011) also take a mean-variance framework to US 
household data but assume that market frictions restrict the ability of households to hold 
portfolios on the efficient frontier. Again, they find strong evidence that risk tolerance 
increases with higher wealth levels. Further, they establish that risk aversion levels 
average around 8. Significantly, and in contrast to Cardak and Wilkins (2009) and 
numerous international studies, they find that risk tolerance is not dependent upon 
education, gender, race or household size. This is a striking finding as it demonstrates 
the sensitivity of coefficients to the definition of risk tolerance employed in the study. 
 
5.3 Empirical Strategy 
5.3.1 Measuring Risk Tolerance 
 
In seeking to estimate the coefficient of risk aversion for households, a mean-variance 
model of investor behaviour is assumed. The discussion below is based on Bucciol and 
Miniaci (2011) and Blake (1996). Similar approaches have been used in the literature, 
for example, DeMiguel, Garlappi and Uppal (2009). A potential criticism is that using 
the statistical properties of a portfolio, in this instance the first two moments, is a 
deficient means of exploring risk aversion in an expected utility framework. A number 
of studies, however, have shown that there is congruence between the two parameter 
mean-variance and expected utility frameworks (see Eichner & Wagener, 2004; Meyer, 
1987). 
 
Informally, for each household, i(i=1,...,N) the risk tolerance measure X%, is estimated 
from the vector of optimal set of portfolio weights Y%=[Y%,$(X%) Y%,Z(X%) ... Y%,[(X%)]′. A 
power utility function of wealth exhibiting CRRA is implicitly assumed: 
 
 ](!) = ^_`a`_$;b  (5.1) 
 
where d is the coefficient of RRA.  Assuming investors maximise expected utility, 
indifference curves are determined by: 
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 c = ] + $Z deZ (5.2) 
 
where ] is an index of expected utility and eZ is the standard deviation of returns. 
Practically, it is possible to derive a measure of risk tolerance from equation (5.2), 
however, this requires the strong assumption that households hold efficient portfolios. It 
is possible to estimate the efficiency of household portfolios using the Gibbons, Ross, 
and Shanken (1989) test, however, this still requires the estimation of ex ante expected 
returns. 
 
To overcome this issue, divergence between the optimal and observed portfolios are 
allowed. Following Bucciol and Miniaci (2011), it is assumed here that observed 
household portfolios of weights, f% = [f%,$(X%) f%,Z(X%) ...f%,[(X%)]′, are a proxy for the 
optimal weights, w	%. Unlike Blake (1996), who imposes significant priors on the data-
generation process to construct portfolios that reside along the efficient frontier, the 
approach of Bucciol and Miniaci (2011) allows for the observed portfolio to deviate 
from the optimal portfolio in deriving the risk tolerance parameter. To construct the risk 
tolerance parameter, an identity is imposed on the portfolio variances on the two 
portfolios: 
 
 Y%(X%)′4Y%(X%) = f′%4f (5.3) 
 
where 4 is the second asset moment. In the absence of portfolio constraints, efficient 
weights are given by: 
 
 
 Y% = X%4;$P, (5.4) 
 
where e, is the first asset moment. By substituting (5.4) into (5.3), it is possible to solve 
for the identity problem and to obtain the risk tolerance parameter: 
 
 X% = ghijgiBhj`_k _l (5.5) 
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The estimated parameter forms the core of this study’s empirical strategy in establishing 
whether households hold constant, increasing or decreasing relative risk preferences in 
wealth. Specifically, the null hypothesis can be stated as: mR: o$ = 0 where o$ is the 
wealth coefficient from a linear regression. If o$ > 0, then DRRA preferences hold. 
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5.3.2 Empirical Model 
 
Although the primary focus is to examine how risk aversion varies with wealth, a 
number of control variables that have been found to have an impact on risk preferences 
are included in the model specification. Building on both Worthington (2009) and 
Cardak and Wilkins (2009), the panel nature of the data is exploited in this study and a 
fixed effects regression is employed for two reasons. Firstly, given the volatile nature of 
the equity markets in the second half of the past decade, risk preferences may show 
considerable time variation. Assuming such time variation is revealed, how does time 
varying risk preferences covary with wealth? Secondly, given the hypothesis that risk 
preferences are heterogeneous and that the heterogeneity is a function of wealth, a 
simple pooled estimate would yield a biased estimate because the pooled error term is 
correlated with the regressor on wealth. To overcome this issue, the Chiappori and 
Paiella’s (2011) modelling approach is followed, applying a first difference estimator 
framework to the fixed effects model. To ensure the validity of the first differences in 
preference to a within effects transformation estimates the presence of serial correlation 
in the idiosyncratic error term is tested utilising the Wooldridge (2002) test. If detected, 
the presence of serial correlation suggests that a first differences approach is preferable 
against the within effects estimator. The panel regression is written as: 
 X%" = qR + o$rs!PMr1ℎ%" + oZusvwLP%" + oxyzP%" + o{yzPZ%" + o|}P~1%" +o/*2010%" + oÅÇw*1zMzPÉM1Ñw%" + oÖÉPs1MrÉM1Ñw%" + oÜ]sÑáP*àÑ1â%" +o$RÇM*Ñ1Mr41M1Tà%" + o$$2ℎÑrä*Ps%" + o$ZãTàQ.TÑ1â%" + å%" (5.6) 
 
The chosen level of analysis here is the household. Although this is standard practice in 
this field, a degree of caution is warranted in interpreting the results. For example, 
Haddad, Hoddinott and Alderman (1996) demonstrate that the individual risk 
preferences of household members can significantly impact on aggregate household 
preferences. (Our research effectively assumes that the household preferences are those 
of the household head.) However, this study differs from previous household studies in 
that the chosen household head is chosen as the individual who undertakes the majority 
management of household finances and not the oldest household male. 
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A difficulty emerges when deciding how to define the portfolio used to estimate risk 
tolerance. Specifically, should housing form part of the portfolio definition. Bucciol and 
Miniaci (2011) adopt both broad and constrained portfolio definitions, where the former 
includes housing and human capital whilst the latter is restricted purely to financial 
assets. In contrast, Blake (1996) includes three financial assets (equities, bonds, and 
deposits) and treats them all as risky assets. The same approach is adopted here. 
Although housing constitutes a large component of Australian household wealth, there 
are both conceptual and data issues that make it problematic in including it. 
Conceptually, many argue that housing represents a stream of non-random services 
where the primary form of the return is in the shelter benefits (Meyer & Meyer, 2006). 
Practically, there is substantial difficulty and cost in obtaining relevant housing data to 
include when constructing the portfolio. Hence, this study follows Blake (1996) and 
assumes that risky assets are restricted to deposits, cash investments and equities. 
Further, nominal returns are utilised in estimating portfolio returns. It is reasonable to 
expect that most households would use nominal returns when estimating expected 
returns as well as when reviewing past performance (Bucciol & Miniaci, 2011). 
 
5.3.2.1 Control Variables 
 
Equation (5.6) includes a number of control variables, beyond wealth. These variables 
are guided by the theoretical papers outlined in section II as well by the empirical 
literature. 
 
Inclusion is guided by previous studies which have found variables to represent 
background risks and life-cycle constraints that explain heterogeneity in risk tolerance. 
Perhaps one of the largest constraints facing households is that of housing. To control 
for the impact of housing consumption this study includes two measures, adopted from 
Cardak and Wilkins’ (2009) definitions, that is mortgage repayments (MortgageRatio) 
and rental repayments (RentalRatio) divided by household income. Cardak and Wilkins 
(2009) find a positive association between risk aversion and mortgage payments and a 
negative relationship with rent. In addition, a control variable is added here for leverage, 
Leverage, which is defined as the ratio of household debt to total financial wealth. 
Throughout the sample, the main debt obligation is found to be mortgages. Yamashita 
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(2003) argues that there should be no relationship between risk aversion and household 
debt obligations. 
 
Life-cycle and income risk considerations constitute a significant aspect of risk aversion 
literature. The relationship between age and risk aversion is one that has received 
considerable attention. Samuelson (1969) argues that risk taking should not vary with 
age. Bodie, Merton, and Samuelson (1992) argue that financial risk tolerance will 
decrease with age due to labour inflexibility of older workers. Empirically, 
contradictory evidence exists as to the direction of this relationship. Hallahan, Faff, and 
McKenzie (2003) use survey based risk measures and find that financial risk taking 
decreases with age. Using the proportion of risky assets to total assets, Wang and Hanna 
(1997) find risk taking increases with age, whilst using a similar measure, Palsson 
(1996) finds a negative relationship between the two. Recent research provides more 
contradictory evidence. Using both survey based risk questions and household financial 
data, Jianakopolos and Bernasek (2006) find that, after controlling for cohort effects, 
risk taking decreases with age. Cardak and Wilkins (2009) find that risk tolerance is 
positively associated with age, even after retirement. To control for age, the age of the 
household head is used. The age variable is derived as the cantered average of the whole 
sample minus the age of the household head. In addition, a quadratic age term is added 
to capture the possible convex relationship between risk taking and age. 
 
Following Cardak and Wilkins (2009), income risk is measured as the coefficient of 
variation age and period adjusted household income. Annual household income is 
regressed on age and quadratic term for age, and a time trend. The predicted change in a 
given survey wave is then subtracted from wave 1. 
 
The level of education attained is often used as a proxy to measure financial 
sophistication. Cardak and Wilkins (2009) find that investors holding a university 
degree to also possess greater risk tolerance, though this is contingent on the model 
used. Guiso and Jappelli (2005) find that education proxies for financial sophistication 
which fosters greater risk tolerance. However, they also find that the type of field in 
which the degree was received to be more influential than possessing any degree per se. 
Bucciol and Minaci (2011), however, do not observe any relationship between the two 
variables. To control for education, a dummy variable is used, where if the household 
head has completed any form of tertiary education it equals one. 
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The composition of the family, whether it is made up of a married or de-facto couple, 
single, and the overall size of the household potentially exert powerful influences on the 
degree of household risk tolerance. To control for marriage or de facto relationships a 
dummy variable is used, with one being married or zero if single. Some literature, 
grounded in matching theory has considered the impact of marriage on risk tolerance. 
The literature suggests that married couples with a male household head are likely to 
maintain lower risk tolerance profiles relative to their single counterparts (Roussanov & 
Savor, 2011). The number of children in the household and those who are under the age 
of 18 are included. Intuitively, the impact of children on risk tolerance might be viewed 
through the impact on consumption with parents assuming lower risk aversion to 
maintain purchasing power of a growing family. However, given the existence of family 
tax benefits in Australia for relatively well-off, middle class households, the impact of 
children on household risk tolerance may be mitigated by such welfare programmes. 
 
5.4 Data 
5.4.1 Household Data 
 
This study utilises the HILDA survey, obtained from the Australian Federal 
Government Department of Families, Housing, Community Services and Indigenous 
Affairs. It is a longitudinal study that began in 2001 with the mission of tracking 
Australian households annually. Beginning in 2002, wave 2, the survey included a 
range of questions recording the financial characteristics of Australian households, 
including the composition of their wealth allocation across various asset classes. 
Following Cardak and Wilkins (2009), data on superannuation is not included. The 
survey at most provides data on aggregate household superannuation levels, but does 
not provide data on how super is allocated across asset classes. Household wealth data 
is provided across three waves, 2002, 2006 and 2010. 
 
The study sample only incorporates households that provide data across all three waves. 
Table 5.1 provides descriptive statistics on the sample. In total, the sample consists of 
3,181 households, with a total of 9,000 observations. The average age of the household 
head is 49, with approximately 1.84 children per household. The sample consists of 
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48.24% of households that are headed by a female.22 Despite the onset of the GFC, both 
mean wealth and income are found to rise over the observation period. Significantly, the 
absolute dollar amounts invested in equities has slightly decreased over the years, whilst 
the amount held in deposits has increased from AUD25,837 to AUD47,429. Further, 
given the increases in average incomes (and possibly the low interest rate environment), 
the mortgage payment ratio has seen a decline from 9% in 2002, to 4% in 2010. 
                                                
22 Gender is considered in this study due to the use of fixed effects model. However, very little evidence 
was found of any meaningful variation in risk aversion between the genders. For brevity, the results are 
summarised here. For male households: 12.30 (2002), 17.52 (2006) and 45.16 (2010). For female headed 
households: 12.01 (2002), 17.03 (2006) and 43.17 (2010). The null of no difference in the means could 
not be rejected for the mean pairs in each year. 
 160 
 
Table 5.1 Descriptive statistics Australian households, 2002, 2006, & 2010 
Year    Wealth $ Income $ Equity$ Deposits $ Cash $ Mortgage Ratio Rent Ratio Age Children 
% female 
headed   
2002 Mean 69,594 33,649 41,482 25,837 2,274 0.09 0.02 45.37 1.69 48.24 
 Std. Dev. 167,444 31,515 143,587 58,335 22,956 1.65 0.21 15.65 1.48  
 Max 1,900,481 598,696 1,602,831 963,986 482,352 83.33 6.73 89 8  
 Skewness 5.91 4.94 7.4 7.47 16.34 43.14 27.53 0.12 0.64  
  Kurtosis 49.04 71.31 71.64 95.24 315.23 2074.41 822.06 2.18 3.26   
2006 Mean 98,883 43,138 63,118 33,277 2,488 0.03 0.01 49.37 1.86 48.24 
 Std. Dev. 286,131 39,020 261,661 75,851 30,959 0.15 0.05 15.65 1.44  
 Max 3,934,015 691,836 3,646,015 1,075,403 881,406 3.79 1.3 93 9  
 Skewness 8.14 3.65 9.95 6.85 23.15 17.7 17.2 0.12 0.57  
  Kurtosis 91.58 36.39 126.23 75.86 625.5 391.26 386.55 2.18 3.58   
2010 Mean 97,144 51,101 47,285 47,429 2,399 0.04 0.01 53.37 1.98 48.24 
 Std. Dev. 221,113 53,492 169,343 107,227 32,145 0.49 0.08 15.65 1.4  
 Max 3,657,055 829,808 3,429,055 1,024,712 815,324 25.67 3.86 93 10  
 Skewness 6.6 5.44 10.05 5.99 21.66 46.32 34.7 0.12 0.54  
  Kurtosis 73.17 63.87 164.18 49.17 526.07 2,341 1,525 2.19 3.93   
Overall  Mean 88,531 42,629 50,628 35,514 23,87 0.05 0.01 49.37 1.84   
 Std. Dev. 230,439 42,929 198,315 83,447 28,972 1 0.13 15.99 1.44  
 Max 3,657,055 829,808 3,646,015 1,075,403 881,406 83.33 6.73 93 10  
 Skewness 5.43 5.27 10.71 6.96 21.98 66.92 38.73 0.11 0.57  
  Kurtosis 48.73 68.92 164.74 71.42 578.82 5,218 1,751 2.25 3.54   
Notes: All the data in Table I has been sourced from the HILDA Survey, Waves 2, 6, and 10, Department of Families, Housing, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs and 
Melbourne Institute. Monetary values denominated in AUD. Equity % = Equities to Total Financial Assets, Mortgage Ratio = Mortgage Payment Monthly Household Income, Rent 
Ratio = Monthly Rent to Monthly Household Income  
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5.4.2 Asset Time Series 
 
In order to estimate the risk tolerance parameter, !" for each household, various asset 
times series data have been obtained. Financial return (equities, deposits and other cash 
investments), are taken from S&P/ASX 200 Accumulation Index, cash investments are 
taken from the UBS Warburg Cash Management Trust Index, and the 90-day yields on 
Australian Treasury notes to proxy for deposit rates are used. Like Blake (1996), all 
assets are assumed to contain some risk, including deposits. In estimating the expected 
returns and co-variances to input into the mean-variance optimisation problem, the use 
of ex ante versus ex post returns is of concern. To overcome this issue, Blake (1996) 
estimates the expected returns using an Autoregressive Distributed Lag–Autoregressive 
Conditional Heteroskedasticity (ARDL-ARCH) framework. Fortunately, the approach 
of Bucciol and Miniaci (2011) somewhat circumvents this since the historical, observed 
portfolio returns are assumed to be proxies of the optimal portfolio weightings via the 
imposition of the identity in equation (5.4). 
 
5.5 Results 
5.5.1 The Distribution of Relative Risk Aversion 
 
This section uses equation (5.5) to establish point estimates for the distribution of risk 
aversion across Australia households. Specifically, the inverse of the estimated 
parameter is taken to establish the estimate of RRA. The estimates are presented in 
Table 5.2 for the three survey years. As in Chiappori and Paiella (2011), substantial 
variation in RRA is found across the sample period. Overall, the mean risk aversion in 
2002 for the population is 12.16, but declines to 2.7 if agents who have less than 6% of 
their financial wealth invested in equities are dropped. Figure 5.1 provides a graphical 
depiction of the distribution across the three waves of the HILDA survey. What is 
evident even with a cursory glance is the dramatic and consecutive shift to the right 
from 2002 through to 2010 of the RRA coefficient. For example, the divergence is 
exposed by the change in the mean of risk aversion, whereby it increased from a low of 
2.7 in 2002, to 10.8 in 2010. This reflects the overall flight to liquid cash style 
investments in 2010, as also shown in Table 5.1, where deposit holdings increased on 
average from AUD33,277 in 2006 to AUD47,429 in 2010, whilst the average equity 
holdings fell from an average of AUD63,118 to AUD47,285. The downward trend of 
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risk aversion has been captured by West and Worthington (2014) who found that 
Australian households generally reduced their tolerance for risk over time. However, as 
Figure 5.1 demonstrates, there are significant outliers causing the distribution to be 
positively skewed, particularly in 2010. Using the median instead, the aversion levels 
are found to be much lower, ranging from 1.71 in 2002 through to 6.7 in 2010 placing 
the study results in the same range as previous studies. 
 
 
Figure 5.1 Distribution of risk aversion across time 
Notes: Distribution excludes non-stock holders. 
 
The truncated risk aversion estimates are in line with international evidence. However, 
it is interesting to note that when the full sample is included, the coefficient of RRA 
dramatically increases, as presented in Table 5.2. The RRA ranges from 12.14 in 2002 
to an exceedingly high of 44.20 in 2010 when using the unweighted mean. 
 
International comparisons are difficult to make due to the myriad of methodologies 
employed and sample periods examined. Empirically, earlier studies found coefficient 
of RRA tending towards one. Blume and Friend (1975), using individual portfolio 
holdings found that the coefficient to be around two. Relatively more recent studies 
have derived significantly different values. Mankiw and Zeldes (1991), estimate a RRA 
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of 26.3 while Blake (1996) arrives at a weighted average value of 35.04. Bucciol and 
Miniaci (2011) find an aversion parameter of 8.24. 
 
Table 5.2 Distribution of risk aversion across time, weighted mean 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The variance in results between the present study and those of Blake (1996) and Bucciol 
and Miniaci (2011) is most likely attributable to the different definitions of portfolio. 
Like Blake (1996), the definition of portfolio is purely restricted to financial assets, 
whereas Bucciol and Miniaci (2011) expand the scope of the portfolio holdings to 
include human capital and housing. Inclusion of these asset classes would likely 
decrease risk aversion levels to those found in that study. Meyer and Meyer (2002) 
argue that studies incorporating more asset classes as risky, will, by definition, decrease 
the level of risk aversion. Another concern is whether one should measure the mean as 
weighted or unweighted by wealth. Barsky et al. (1997) argue that any estimates should 
be weighted by wealth. The rationale being that in capital markets, wealthier investors 
are likely to hold more equity, therefore the mean should be weighted accordingly. 
When weighting the risk aversion parameter by wealth, much lower levels of risk 
aversion are found. The weighted mean column of Table 5.2 shows that risk aversion 
levels in 2002 and 2006 were 5.78 and 6.77, respectively. However, for 2010 a dramatic 
shift is again observed in the average aversion level to 24.29. Overall, the weighted 
mean across all three years is 12.92, which is close to those reported by Barsky et al. 
(1997) for the US. 
 
The differences between the unweighted and weighted means presented in Table 5.2 
suggest that there is a negative relation between risk aversion and wealth. To construct a 
Year  Truncated Mean Full Sample Mean  Weighted Mean 
2002 2.76 12.16 5.78 
2006 3.81 17.28 6.77 
2010 10.78 44.20 24.29 
Overall  5.59 24.55 12.92 
Notes: Estimates calculated as the inverse of equation (5). The weighted mean is 
weighted by household wealth. The truncated column excludes households who have 
less than 6%of investments in equities. 
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more transparent picture of the relation between wealth and risk aversion, wealth is 
divided according to nine percentiles and the mean risk aversion is taken within each 
percentile. Table 5.3 presents the results. Of note are the exceedingly high levels of risk 
aversion among the lowest wealth percentiles (15th to 40th percentiles). For these 
percentiles, mean RRA ranged between 18.90 to 10.85 in 2002, increasing over the next 
two waves. By 2010, the range was 64.60 to 47.70. These estimates are in the ranges 
established by Blake (1996), who found that for UK households in 1992, risk aversion 
levels ranged between 30 to 50 but were lowest among the wealthiest households. The 
85th and 95th wealth percentiles consistently exhibit the lowest RRA levels, which 
were 5.99 and 3.19, respectively, in 2002. The following survey wave saw minor 
increases in risk aversion. However, the dramatic shift in the level of risk aversion, from 
4.25 in 2006 to 15.78 in 2010, a change of 271.5%, suggests that even at the highest 
wealth levels a substantial premium was being demanded by wealthy investors to hold 
equity in light of the financial crisis, which saw Australia’s equity market experience 
large falls. The results provide preliminary evidence that for Australian households, 
DRRA preferences hold when tabulating by wealth percentiles. 
 
 
Table 5.3 Household risk aversion by wealth percentiles 
Percentile 2002 2006 2010 
15th 18.90 26.57 64.60 
25th 14.11 20.85 51.92 
35th 14.93 19.57 49.87 
40th 10.85 19.01 46.70 
50th 8.88 15.35 42.79 
65th 9.11 11.56 37.39 
75th 7.84 11.67 35.55 
85th 5.99 8.41 26.40 
95th 3.19 4.25 15.78 
 
A clearer image of the relationship between wealth and risk aversion emerges when the 
two variables are plotted. Figure 5.2 plots a smoothed line over the entire range of 
wealth for every survey wave. The full extent of the dramatic divergence between the 
various wealth levels becomes apparent in these plots. The relationship between wealth 
and risk aversion appears to follow that of a logarithmic specification. From 
approximately AUD300-500,000 and beyond the rate of risk aversion, visually, appears 
to decrease at a slower marginal rate. 
 165 
 
To confirm the reasonableness of these risk aversion estimates, the estimated risk 
aversion parameter is compared to a question of self-assessed measure of risk aversion 
in the HILDA database. This approach is adopted by Bucciol and Miniaci (2011), who 
use the self-assessed risk measure from the US Survey of Consumer Finances to 
establish the reasonableness of their aversion parameter. The HILDA question asks: 
 
 Which of the following statements comes closest to describing the amount of financial 
risk that you are willing to take with your spare cash? That is, cash used for savings or 
investment: 
 
1. Takes substantial risks expecting substantial returns.  
2. Takes above-average risks expecting above-average returns.  
3. Takes average financial risks expecting average returns. 
4. Not willing to take financial risks. 
 
 
Figure 5.2 Scatterplot, risk aversion against wealth 
 
Following Bucciol and Miniaci (2011), 1 and 2 are recoded as risk tolerant households, 
and those responding 3 or 4 as risk averse households. Although there is substantial 
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disagreement as to the relative merit of self-assessed measures, one would expect some 
congruence between these figures and any measure of revealed preferences. It would be 
expected that for individuals self-classifying as risk tolerant (risk averse), their 
associated risk-aversion parameter should be lower (higher). The results are reported in 
Table 5.4, where the median of the estimated risk aversion figures for self-assessed risk-
averse individuals is indeed lower relative to the risk-tolerant group. When examining 
the congruence between the study’s measure and the survey’s measure, measured risk 
aversion is found to be lower for those in the self-assessed risk-tolerant category, 
whereas the converse holds true for the self-assessed risk-averse group. Across wealth 
groups, however, it is interesting to note that the wealthier households are self-assessed 
as risk averse and actually display greater risk tolerance than the bottom two wealth 
quartiles that are self-assessed as risk tolerant. This may be due to the notion of 
‘Keeping up with the Joneses’. Roussanov (2010) finds that risk preferences can vary 
depending on the degree to which households reference their neighbours or social circle. 
Whether such an issue is at play here is a question for future research. 
 
 
Table 5.4 Comparison: HILDA based self-assessed risk measurement and g estimates 
  2002   2006   2010  
Self-assessed risk tolerant   7.31  11.20   30.92  
Wealth Class:        
Quartile I   18.21   26.78   69.63  
Quartile II   6.30   14.04   43.91  
Quartile III   6.74   7.86   22.57  
Quartile IV   3.04   4.76   15.64  
Self-assessed risk averse  13.08  18.23   46.30  
Wealth Class:        
Quartile I   19.07   26.45   64.10  
Quartile II   13.57   19.98   49.26  
Quartile III   9.46   14.51   42.16  
Quartile IV   7.00   9.40   30.78  
 
5.5.2 Pooled Regressions 
 
To formally test the hypothesis that risk tolerance is a function of wealth a pooled linear 
regression is performed initially. Table 5.5 reports the results of the estimation of 
pooled regressions, with risk tolerance defined as estimated from equation 5.6 and takes 
the logarithmic form ln(1+#). The baseline specifications appear in columns 1 through 
to 3, which controls for the main variable of interest, natural log of financial wealth, and 
for aggregate shocks with year-period dummies. The coefficient on lnWealth measures 
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the elasticity of risk tolerance to wealth. If CRRA holds, lnWealth would not be 
expected to be statistically different from zero, that is $%: ' = 0. However, in columns 
(1) through to (3), the coefficients range from .3008 to .3734 and are statistically 
significant. These results are directly comparable to Bucciol and Miniaci (2011) who 
report coefficients of approximately similar magnitude. The wealth effect remains 
strong even in the presence of both socioeconomic and life-cycle control variables, 
including the age of the household head, the presence of mortgage or rental payments, 
debt levels, income risk as well as marital status and the highest level of education 
attained by the household head. 
 
The presence of serial correlation in the error term can suggest that a modelling 
approach exploiting the panel structure of the data is preferred. Recall that Chiappori 
and Paiella (2011) argue that a pooled regression might positively bias the relationship 
between wealth and risk tolerance if risk tolerance is heterogeneous and positively 
correlated with wealth. Following their suggestion, this study takes a fixed effects 
transformation via a first difference transformation of the variables. 
 
5.5.3 First Differences Regressions 
 
To remove potential bias, a fixed effects approach is employed. An immediate concern 
is the form that the fixed effects transformations should assume, that is, first differences 
or within effects transformations. Although the within transformation is considered to 
be the most efficient of the two, the presence of autocorrelation in the idiosyncratic 
error term of the model can potentially significantly bias standard errors down 
(Wooldridge, 2002). Serial correlation can potentially exist for any number of reasons, 
including common shocks, herding behaviour or correlation arising due to geographical 
proximity (for discussion, see Driscoll and Kray (1998)). To test for serial correlation in 
the idiosyncratic error, the Woolridge test is performed on the full model containing all 
of the variables. The Wooldridge test has the null that there is no first-order serial 
correlation in the idiosyncratic error term, *+: ,-../"0 = +. The null of no first-order 
serial correlation is significantly rejected for this model, with an F statistic of 455.29 
(Probability > F = 0.000). Therefore, the within effects transformation is rejected here in 
favour of the first differences model as used by Chiappori and Paiella (2011).  
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Table 5.5 Pooled regression results 
Variables  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
lnWealth10  0.3734  0.3008  0.3751  0.3872  0.3819 
 (0.0182)***  (0.0154)***  (0.0170)***  (0.0169)***  (0.0165)*** 
Income10  0.0124  0.0105  0.0092  0.0020 
 (0.0161)    (0.0159)  (0.0156)  (0.0157) 
Yr2010  -0.1576   -0.1570  -0.1538  -0.1540 
 (0.0036)***   (0.0035)***  (0.0034)***  (0.0034)*** 
Debt  0.0043      0.0001   
 (0.0026)      (0.0035)   
Age  0.0008   0.0006     
 (0.0002)***   (0.0002)***     
Age2  -0.0000    -0.0000    
 (0.0000)    (0.0000)     
MortgageRatio  0.0053      0.0050   
 (0.0008)***      (0.0008)***    
RentalRatio  0.0162     0.0170    
 (0.0220)      (0.0231)    
University  -0.0061      -0.0051 
 (0.0055)       (0.0054) 
Marital  -0.0130        -0.0050 
 (0.0069)*        (0.0066) 
Children  -0.0017       0.0019 
 (0.0020)        (0.0017) 
BusEquity  -0.0043          
 (0.0068)          
Constant  -0.2710  -0.2251  -0.2791  -0.2950  -0.2805 
 (0.0289)***  (0.0194)***  (0.0261)***  (0.0241)***  (0.0250)*** 
F  182.65  381.38  424.71  362.42  352.26 
N  7,395  7,434  7,434  7,395  7,434 12  0.18  0.04  0.18  0.18  0.18 
Notes: One, two and three asterisks denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, 
respectively. Standard errors in parentheses. 
 
The results of the first differences regression are presented in Table 5.6. To minimise 
the possibility of biased standard errors, standard errors are clustered by households. It 
is immediately apparent, that the coefficient estimates for lnWealth are lower in the first 
differences model relative to the pooled estimates. Comparing the coefficient estimates 
from Table 5.5 (column 1), to Table 5.6 (column 1), the coefficient is found to have 
fallen from .3734 to .2476. Further, there is an increase in the standard errors but their 
magnitude is in line with other studies. Although there is a decrease in the coefficient 
size, wealth retains a statistically significant positive influence on risk tolerance, in line 
with the DRRA hypothesis. Given the measure of risk tolerance adopted here, there are 
limited studies to which it can be directly compared. The magnitude of the wealth effect 
is close to that established by Bucciol and Miniaci (2011) at .224 for US households. In 
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addition, the variability of the lnWealth coefficient is very small across the various 
specifications in Table 5.6 (Columns 1-5). The results suggest that Australian 
households exhibit risk preferences that are consistent with DRRA.  
 
 
Table 5.6 First difference regressions 
Variables  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
D.lnWealth10  0.2476  0.2645  0.2436   0.2530   0.2592 
 (0.0345)***  (0.0320)***  (0.0340)***   (0.0332)***   (0.0337)*** 
D.Income10  -0.0046   -0.0058   0.0038   -0.0003 
 (0.0201)    (0.0199)   (0.0199)   (0.0197) 
D.Debt  0.0038    0.0032   0.0040   0.0041 
 (0.0043)    (0.0042)   (0.0041)   (0.0042) 
D.Yr2010  -0.0352    -0.0354   -0.0370   -0.0360 
 (0.0062)***    (0.0062)***   (0.0062)***   (0.0062)*** 
D.Age  0.0219    0.0221      
 (0.0113)*    (0.0113)*      
D.Age2  -0.0001    -0.0001      
 (0.0000)***    (0.0000)***      
D.MortRatio  0.0050      0.0049    
 (0.0007)***       (0.0007)***    
D.RentalRatio  -0.0125      -0.0130    
 (0.0086)       (0.0096)    
D.University  -0.0207         -0.0264 
 (0.0130)         (0.0126)** 
D.Marital  0.0160         0.0150 
 (0.0119)         (0.0119) 
D.Children  0.0018         0.0051 
 (0.0058)         (0.0055) 
D.BusEquity  -0.0002          
  (0.0087)          
Constant  -0.1636  -0.0926   -0.1630   -0.0741   -0.0767 
 (0.0454)***  (0.0025)***   (0.0453)***   (0.0045)***   (0.0047)*** 
F  16.52  68.24  21.73  26.50  15.73 
N  4,917  4,956  4,917  4,917  4,917 12  0.03  0.02  0.03  0.03  0.03 
Notes: One, two and three asterisks denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, 
respectively. Standard errors in parentheses. 
 
 
The results are robust to the inclusion of period effects as well as a range of socio-
economic control variables. Unlike other studies, income risk was not found to have any 
bearing on the amount of risk assumed. The coefficient for Δ.456, 0.0219, and 
associated quadratic term, 4562, -0.0001, suggest that the relationship between risk 
tolerance and age is concave, although the smallness of the coefficient suggests that the 
curvature is close to being flat during the middle ages. Only in later life is a substantial 
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reduction in risk tolerance observed. Figure 5.3 shows the relationship between risk 
tolerance and age. As one would expect, the elderly experience a significant reduction 
in risk tolerance beyond the age of 70. Theoretically, the positive relationship between 
risk tolerance and age effects can be explained either by the Samuelson et al. (1992) 
argument that risk tolerance increases due to the labour flexibility of workers in their 
younger years. When retirement is reached, however, labour inflexibility compels a 
reduction in the degree of risk tolerance. Alternatively, an idea rooted in prospect theory 
can be put forth that the increase in risk tolerance is due to an inability of older 
individuals to gauge risk tolerance accurately. This is a discussion for future research. 
The results of the present study are generally in agreement with those of Chiappori and 
Paiella (2011), who also find a concave relationship between age and risk tolerance. 
However, the results differ from Cardak and Wilkins (2009) who find risk tolerance 
increases across all ages. 
 
Turning to the other explanatory variables, only variables associated with housing are 
found to have any statistically significant impact on risk tolerance. A change in the 
mortgage ratio is found to be positively associated (and statistically significant) with 
risk tolerance. The effect of mortgage payments, although statistically significant is 
economically insignificant 0.004. It is safe to conclude that mortgage payments have a 
constant impact on risk tolerance. Yamashita (2003) argues that in standard portfolio 
theory, heterogeneity in risk tolerance should not be a function of the proportion debt 
held or the mortgage payments being made. Interestingly, the coefficient estimates of 
this study closely resemble those of Yamashita (2003), who found the impact of the 
mortgage ratio to range between 0.002 and 0.004. 
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Figure 5.3 Profile of risk tolerance and age 
 
For the other control variables, heterogeneity in risk tolerance is not found to be a 
function of any of the variables. Perhaps most strikingly, having completed a university 
degree does not appear to have any effect on risk tolerance. This is not only in contrast 
to Cardak and Wilkins (2009) but various other studies. The results do, however, 
conform with those of Bucciol and Miniaci (2010), who also found that a university 
education does not weigh upon the level of household risk tolerance. There are two 
potential explanations for why this result has emerged. The first is that degrees are not 
differentiated here by the discipline in which they were attained. Guiso and Jappelli 
(2005) document that individuals who are more comfortable with mathematics tend to 
exhibit greater financial sophistication. These potentially key details are lost in the 
aggregation of university attainment into a simple dummy variable. The second 
explanation is simply one of model misspecification. Given a first differences model has 
been used, the number of individuals going from not having a degree to having one is 
arguably small. However, even in the pooled estimates the coefficient is statistically 
insignificant at -0.0061 versus -0.0207 for the first difference model. 
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5.5.4 Robustness Results 
 
So far, the study results suggest that any heterogeneity in risk tolerance is a function of 
wealth, age and period effects. To verify the robustness of the results, more models that 
accommodate liquidity and age considerations are estimated. Vissing-Jørgensen (2003) 
argues that liquidity constraints and transaction costs erect barriers that make it difficult 
for those with less wealth to engage in investment activities. As a consequence, any 
sample that incorporates the poorest households is likely to increase the magnitude of 
the wealth effect (that is, the coefficient slope will be steeper). To control for this 
possibility, the sample is restricted to those who have financial wealth greater than 
AUD10,000 and AUD100,000. By restricting the sample size to those endowed with 
greater wealth, the wealth coefficient is expected to be smaller (flatter) than those 
reported in Table 5.6 if CRRA holds. Table 5.7, column 1 reports the result. Restricting 
the sample to households with more than AUD10,000 shifts the wealth effect to 0.27 
compared to 0.23 in Table 5.6 column (1), and is suggestive that the liquidity constraint 
hypothesis does have merit. Nevertheless, the magnitude of the coefficient, 0.23, is still 
large and economically significant. In column (2), the sample is restricted to households 
that have greater than AUD100,000 in wealth. The wealth effect is substantially more 
robust now, at 0.426. This finding is interesting as it suggests that risk tolerance 
increases exponentially at the higher wealth levels. Further, wealth and the period effect 
(Yr2010), remain the sole factors in provoking heterogeneity in risk tolerance levels, 
with marriage and the change in the number of children having only marginal effects. 
Other factors, such as age, or education now do not have a statistically significant 
influence on observed risk tolerance levels. 
 
Hurd (2001) argues that the elderly might be subject to substantial liquidity constraints 
due to a lack of work that lead to a revealed risk preference different than what they 
otherwise would prefer. To control for this possibility, the sample is restricted to those 
above the age of 65. The impact of wealth on risk tolerance is now diminished, falling 
from .248 in Table 5.6 for the whole sample to a statistically significant .204. 
Restricting the sample to those below 65, no significant change is found in either the 7896:7;ℎ variable or the various control variables. 
 
Given the robustness of the result to the presence of the various controls, it can be 
concluded that RRA is decreasing in wealth, in contrast to Chiappori and Paiella (2011), 
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but largely in agreement with Bucciol and Miniaci (2011) and Blake (1996). The 
divergence here may be due to either the method of measuring risk tolerance (mean 
variance or risky asset share) or the presence of sociocultural differences between the 
three Anglo dominated cultures (Australia, the UK and the US) vis-à-vis Italy with its 
concomitant divergence in language, religion and legal traditions. The extent to which 
culture causes variations in risk preferences is beyond the scope of this study. 
 
Further, the results of this study are at odds with those of Cardak and Wilkins (2009) 
who only find a negligible impact of wealth on risk tolerance (measured as the risk 
share to total assets). However, Cardak and Wilkins (2009) adopt a different measure of 
risk. Whereas the definition in this study is derived from the variance of the portfolio, 
they use the proportion of risky assets (equities) to total assets. Maintaining the null of a 
CRRA, the model from Table 5.5 is estimated again, but this time using the Cardak and 
Wilkins’ (2009) definition of financial risk. The results are presented in Table 5.6 in the 
column labelled ‘risk ratio’. Overall, wealth does not have an economically significant 
relationship with risk tolerance, in line with the findings of Cardak and Wilkins (2009). 
The results suggest that the divergence in wealth effect estimates are probably 
attributable to the method of risk tolerance measurement employed. 
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Table 5.7 Robustness regressions 
 Variables  Wealth ≥ 
$10,000 
(1) 
Wealth ≥ 
$100,000  
(2) 
Age 65 
 
(3)  
 Age ≤ 65 
 
(4)  
 Risk Ratio 
 
(5) 
D.lnWealth10  0.261  0.345  0.204  0.252  0.023 
 (0.055)***  (0.115)***  (0.097)**  (0.035)***  (0.024) 
D.Income10  -0.010  -0.029  -0.002  -0.010  0.021 
 (0.021)  (0.041)  (0.046)  (0.019)  (0.010)** 
D.Yr2010  -0.063  -0.111  -0.039  -0.032  -0.010 
 (0.007)***  (0.011)***  (0.011)***  (0.006)***  (0.004)*** 
D.Debt 0.014 0.039 0.017 0.007 -0.010 
 (0.008)* (0.013)*** (0.015)*** (0.007) (0.006)* 
D.Age  0.024  0.022    -0.005 
 (0.012)*  (0.025)      (0.009) 
D.Age2  -0.000  0.000    -0.000 
 (0.000)*  (0.000)      (0.000)** 
D.MortgageRatio  0.001  -0.012  0.037 0.004  0.001 
 (0.009)  (0.022)  (0.033)  (0.001)***  (0.000)*** 
D.RentalRatio  -0.009  -0.043  -0.114  -0.014  0.001 
 (0.007)  (0.112)  (0.079)  (0.008)*  (0.007) 
D.University  -0.013  -0.071  -0.032  -0.024  -0.008 
 (0.017)  (0.038)*  (0.086)  (0.012)**  (0.005)* 
D.Marital  0.007  0.050  0.039  0.008  0.006 
 (0.016)  (0.026)*  (0.024)  (0.014)  (0.009) 
D.Children  -0.001  -0.027  0.006  0.004  -0.002 
 (0.008)  (0.014)**  (0.014)  (0.006)  (0.004) 
D.BusEquity  0.002  -0.001  0.011  -0.009  -0.009 
 (0.009)  (0.014)  (0.021)  (0.008)  (0.004)** 
Constant -0.164  -0.145  -0.083  -0.080  0.018 
 (0.049)***  (0.101)  (0.009)***  (0.005)***  (0.037) 
F  12.52  11.93  3.32  12.04  3.76 
N  4,098  1,373  1,326  4,662  6,110 12  0.05  0.11  0.02  0.03  0.01 
Notes: One, two and three asterisks denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
Standard errors in parentheses. 
 
5.5.5 Risk Aversion and Financial Advice 
 
This section discusses the possible relationship between risk aversion, wealth and the 
use of financial advice, though these are highly preliminary results requiring further 
investigation and inclusion of new HILDA survey waves. In 2007 HILDA survey wave 
7, sought responses as to the question as to whether the respondent had sought financial 
advice as to retirement. The responses are cross tabulated with the risk aversion 
estimates for 2006.  
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The impact of financial advice on the risk preferences of households has only received 
limited attention. The increasing role of financial intermediaries in household finances 
was emphasised by Campbell (2006). Utilising a proprietary database, Bluethgen, 
Gintschel, Hackethal and Müller (2008) typically find that in Germany, financial 
planning clients tend to be more wealthy and risk averse than those without an adviser. 
Additionally, they find that financial advice tends to enhance diversification. In 
contrast, Bhattacharya, Hackethal, Kaesler, Loos and Meyer (2012) find that the impact 
of financial advice on Germans tends to be negligible, with most clients foregoing their 
planners’ advice. 
 
Unfortunately, present study could not have access to the comprehensive datasets of the 
aforementioned studies. Despite these severe data restrictions, some preliminary results 
can be presented. Table 5.8 presents average risk aversion between those that have and 
have not received financial advice. A one-way ANOVA test between subjects was 
conducted to compare the impact of advice on the mean level of risk aversion overall 
and by wealth percentile. There was a significant financial advice effect overall on the 
proportion of observed risk aversion at the p<.05 level [F(1, 971) = 83.42, p = 0.000]. 
Numerically, the level of risk aversion among those who had received advice was 12.38 
compared to 12.82. Although statistically significant, the difference does not appear to 
be economically significant.  
 
 
Table 5.8 Mean RRA comparison of those with and without financial advice, by wealth percentile 
Percentile Advice received No Advice 
15th 26.81 26.12 
25th 18.09 22.58 
35th 16.88 19.97 
40th 15.02 19.22 
50th 10.32 17.37 
65th 7.13 12.21 
75th 8.24 10.69 
85th 7.03 11.49 
95th 3.65 9.58 
 
Once again, however, it may be possible that the aggregate results shroud the impact of 
financial advice on risk aversion without incorporating the wealth dynamics. Table 5.8 
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decomposes the mean risk aversion by wealth percentiles. A number of interesting 
inferences can be made. Firstly, the degree of risk aversion decreases among both 
groups in accordance with the level of wealth as established in Section 5.5.1. Secondly, 
and most significantly, the intra percentile dynamics reveal that for those that have 
received advice there is a significant difference compared to the aggregate result 
mentioned previously. At the very lowest percentile, 15th, there is effectively no 
substantial difference with those having received advice averaging 26.81 versus 26.12. 
However, as one proceeds up the wealth ladder the difference progressively becomes 
larger. For example, at the 35th percentile the level of RRA for those receiving advice is 
16.88 compared to 19.96, a difference of 15.4%, at the 50th percentile this difference 
increase by 40.6% with those receiving financial advice exhibiting a mean RRA of 
10.32 compared to 17.37.  
 
At the most extreme wealth levels that are observed in the HILDA Survey data, the 
relative magnitudes differences between the two groups are maintained. This is 
illustrated in Figure 5.4, which plots the mean RRA across the percentile for the two 
groups. At the 85th wealth percentile, RRA is 7.03 for advice seekers and 11.49 for 
those who had not sought out advice. The largest gulf is found at the 95th wealth 
percentile where the difference between the mean RRA is 61.8%. Among this group, 
the RRA for those having received advice at some time is 3.65 compared to 9.57. Given 
the relative small sample sizes at the highest wealth percentile (nYes=8, nNo=35), caution 
should be adhered too when relying on these results. However, given the general trends 
one could infer two cautionary findings from this data. Firstly, ultimately wealth is the 
dominating factor when explaining risk aversion heterogeneity. Secondly, although 
wealth is a dominant factor, it appears that receiving financial advice (in this instance in 
the limited capacity of retirement), does have an accentuating effect on the RRA levels. 
Given the limitations mentioned above, it does suggest that receiving advice does 
provide some, to borrow Piketty’s (2014) parlance, form of ‘economies of scale’ in 
portfolio management, assuming that higher expected returns in a portfolio generally 
equate to lower risk aversion levels. 
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Figure 5.4 Profile of risk aversion by advice and wealth percentile 
 
5.6 Summary 
 
At the core, the purpose of this chapter is to explore and document whether Australian 
households exhibit decreasing relative risk aversion in wealth. Policy makers and 
sections of Australian society are increasingly discussing the role that financial wealth 
is playing in augmenting a path of increasing inequality in Australia. Despite vigorous 
debate there has been little empirical evidence to demonstrate that Australia’s wealthy 
actually exhibit greater risk tolerance. To close this gap, we utilize the HILDA survey in 
conjunction with historical asset prices to estimate the level of risk aversion across the 
Australian population. 
 
The main finding is that wealth has a strong positive effect on risk tolerance, and unlike 
Cardak and Wilkins (2009), this is found to be economically significant. Theoretically, 
the results presented here could be explained by the “capitalist spirit" model developed 
by Bakshi and Chen (1996). Given the degree to which wealth dominates over all other 
variables, the holding of wealth as an ends in itself may very well be at the core of what 
is being observed. The finding is robust to a number of life cycle and demographic 
variables. In addition to wealth, age and mortgage effects were found to be statistically 
significant, with risk tolerance rising in both. Overall, risk aversion levels were found to 
average between 6 and 60, depending on the wealth quartile and the year examined. 
Risk aversion was shown to be heavily countercyclical with all wealth levels exhibiting 
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
15th 25th 35th 40th 50th 65th 75th 85th 95th
R
is
k 
av
er
si
on
Percentile
Advice received No advice received
10
20
15th 25th 35th 40th 50th 65th 75th 85th 95th
Wealth percentile
Re
lat
ive
 ris
k a
ver
sio
n
Advice received No advice
 178 
increased risk aversion during the Global Financial Crisis period. Further, although the 
least wealthy had the highest levels of risk aversion during this period, the wealthy 
exhibited the greatest swing in risk aversion. However, given that equity markets 
recovered in 2011, wealthier investors were in a much better position to take advantage 
of the positive returns. 
 
The findings have a number of important policy implications. Firstly, it has been 
documented that the upper income distributional cohort of Australian society has been 
able to augment their already high labour incomes with substantial income from capital 
(Greenville, Pobke and Rogers 2013). Our findings appear to add greater weight to 
these studies as wealthier households can allocate a greater proportion of their wealth to 
higher return generating portfolios. Secondly, given that wealthier households have 
greater access to wealth management services (see Hackethal, Haliassos and Jappelli 
2012 and BlackRock 2013), the disparity between wealthy and poor is likely to become 
exacerbated.  
 
Preliminary results that at the very least suggest that those who receive financial advice 
tend to exhibit RRA coefficients an order of magnitude below those who do not. 
Perhaps more significantly, the effect becomes much more pronounced as one proceeds 
up the wealth ladder. This the ongoing policy debated regarding financial advice reform 
in Australia must factor in the cost of accessing such advice for the less well off. The 
extent to which financial planning drives revealed household risk preferences, 
especially amongst the wealthy, is a potential fruitful question worthy of further 
exploration be it through HILDA or any number of private data collection agencies and 
consultancies. Even at this early stage though, the policy question to be asked is 
whether wealthier households can generate significant “economies of scale” in portfolio 
management and should there be an intervention to ensure that wealthier households are 
not being advantaged beyond their already financially superior position in the wealth 
ranks. 
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Chapter 6 Sources of Great Fortunes in the World 
Chapter 4 and 5 have largely abstracted from the actual individuals explored in Chapter 
3 by performing a macro and microeconomic analysis of wealth accumulation. The 
objective of Chapter 6 is to focus upon high net- wealth individuals and their associated 
sources of wealth. The Chapter assumes a cross-regional comparison – to better analyse 
and identify the sources of great fortunes today. The analysis pays attention to the role 
of self-made and inherited wealth, the social and economic conditions when many of 
the fortunes were first made and the links between great fortunes and government 
policy, particularly in sustaining inherited fortunes. Further, a link is made between 
diversification strategies and inherited wealth.  
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter analyses two aspects of wealth accumulation via a cross-regional 
comparison. Firstly, it explores the industrial activities that have enabled individuals 
and family dynasties to amass great fortunes and places this process firmly in its social, 
economic and/or political context. Secondly, it examines the extent to which individuals 
made their fortunes through their own entrepreneurial effort as opposed to inheritance, 
focusing on why inheritance levels among the ultra-rich should differ between advanced 
economies and, where relevant, how that wealth is sustained across generations.  
 
Much like the Gilded Age, entrepreneurship appears to have played the dominant role in 
the process of massive wealth accumulation observed today. Although the US continues 
to lead the world in producing large fortunes, the phenomenon appears to have been 
replicated across the globe, as first observed in Chapter 3. However, given the disparate 
paths in historical and institutional developments across the globe, there may be 
substantial differentiation in not only the patterns of entrepreneurial development, but 
also how societies accept the emergence of a patrimonial capitalism. 
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The term “patrimonial capitalism” or patrimonialism is a concept characterised by 
notions of inheritance, state paternalism, and a concentration of wealth. The degree to 
which one of these characteristics dominates is contingent upon whether the approach is 
based on an economic or sociological analysis. Piketty’s (2014a) use of the term 
appears to be largely centred on the notion that the economic elite’s fortunes are mainly 
derived through inheritance rather than entrepreneurship. Piketty (2014a) argues that the 
concentration of wealth savings behaviour alone cannot explain the concentration of 
wealth, but must be combined with evidence on the importance of inherited wealth. 
 
This Chapter in scope is most closely aligned to Kaplan and Rauh (2013) who use a 
similar database (US Forbes 400). Their explanation for the rise of great fortunes in 
modern society are ensconced in theories of human capital and the return to skills as 
exemplified by the information technology entrepreneur. However, this thesis strives to 
firmly place the sources of great fortunes, and to quote Watkins (1907), ‘[to] changes in 
external conditions’ (p. 5). It argues that the sources of great fortunes are just as much 
due to the existence of fortuitous historical and political circumstances from which 
traditional notions of randomness can then come to the fore. As the countries examined 
have high levels of human capital, if Kaplan and Rauh’s (2013) thesis were correct, a 
wealthy elite in highly technical industries would be expected to emerge in other 
countries where these skills exist to a similar degree. By restricting their analysis to 
skills scalability and human capital for example, Kaplan and Rauh (2013) ignore the 
role of both family and state patrimony in the growth of great fortunes. Further, they do 
not consider the type of risks assumed under which initial self-made fortunes were 
made, and what sort of investments are subsequently made in states of inheritance. 
 
To explore the first objective, the key trends and defining patterns of growth among the 
most prominently represented industries across the relevant regions are considered in 
order to: 1) systematically identify patterns of variation in the industrial sources of 
wealth; 2) the era when the first big opportunities arose; and 3) the general political, 
social and macro conditions that ensured significant payoffs. Differentiating self-made 
from inherited wealth at an intra-industry level is important for a number of reasons. 
Firstly, the preponderance of inheritance in each industry may signal significant barriers 
to new entrants into an industry. As argued by Figueroa (2008) and Bodley (1999), the 
existence of an economic elite erects barriers to entry (see Chapter 2). In addition, 
Shorrocks (1988) argues that such barriers may exist because of the unique risks 
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ensconced in certain project are more optimally performed (from an atomistic not 
socially optimal perspective) at different wealth levels. Secondly, the dominance of 
patrimony may, ceteris paribus, result in lower economic growth (Piketty, 2014a).  
 
Finally, it will be argued that how wealth is sustained, particularly in family dynasties, 
may be intimately bound up in a movement towards a more rentier-based wealth class 
than one derived from purely entrepreneurial effort. The following questions are also 
asked: Why should inheritance come to dominate a given country’s wealth ranks? And 
how is it possible that family dynasties are able to secure, and often, expand the scope 
of their influence and control across an industry or industries? 
 
As detailed in Chapter 3, rates of return across the advanced economies have 
demonstrated a secular downward trend since the 1960s, while the wealth accumulated 
has significantly increased. Although the decrease has been far from uniform across the 
advanced economies of the world, it does signal that entrepreneurial effort may have 
been higher during the 1950s to 1970s. Piketty (2014a), it will be recalled, argues that 
periods of high entrepreneurial effort are usually synonymous with higher rates of 
return and high national income growth. A natural question then to consider is how do 
entrepreneurs or those who inherited wealth respond? Watkins (1907) argued that it is 
during periods of high returns that entrepreneurs emerge. Conversely, when confronted 
with low returns, the degree of entrepreneurial application will diminish to the extent 
that they can easily increase their fortunes through speculative ventures beyond their 
expertise. The means through which this is achievable is not clearly outlined but 
Watkins (1907) offers various possibilities, chiefly speculation brought upon by the 
emergence of abstract financial property. Alternatively, in contemporary times, 
diversification (be it through mergers or acquisitions or greater asset allocation 
diversity) may provide such means through which already wealthy entrepreneurs shift 
from entrepreneurial activity to a rentier-style existence. For family dynasties, it is 
posited that this tendency is just as pronounced. This theme can be further motivated in 
the theoretical framework of Shorrocks (1988) discussed in Chapter 2.  
 
Lastly, the relationship between government and the ultra-rich is an area lacking in the 
literature (Medeiros & Pedro, 2014) point out that this is an area of research that is 
sorely lacking. The relation is multifaceted and need not necessarily be due to direct 
subsidisation of capitalist interests, and will manifest itself substantially different 
 182 
depending upon the historical trajectory of a country’s political and economic 
landscape. 
 
This chapter offers policy implications, as it demonstrates that many of the great 
technological and welfare enhancing activities enacted by entrepreneurs, upon which 
today’s great fortunes were built, were not blunted by more onerous tax regimes or high 
labour wages throughout the 1950s, ‘60s or 70s. Indeed, Solow (2014) argues that the 
‘rich-get-richer’ dynamic of Piketty’s (2014) thesis does not necessarily work ‘through 
individual incentives to innovate’ (para. 22). Hence, policy that seeks to blunt wealth 
accumulation should not necessarily be inhibited by arguments relying on notions of 
stifling innovation or unfairly reducing returns to human capital. 
 
This chapter is divided along regional and country dimensions to facilitate the 
organisation of a large amount of data under consideration. Section 6.2 explores the 
billionaire factory of North America. Despite the rise of East Asia and reassertion of 
Western Europe as an economically powerful bloc, North America still remains the 
primary driver of the extraordinary growth of billionaires in the past 30 years. Section 
6.3 shifts to Western Europe, focusing on Germany, France and the UK. Section 6.4 
investigates the rise of great fortunes in the new economic powerhouses of India, China, 
and Russia. East Asia, specifically Japan and South Korea are the focus of Section 6.5. 
These two countries, despite sharing similar cultural and historical underpinnings, have 
exhibited dramatic and divergent evolutionary paths in the rise of their respective 
billionaires. Section 6.6 examines Latin America, where it is found that the political 
economy has had a manifestly strong role in the economic elite of that continent. 
Section 6.7 examines Australia and New Zealand, which, despite their relative small 
population bases, have exhibited a sizable growth in vast fortunes in the past decade. 
Lastly, Section 6.8 provides a summary of the chapter. 
 
6.2 North America: Billionaires’ Factory 
 
The detailed regional exploration of billionaires begins with North America, which here 
includes the US, Canada and Mexico. The bulk of the billionaires do come from the US, 
although there are notable examples from both Canada and Mexico. For example, 
Mexican Carlos Slim often vies for the richest individual in the world with Bill Gates 
and Warren Buffett. In our era, how did the US once again manage to emerge at the 
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forefront of producing individuals who can accumulate extreme wealth? Watkins (1907) 
and Rubinstein (1980) both recognised that during the Gilded Age, the US led the world 
not only in terms of the size of fortunes, but also in the number of ultra-rich. In 
contemporary times, how did the average North American billionaire establish their 
fortune? Figure 6.1 presents the distribution of North American billionaires by 
industrial group.  
 
Figure 6.1 Distribution of North American billionaires by GICS industry group 
Source: Forbes (1990-2013), Author’s compilation from various secondary sources 
 
The first salient fact that should be noted in Figure 6.1 is that no industry has shown a 
general retreat overall, with at most ephemeral reversals during the outbreak of crises. 
Across every industry, there is a demonstrable increase in the population of billionaires. 
This increase is particularly evident between 2000 and 2005 with certain sectors 
registering a three-fold increase. Contrary to popular perception, these increases are not 
necessarily tied to ‘new economy’ industries only. For example, consumer discretionary 
increased by almost 380% from 29 billionaires in 1990 to 139 in 2013, exhibiting one of 
the slowest growth rates at 8.7% per annum. Finance, which includes banking, 
Notes: The chart provides a visual summary of the distribution of individuals across North American 
industries using the two-code GICS. The data is presented on a 5-year interval basis. The numbers for 
associated sectors are: 10: Energy, 15: Materials, 20: Industrials, 25: Consumer Discretionary, 30: 
Consumer Staples, 35: Health care, 40: Financials, 45: Information Technology, 50: 
Telecommunication Services, 55: Utilities.  
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diversified financials, insurance and property, has demonstrated even greater growth, 
increasing from 17 in 1990 to 151 by 2013, the equivalent of a 790% increase in their 
population ranks and a 13% per annum growth rate. In 2013, financial services 
represent the bulk (31.1%) from where North American great fortunes emanate. IT has, 
unsurprisingly, demonstrated exceptional growth, albeit from a smaller base. In 1990, 
there were four billionaires in IT, which increased to 53 in 2013, the equivalent of an 
1,225% increase or a 12% per annum growth rate. The second key point is that the year-
on-year distribution of billionaires across industries has been far from uniform 
throughout the sample period. Rather, a dramatic shift between the 1990s and the 2000s 
is observed. According to Figure 6.1, throughout the 1990s, consumer discretionary 
(25), industrials (10), consumer staples (30) and financials (40) dominated. However, 
throughout the 2000s a radical shift in the composition in the sector distribution is 
observed. Now, materials (15) consumer discretionary (25), financials (40), and IT (45) 
all tend to dominate the North American billionaire wealth ranks. The combined sub-
group accounted for 71.1% of billionaires during 2013. 
 
The variation in sector dominance from the 1990s to the 2000s is also reflected in a 
concomitant change in the demographical profile of North America’s billionaires. The 
mean age profiles are presented in Figure 6.2. At first glance, there is substantial cross-
sectional variation in the mean age exhibited by the various industries. The mean age 
ranges from a low of 50 in IT and services to a high of 82 in utilities. Overall, the mean 
age is 66, in line with the US study by Canterbery and Nosari (1985), who attribute this 
finding to a life-cycle dynamic. Across time, all industries demonstrate a general 
upward trend although there appear to be bouts where much younger individuals enter 
the billionaire ranks.  
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Figure 6.2 Mean age profile by industry in North America, 1990-2013 
Source: Forbes (1990-2013), Author’s compilation from various secondary sources 
 
The large oscillations to an industry’s mean age appears to be clustered in the late 
1990s. IT, energy, telecommunications and financials all registered drops in the mean 
age throughout this period. The substantial drops in IT are particularly revealing. In 
1994, the peak mean age was 60, before decreasing to the mid and low 40s between 
1996 and 2001. The decrease in the average of age of the IT entrepreneur coincides with 
an influx of youthful individuals in Internet-related enterprises. However, since 2001 
there has been a long steady increase to the mid-50s. Finance, too, registered a drop 
during this period, although by no means as dramatic. Throughout the sample, the mean 
age of billionaires in financial services is 65. Between 1999 and 2003 it remained below 
the long-term trend, due largely to the influx of new rich from the hedge funds 
industry.23  
                                                
23 A one-way between subjects ANOVA was conducted to compare the mean differences between the 
various industrial sectors by age, for every sample year. Table 6.1 presents the results of the one-way 
ANOVA analysis. It shows that throughout the 1990s there was very little variation either in the mean age 
or variances between the various industrial groupings. In 1992, for example there was a statistically 
insignificant effect of industry on age [F(15, 62) = 1.640, p = 0.0.089], became systematically less 
significant as the decade progressed with the F ratio tending to 1.0. In 1998, for example, the F ratio was 
1.130, with a p value of 0.228. From 1999 to 2013, the results change with every year with a statistically 
significant effect of industry on the mean billionaires’ ages being observed. A post-hoc Tukey honest 
significant difference (HSD) comparison was applied to determine in which industries the variance was 
largely being driven. The post-estimation procedure found that the IT, energy and materials were the 
industries driving the fluctuations in mean age.  
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In general, the changes in the mean age distribution across time and industry coincide 
with the large jumps in the overall trend of billionaire numbers. However, there are 
some industries that exhibiting robust growth in numbers, which is not necessarily due 
to recent entrepreneurial effort. Consumer discretionary is dominated by the retail and 
media industries – both of which have experienced a dramatic swelling in their ranks 
since 2000. Despite the growth in both, deep analysis reveals them to consist of mainly 
older individuals who have been in enterprise for many years. These issues are explored 
further in Section 6.2.1. 
 
The infusion of younger individuals could be driven by inheritances (intergenerational 
wealth transfers), new industry, or growth in mature industries due to substantial 
technological advancement. In Section 4.3, it was shown that when compared to the rest 
of the globe, North America exhibited the lowest proportion of inheritances suggesting 
that one of the latter two is at work. The natural issue arises as to how widespread this 
trend has been across the North American industrial structure, or whether it is just a few 
key industries that have induced this trend. Figure 6.3 presents the proportion of 
inheritances in North America by industrial grouping since 1990. Most industries 
exhibit decreasing levels of inheritance, with only a few registering stability or slight 
increases. Of the former, industrials, financials, materials and telecommunications have 
demonstrated the largest falls. Consumer staples (µ =71%), energy (µ =63%) and 
                                                
 
One Way ANOVA test of mean age by GICS sectors, 1990 to 2013, North America 
  Between Group d.f. Within groups d.f. F p > F Bartlett Test 
1990 19 367 3.500 0.000 0.701 
1991 13 61 2.010 0.035 0.270 
1992 15 62 1.640 0.089 0.620 
1993 15 69 1.330 0.207 0.608 
1994 15 85 1.130 0.344 0.775 
1995 16 94 1.010 0.454 0.886 
1996 19 128 1.370 0.155 0.912 
1997 16 49 1.170 0.323 0.299 
1998 16 60 1.300 0.228 0.537 
1999 14 52 2.910 0.003 0.942 
2000 15 59 3.420 0.000 0.785 
2001 21 268 2.960 0.000 0.789 
2002 20 227 2.560 0.000 0.970 
2003 19 226 1.950 0.012 0.832 
2004 21 281 2.770 0.000 0.338 
2005 21 344 3.480 0.000 0.700 
2006 21 380 3.570 0.000 0.623 
2007 21 428 3.600 0.000 0.502 
2008 21 481 4.920 0.000 0.681 
2009 19 367 3.500 0.000 0.701 
2010 21 404 4.120 0.000 0.877 
2011 21 425 4.560 0.000 0.679 
2012 22 434 4.460 0.000 0.932 
2013 22 458 4.060 0.000 0.975 
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materials (µ =62%) have generally exhibited, on average over the sample period, 
majority patrimony. In contrast, financials (µ =28%), health care (µ =22%) and IT 
(µ =3%) all exhibit the lowest levels of inheritance.  
 
Figure 6.3 Proportion of inheritances by industry in North America, 1990-2013 
Source: Forbes (1990-2013), Author’s compilation from various secondary sources 
 
Of the three largest growth industries, (financials, IT and consumer discretionary), 
consumer discretionary has generally demonstrated a close to even split between 
inheritance and self-made individuals (µ=48%). How and why these three industries 
should demonstrate the most growth in the past two decades and why inheritance 
proportions can vary between industries are explored in further detail below.  
 
6.2.1 Consumer Discretionary  
 
The realm of the consumer discretionary spending has been a consistent producer of 
billionaires, albeit at a slower rate relative to other North American industries. Figure 
6.4 presents the sample trend since 1990 in each of the consumer discretionary industrial 
subgroups. Since 1990, the number of billionaires finding a fortune in consumer 
discretionary spending has grown annually by 12%. The largest representative is media, 
averaging 40% of the number of billionaires in the consumer discretionary sector throughout 
the sample period, followed by retail (32%), consumer services (19%), consumer durables 
and apparel (8%) and automobiles and components (1%). 
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Figure 6.4 Consumer discretionary sector trends in North America, 1990-2013 
Source: Forbes (1990-2013), Author’s compilation from various secondary sources 
 
In total, 35 individuals found their fortune in media as of 2013, having fallen from a high 
of 49 in 2008. Some portion of the decrease can be explained by death, where the 
subsequent inheritance was divided up into individual portions falling below the one 
billion dollar Forbes threshold. Examples include the co-founder of The Weather 
Channel and head of Landmark Communications, Frank Batten, who died in 2009 
(Hevesi, 2011), and John Kluge, who was once rated the wealthiest man in the world in 
the late 1980s after making his fortune by buying and selling broadcast and cellular 
properties, (Berger, 2010). After Kluge died in 2010, his wealth was shared among his 
three children, despite some media outlets stating that the fortune had disappeared (Martel, 
2014). In 2009, Leonore Annanberg passed away with an estimated net worth of $1.7 
billion, and the estate was divided up between numerous beneficiaries (McFadden, 
2009).  
 
Overall, however, except for personal risks or death, media appears to have been a robust 
source of wealth in North America in the recent past. A major reason for this appears to 
have been a large increase in mergers and acquisitions between various media companies, 
generating enormous returns to owners. Bagdikian (2000) shows that the process of 
concentration in media is greater in the past 20 years compared to any prior period: 
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In 1983, fifty corporations dominated most of every mass medium and the biggest 
media merger in history was a $340 million deal …. [I]n 1987, the fifty 
companies had shrunk to twenty-nine.… [I]n 1990, the twenty-nine had shrunk 
to twenty three…. [I]n 1997, the biggest firms numbered ten and involved the 
$19 billion Disney-ABC deal, at the time the biggest media merger ever …. [In 
2000] AOL Time Warner’s $350 billion merged corporation [was] more than 
1,000 times larger [than the biggest deal of 1983]. (pp. xx-xxi) 
 
From 2000, the number of media moguls increased from 8 to 35, suggesting that the scope 
for wealth creation in media is still there, though it tends to be associated with older 
individuals who have long been in the media game or those via intra-generational 
inheritance. Of course, the rise of the Internet must constitute one of the determinants that 
have caused an immense increase in the number of media moguls, with their content now 
being able to reach a global audience rather than just the US. Rosen's (1981) argument that 
advanced technological communication platforms increases returns to scale becomes 
easily attainable. Given the association between scale and technology the Internet provides 
an ever-greater pool from which new individuals will make large fortunes. Moreover, the 
scale attainable suggests that accumulation through mergers and acquisitions is not likely 
to let up anytime soon with newer content providers and delivery systems vying for both 
the North American and global markets.  
 
Closely mirroring the growth in media has been the growth in representation of the 
consumer services. Over 1996 to 2003, the number of billionaires averaged 15; however, 
over the 2005 to 2013 period the mean number of billionaires ballooned to 48. The 
increase has been dominated by the hospitality sector owing to both demand and supply 
factors. On the demand side, tourism in the US has undergone a growth, with tourist 
numbers far outstripping those of Europe and Asia throughout the 2000s (Hobbs & 
Toscano, 2014). Perhaps signifying still existent arbitrage opportunities, the growth in 
demand has not witnessed a commensurate rise in the supply of hotel rooms, leading to 
increased pricing and, therefore, substantially increased revenue for incumbents. Still on 
the supply side, an added force that may assist in creating greater wealth accumulation in 
the sector is a substantial increase in the casualisation of the US hospitality workforce. 
The process towards casual work was evident in 2013, with hoteliers and restaurateurs 
recruiting a greater proportion of part-timers than full-time employees (Hobbs & Toscano, 
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2014). Given the relative recent growth in hospitality, the majority of wealth is 
associated with self-made wealth.  
 
The high incidence of inheritance in the consumer discretionary sector is largely 
driven by the retail sector. Examining the raw data, the number of retail moguls 
increased from just four in 2000 to 31 in 2001, an increase of 675%. Though it plateaued 
throughout the 2000s, it peaked at 46 in 2013. Of these, an average 46% inherited their 
wealth, with the Walton family the most famous and wealthiest. Christy, Jim, Alice and 
Samuel Walton all had an individual net worth in excess of $20 billion in 2013. Other 
inheritors litter the list with many demonstrating a propensity to diversifying the business 
interests through either vertical supply chain purchases or straight-out acquisitions. 
Charles Butt made billions by diversifying into Latin American neighbourhoods and 
Mexico after inheriting the family owned H. E. Butt Grocery chain. The Waltons also 
commandeered an aggressive position over the value chain by often negotiating at below 
cost for products to appear on the retail giant’s shelves. In retail, at least, a winner-takes-
all dynamic has arisen, either through mergers or acquisitions. 
 
Of the self-made individuals, the majority built the foundations for their success in the 
1950s or 1960s, reflecting the opportunities afforded to entrepreneurs during an era of high 
growth and commensurate high returns, as discussed in Chapter 3. Bernard Marcus, James 
Moran and Jean Coutu all successfully exploited the growing consumerism of North 
American society through the application of innovative retailing strategies. The 
strategies ensured the attainment of rapid scale across the North American landscape 
during the golden years of post-war capitalism. 
 
Overall, the billionaire number increases in the consumer discretionary sector seem to be 
much more aligned with the randomness hypothesis of Thurow (1975) for the self-made 
entrepreneur. When it comes to inheritances, there is a marked tendency for growing 
one’s wealth through acquisitions or diversification of business holdings. 
6.2.2 Financials 
 
Eclipsing the number and growth of billionaires in the consumer discretionary sector 
is the financial services industry, which is here taken to represent banking, diversified 
financials (including hedge funds) insurance, and property investments. Financial 
services continue to provide fertile ground for extraordinary riches to be made, despite 
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being the sector at the core of the Great Recession of 2008. A similar dynamic is 
observed during the Gilded Age when the depression of 1893 did little to dent the 
accumulation of wealth among the financial and propertied groups (Rockoff, 2012). 
Referring to Figure 6.5, only diversified financials and property have shown high 
growth over the entirety of the sample and since the Great Recession. Given that the 
US has a market-based financial system, it is not surprising to observe that insurance 
and banking have only small representation on the wealth tables. In 2013, there were 
107 billionaires in diversified financials, representing a significant increase from the 
84 observed in 2008. Similarly, for real estate, a high of 38 was reached in 2008, 
before decreasing to 27 in 2009, but then recovering to reach 41 in 2012 and 33 in 
2013. The number of billionaires increased from nine in 2000 to 58 in 2001, a 
dramatic increase of 544%, though the majority was due to diversified financials. 
 
 
Figure 6.5 Financials sector decomposition and trends in North America, 1990-2013 
Source: Forbes (1990-2013), Author’s compilation from various secondary sources 
 
A booming stock market during the late 1990s presents itself as an obvious 
explanation as to why the financial sector in North America is the dominant industry 
in producing vast fortunes. However, significant regulatory changes throughout the 
past 30 to 40 years present just as compelling an explanation in creating the necessary 
opportunities for such growth in the finance sector. For example, the Tax Reform Act 
of 1986 eliminated the attractiveness of real estate tax shelters, causing the real estate 
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boom to go bust in the 1980s. Consequently, individuals such as Andrew Beal 
purchased distressed real estate loans throughout Texas, securing his meteoric rise in 
the wealth ranks.  
 
A problem with dealing with the diversified financial community is that it 
incorporates largely disparate groupings. This study focuses on the two sub-sectors 
that have brought the most growth, investments (incorporating managed fund owners) 
and hedge fund owners. Figure 6.6 displays both the average age and number of those 
engaged in the investment sector. Three items are of note. Firstly, as in other sectors 
of the US economy, the number of individuals who generated their wealth from 
investing demonstrated a dramatic increase from 2000 to 2001. In 2000, there were 
five billionaires and by 2001 there were 38, representing an increase of 660%. The US 
stock market downturn of 2002 only had marginal effects on the number of 
billionaires who remained in the rich lists. Since 2001, there has been substantial 
growth, with the GFC proving to be only a momentary hurdle for growth. Since 1990, 
the average growth rate has swollen the number of super rich by 10.9% overall 
(geometric mean). Taking the more extreme period, 2000 to 2013, the growth rate is 
an astonishing 24.5% per annum. By 2013, there were 87 billionaires, of which 77 
were self-made and 10 inherited their wealth. Since 2002, the relative proportion of 
self-made individuals has increased from 68.4% to 88.5% in 2013.  
 
Figure 6.6 Number and mean age of billionaires in North America: Investments 
Source: Forbes (1990-2013), Author’s compilation from various secondary sources. 
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Among the investment community the older cohorts mainly began their roads to 
wealth during the 1970s and 1980s. The timing of their entry into the industry 
positioned them to effectively benefit from the changing nature of the financial 
landscape, largely due to regulation. For example, under Regulation Q of the Banking 
Act of 1933, a 5.25% ceiling on savings accounts was imposed. According to 
Sherman (2009), this had a deleterious impact upon the ability of banks to attract 
capital but benefitted a new emerging class of financiers: 
 
In the late 1970s, inflation caused market interest rates to rise above the 
limits mandated by Regulation Q…. Brokerage firms and other financial 
institutions began to create money market mutual funds … They quickly 
became popular among small investors who shifted their money out of the 
regulated accounts in depository institutions, which paid considerably lower 
interest rates. (p. 6) 
 
The impact can be viewed clearly in Figure 6.7, where the managed funds industry 
saw dramatic growth in the 1980s. More recently still, the Financial Modernization 
Act of 1999 allows financial services companies to achieve unprecedented scale.  
 
 
Figure 6.7 Net assets under management in North America, 1940-2013 
Source: Investment Company Institute (2015)  
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Although the proportion of inherited wealth has remained relatively stable, there 
appears to be differences between the two groups in terms of how their wealth and 
associated enterprise interests are handled. A sizeable proportion of self-made 
individuals in investments made their fortunes by targeting specific investments rather 
than diversifying. Previous scholarship has often identified the ability of investments 
to be rapidly capitalised in a Fisherian manner (Hirsch, 1911; see Thurow, 1975). 
Examples of such individuals abound in the US data with many making their fortunes 
in private equity particularly. In contrast, the inherited group generally appear to adopt 
much more diversified approaches to their investments. 
 
Given the impact of hedge funds on the industry some attention is focused on the 
pioneers of this sector. Generally, the overwhelming majority can be described as self-
made entrepreneurs from the baby boomer generation compared to the older cohorts 
observed in the investments community. Table 6.1 shows that since 2001, the average 
age of hedge fund billionaires has decreased from the mid-60s during the 1990s to 
approximately the mid-fifties since 2002. The large, almost, generational shift is 
mostly attributable to a large influx over the past decade. During the 1990s, the 
number of hedge fund billionaires was small, just one, George Soros, born in 1931. In 
2001, there were four hedge fund billionaires; by 2012 the number of billionaires had 
swelled to 31, an increase of 675% and representing 35.6% of the diversified 
financials community. With the increase, there has been a large concomitant decrease 
in the average age of the hedge fund billionaires, decreasing from 60 in 2001, to the 
mid-50s throughout the 2000s. 
 
Table 6.1 Number, mean age, and date of birth of hedge fund owners in North America 
           
Year 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Number 1 1 1 1 1 1 - 4 3 3 
Average Age 63 64 65 66 67 68 - 60 58 59 
Average Birth 
Year 1931 1931 1931 1931 1931 1931  - 1941 1944 1944 
           
Year 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Number 5 7 10 13 28 24 25 26 31 31 
Average Age 54 56 54 56 53 55 55 56 56 57 
Average Birth 
Year 1950 1949 1953 1951 1955 1954 1955 1955 1956 1956 
Source: Forbes (1990-2013), Author’s compilation from various secondary sources. 
 
The growth in the hedge fund industry and the antecedent wealth it generated for its 
captains can be traced to two main factors. Firstly, the source and size of fund flows 
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has dramatically changed since the 1990s. In previous decades, wealthy individuals 
were, typically, the main investors in hedge funds. However, the sheer scale of fund 
flows has now largely emanated from mutual and pension funds brimming with large 
pools of funds (Stulz, 2007). An important issue is why hedge funds should be 
attracting such significant investment flows from institutional investors and wealthy 
individuals. As noted in Chapter 3, that real returns have been significantly decreasing 
since the Second World War across both North America and Western Europe. Could 
the search for higher returns be driving a flight to hedge funds? According to Preqin 
(2014), more than 80% of fund flows into hedge funds come from Europe and North 
America. The Preqin (2014) industry survey lists three major reasons why institutional 
investors favour hedge funds, including: the ability to reduce volatility; diversifying 
risk premia; and producing absolute returns.24  
 
Secondly, hedge fund fee structures ensure a robust channel for wealth accumulation. 
Compensation contracts that are extremely favourable to the hedge fund managers 
ensure significant pecuniary advantages: 
 
...almost all hedge fund managers have an asymmetric compensation contract 
that specifies that they receive a substantial fraction of the profits they 
generate …. Typically, hedge fund managers receive a fixed compensation 
corresponding to 1-2 percent of the net asset value of the fund ... and 15-25 
percent of the return of the fund above a hurdle rate (which can be the risk-
free rate). (Stulz, 2007, p. 184) 
 
Given a) the massive influx of cash flow into hedge funds, and b) the generous 
compensation packages of hedge fund managers, it is not surprising to observe the 
swelling of wealth being generated in this sector.  
 
The other great producer of wealth for North America’s financial sector has been 
property – although close inspection of the data suggests that the scope for new wealth 
is limited. Figure 6.8 presents the overall number and average ages of realty 
billionaires in North America between 1990 and 2013. The number of billionaires 
languished in single digits during the 1990s, with the maximum numbering a meagre 6 
                                                
24 Absolute returns taken to mean the search for investment strategies generating only positive returns. 
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in 1990. Throughout the 1990s, there was, in fact, a secular downward trend and by 
1999 not one real estate billionaire appeared in the Forbes list. However, by 2001, 
there were 8 billionaires and by 2008 there were 38, an increase of 375%. 
Significantly, the majority of growth is due largely to self-made individuals and not 
inheritance. However, this should not be tied to recent entrepreneurial effort. The 
average number of inheritances over the entire sample has remained low at 3 with the 
highest recorded in 2012 and 2013 at 6. Turning to the billionaires’ ages, more 
variation and a higher mean age overall are observed compared to the other 
investment related sectors.  
 
 
Figure 6.8 Number and mean age of billionaires in North America: Real estate 
Source: Forbes (1990-2013), Author’s compilation from various secondary sources. 
 
Both the stalwarts and relative new entrants into the billionaire ranks have a long 
history in the property game, and represent fortuitous timing in the grand socio-
demographic changes experienced by North America after the Second World War. 
The original propertied billionaires, individuals such as DeBartolo Sr., Taubman and 
Bren, all appear to have recognised the significant demographic changes of the 1960s 
towards suburban living. The experience of the more recent rich inductees reflects the 
paths of the older cohorts during the 1960s and 1970s.  
 
40
45
50
55
60
65
70
75
80
85
90
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
A
ge
N
um
be
r 
of
 in
di
vi
du
al
s
Year
Inherited
Self-made
Mean Age Self-made
Mean age of beneficiaries
 197 
A confluence of economic and policy forces throughout the 1930s to 1970s ensured 
that the economic structure was there for any keen entrepreneur to exploit. The 
creation of the Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) in 1938 provided 
mortgage finance to millions of prospective and aspiring homeowners in subsequent 
decades. The G.I. Bill of Rights provided the backbone for a massive home 
development market. By 1952, the government backed approximately 2.4 million 
homes. The Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1956, which provided funding for 41,000 
miles of interstate highways, ensured that viable suburban communities to develop 
could be connected to large regional metropolitan centres. The freeway initiative 
having benefits for individuals involved in the mass development of master planned 
communities such as Donald Bren (Forsyth, 2005). Similarly, the urban sprawl 
providing fertile ground in which shopping malls would become part of the wealth 
generating businesses for individuals like DeBartolo and Taubman. 
 
To summarise, several salient themes become apparent among the propertied elite. 
Much of the wealth is generated via construction of retail centres or supplying 
residential housing. Ultimately, both were largely spurred on by the substantial post-
war wave of urbanisation across both the US and Canada. For property, at least, the 
means to extreme wealth appears to be very much restricted to having identified 
opportunities in the post-war era and accumulated significant property holdings in the 
1950s to 1970s. The surprising lack of ‘youthful’ wealth suggests a substantial cohort 
effect during the post-war era. The rise itself in the number of billionaires during the 
2000s is obviously associated with the boom in property prices – however, a 
substantial element in their success is fortuitous timing since their investments during 
the 1950s and 1960s placed them in a position to ride the property boom of the 1990s 
and beyond. 
6.2.3 Information Technology 
 
In popular media, whenever billionaires are brought up, reference is typically made to 
those who made a vast fortune in IT. Indeed, given that Bill Gates is usually 
considered the wealthiest man alive, this is not surprising. Even in economic debates 
on the merits of vast wealth, advocates of the rich will often highlight names from this 
industry. The name of the late Steve Jobs is often evoked (see e.g. Mankiw, 2013). 
Further, a cursory glance across industry news would often suggest that many of those 
who made their fortunes are still very young, a trend that has continued since the 
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1960s with the pioneers of the microchip architecture. More recently, individuals such 
as Jeff Bezos (Amazon) and Mark Zuckerberg of Facebook fame have continued the 
trend of relatively young individuals making rapid wealth gains in IT. In many 
respects, these individuals are often accorded a similar status to the individuals who 
spurred on the industrial revolution in the UK in the early nineteenth century. A 
significant difference, however, is that the industrialists of that era were never at the 
pinnacle of the wealth tree compared to what is observed with the wizards of the 
digital revolution.25  
 
Figure 6.9 presents a breakdown of the IT sector by time along the dimensions of 
average age and the number of billionaires. The sample is not divided by inherited and 
self-made wealth only two names had inherited wealth: Henry Ross Perot Jr., the son 
of the former US presidential candidate, Henry Perot, and Laurene Jobs, the widow of 
the Apple cofounder Steve Jobs. Overall, the average digital billionaire is aged 53, 
though the average age did demonstrate a marked downward trend throughout the 
1990s to 2000. Only with the influx of new entrepreneurs from Internet-related 
enterprises is the average age suppressed. By 2001, with the dot com crash largely 
sorting the winners and losers in the Internet game, the average age once again started 
to slowly rise and continued to do so particularly between 2004 and 2013, suggesting 
more maturity in the industry. The increase in the average age has not, however, 
appeared to diminish for the computer or IT industry’s capacity to generate significant 
wealth. By 1999, there were 12 billionaires in this industry, by 2001 it had jumped to 
32, by 2010 it was 48 and by 2013 it had reached 53. Annually, the number of 
individuals added to the ranking has averaged 15% on the previous year.  
 
                                                
25 As Rubinstein shows, the financial and propertied classes dwarfed the wealth of the British 
industrialists in the 1800s. 
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Figure 6.9 Number and mean age of billionaires in North America: Information technology 
Source: Forbes (1990-2013), Author’s compilation from various secondary sources. 
 
Before proceeding, it is necessary to further breakdown the sample according to sub-
categories. As it stands, by applying the GICS overlay the industry detail is lost. This 
is an important issue since the IT industry is substantially heterogeneous with many 
making fortunes in software development, hardware development, computer 
consultancy or the Internet (with the last often incorporating elements of the other 
three), each possessing a degree of heterogeneity in the path to great wealth.  
 
 
Figure 6.10 Information technology sector decomposition and trends in North America, 1990-2013  
Source: Forbes (1990-2013), Author’s compilation from various secondary sources. 
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Figure 6.10 disaggregates the sector by the four subcomponents. The chart suggests 
that software and hardware only experienced rapid growth in the late 1990s. The 
number of hardware vendor entrepreneurs averaged 3.1 in the 1990s, increasing to 8.7 
between 2001 and 2013. Software demonstrates similar numbers, with an average of 
4.4 individuals amassing great fortunes in the 1990s, increasing to 11.4 between 2001 
and 2013. Overall, particularly when compared to the IT industry as a whole, the slow 
growth rates can either be explained by appeals to notions of maturing markets, as 
well as substantially more competition from East Asia, particularly in the hardware 
sector through such manufacturers as Acer, Asus, Sony and Samsung, and software 
development from India. Growth rates have been much more robust among Internet-
connected entrepreneurs, with an average growth rate of 20% since the first 
billionaires made their fortunes in 1990s. From 2001, the number of Internet-related 
billionaires was five, increasing to 23 by 2013. This compares favourably against 
hardware (11.6%) and software developers (10.4%). 
 
Among the hardware and software entrepreneurs, numerous household names abound. 
William Hewlett and David Packard names have become synonymous with the 
personal computer and printer hardware. In software, Henry Ross Perot, born in 1931, 
now best remembered as a US independent presidential candidate in the 1990 and 
1996 elections, also saw opportunity in major sales to the US government. The one-
time International Business Machines (IBM) salesperson, Perot created Electronic 
Data Systems (EDS) in 1962. EDS’ principal revenue came from the computerisation 
of the government’s Medicare and Medicaid records in relation to the Great Society 
programs (Swedin & Ferro, 2005). The rise of computer equipment as a channel of 
wealth accumulation during these formative years can be readily observed in 
aggregate sales for the US. Table 6.2 shows the continued growth of computer 
equipment sales as a significant contributor to overall US gross domestic product 
(GDP) from the 1960s, demonstrating the significant possibilities for wealth 
accumulation. 
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Table 6.2 US computer equipment sales, 1990-1995 
Year GDP (billions) Sales of Computing equipment (billions) 
Computer Equipment as 
% of GDP 
1960 513 1.5 0.3 
1970 1,010 10.5 1 
1980 2,708 55.1 2 
1990 5,546 154.8 2.8 
1995 7,117 204.8 2.9 
Source: Committee on Innovations in Computing and Communications: Lessons 
from History (1999) 
 
As in many of the other industries, much of the innovation of these early innovators 
and entrepreneurs arose during an era of high-income growth and taxation. One of the 
main reasons for this, is that much of the evolution in computing appears to have 
followed a process of knowledge diffusion across numerous parties rather than being 
tied to individual genius. Knowledge diffusion, for example, being identified by 
Rockoff (2012) as of paramount importance to the success of the early pioneers of 
assembly manufacturing. Perhaps the prime example of this is Gordon Moore and the 
subsequent technological spinoffs. Moore, co-founded Intel in 1968 with Robert 
Noyce, and was part of the infamous Silicon Valley story of the ‘Traitorous Eight’. 
Previous to Intel, a bespoke approach to integrated circuitry was required that swelled 
the costs of the technology limiting market scale. Intel developed a paradigm that still 
exists today - develop a single integrated circuit with general capabilities, and then use 
software to tailor the tasks to be undertaken by the computer (Ceruzzi, 2003). Not 
only did Moore’s brainchild ensure future success for himself personally, but it also 
provided the platform upon which others in the 1970s and 1980s, such as Bill Gates or 
Steve Jobs, would be able to grow their own business and fortunes – a process in line 
with the pattern of knowledge evolution in industries first observed by Jones (1831).  
 
It must be emphasised that much of the early innovation was attributable to substantial 
funding of the US government. For example, ‘federal contracts supported more than 
half of the R&D and about 35 per cent of R&D as late as 1963’ (Committee on 
Innovations, 1999, p. 88). Direct funding was not always a necessary precursor, 
indeed often the research slowly disseminated through several years before a 
commercial application could be found. Indeed, as has often been pointed out, 
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entrepreneurs such as Steve Jobs at Apple and Bill Gates at Microsoft ‘built upon 
ideas developed previously, many of them with government funding’ (Committee on 
Innovations, 1999, p. 108). Rather, the dissemination of knowledge and collaboration 
ensured technological progress wherein viable commercial applications were found.  
 
Among the more recent billionaires, there is a preponderance of those making their 
fortunes with Internet-related businesses. What is, however, perhaps most compelling 
is the extent to which these individuals have amassed vast fortunes in a short span of 
time and the rapidity with which they have tended to diversify their business interests, 
as exemplified by Google’s Larry Page and Sergey Brin. Mark Zuckerberg of 
Facebook fame is by far the most famous, debuting on the billionaire rich list in 2008 
with an estimated net worth of $1.5 billion in 2008. His net worth rose substantially 
prior to the initial public offering (IPO) for Facebook in 2012, reaching $13.5 billion 
in 2011. By 2012 when the IPO was made, Zuckerberg’s wealth rose by $6 billion to 
$17.5 billion. The ability to displace an old industry and quickly scale to a vast market 
is seen in the case of Jeffery Bezos and his Amazon empire. Although Bezos’s wealth 
could be tied with the retail sector, there are sufficient business interests that firmly 
centre his company into the IT sphere. Amazon gained substantial market share firstly 
in online book and movie sales but has since moved into product categories usually 
sold by bricks and mortar department stores. Further, Amazon has diversified into 
cloud infrastructure and tablet and phone devices. PayPal is an example of an 
enterprise that has radically transformed the payments system and elevated one of its 
founders, Peter Thiel, to billionaire status, as is eBay.  
 
6.3 Western Europe: Old and New Money  
 
In shifting focus from North America to Western Europe one is immediately struck by 
the central role played by old or inherited wealth compared to North America. In 
Chapter 4, Table 4.3 was used to compare the relative numbers of inherited and self-
made fortunes between regions. Throughout the 1990s, the proportion of individuals 
that had inherited their wealth was approximately 73.4% for Western Europe compared 
to 51.4% for North America. As one shifts into the latter years of the sample, the trend 
in Western Europe reverses, with the self-made individual increasingly dominating the 
enumerated rich lists. Since 2010, there have been consecutive points in time where the 
self-made rich represent the majority of billionaires in Western Europe, although there 
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is a small reversal towards inherited wealth. For example, in 2012, 43.9% of Western 
European billionaires had inherited their wealth; by 2013 this had increased to 46.8%. 
Contrasted to this are the North American observations, where only 29.4% and 29.9% 
had inherited their wealth in 2012 and 2013, respectively. What is influencing the 
dramatic and contrasting wealth structure between Western Europe and North America? 
To explore this question, the Western European data is discussed with reference to both 
the country breakdown and the main sectors of wealth generation in each.  
 
To acquire a better understanding, the inherited and self-made groups are further 
disaggregated by country. The results are presented in Figure 6.11. A cursory glance 
immediately reveals that there is an intra-European gulf in the proportion of old and 
new wealth that is masked by the aggregate data in chapter 4. The gulf is particularly 
between continental Europe on the one hand and the UK on the other. For France and 
Germany, 71.1% and 70.8% on average inherited their wealth, respectively over the 
sample period. In contrast, the British billionaire composition shows a dramatic shift 
from 2002 to 2004, where there was a precipitous increase in the number of self-made 
billionaires. Here, there is a major reversal in the composition of wealth. Throughout 
the first half of the sample, 1990 to 2001, the mean proportion of inheritances was 
73.62%. For the second half of the sample, 2002 to 2013, dramatically reverses, with 
the mean drastically decreasing to 25.87%. 
 
Figure 6.11 Proportion of inheritances across Western Europe, 1990-2013 
Source: Forbes (1990-2013), Author’s compilation from various secondary sources. 
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6.3.1 Germany: Dominance of Patronage  
 
The gulf in inherited and self-made fortunes is particularly acute between Germany on 
one hand and the UK and the US on the other. Given the importance of inherited wealth 
for the composition and structure of Germany’s largest wealth holdings, the discussion 
first focuses on those industries in which a few key families dominate. This includes 
families who made their wealth either from the pre- or post-war eras. As Figure 6.11 
establishes, the majority of Germany’s elite inherited their wealth. Throughout the 
1990s, this averaged in the high 70s, by the latter half of the sample the proportion of 
wealthy has stabilised between 63% to 65%. The industrial distribution is presented in 
Figure 6.12. Of immediate interest is that inherited wealth is certainly not uniformly 
distributed across German industries, rather it is clustered in a few key industries. These 
industries are consumer discretionary (25) and food, beverages and tobacco (30). For 
the remaining industries where inherited wealth is present, the number of individuals is 
considerably low at one or two. Although this should not necessarily be taken as 
signifying a lack of commercial significance. 
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Figure 6.12 Distribution of industries in Germany: Inheritances 
Source: Forbes (1990-2013), Author’s compilation from various secondary sources. 
 
Industrials have traditionally been viewed as a mainstay of Germanic economic 
expertise. A cursory glance at the wealth ranks reveals a plethora of dynasties that have 
dominated the German industrial landscape for well over a century now. Among the 
producers of capital goods are names such as Bosch, Haniel, Diehl, Rochling, and von 
Siemens – family dynasties mostly founded prior to the twentieth century. Despite the 
immense wealth of these family dynasties, many have fallen outside of the rich list due 
to the diffusion of wealth across successive generations. Those who have maintained a 
presence, such as the Loh or Happel families, have carried on the family name through 
diversification into construction or engineering. 
 
The consumer discretionary sector possesses both the bulk of billionaires and the great 
number of inheritance beneficiaries. There is not much variation in the degree to which 
inheritance dominates across German industry. Among the inherited media wealthy, the 
means of maintaining wealth is through acquisitions and geographical diversification. 
Some of the more recent listed names are Reinhard Mohn (born in 1922) and Anneliese 
Brost (born in 1921). Brost inherited her stake from her deceased husband, Erich Brost, 
who was one of the cofounders of Westdeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, one of Germany’s 
largest newspapers. Yvonne Bauer’s plan for the family business falls in line with the 
established pattern observed among other inherited wealth holders, of growth through 
acquisitions globally. For example: 
 
[a] flurry of recent activity suggests that Yvonne Bauer has ambitions to 
expand this global empire, which already extends to 15 countries.… Last 
month, she splashed out A$500m (£320m) to buy the Australian magazine 
group ACP [Australian Consolidated Press], including top-sellers such as 
Woman's Day and Harper’s Bazaar. (Spanier, 2012, para. 9-10) 
 
Despite Germany possessing a bank dominated financial system, finance only has a 
miniscule representation. Despite the size of Germany’s financial system, only 4 
billionaires in 2013 have been found from the ranks of financiers. The number has 
largely remained stable since 1990. The lowest points being reached in 2010 (one), and 
1998 (one). The list of finance self-made men is short, at just one. Here Karl Ehlerding, 
born in 1945 made his fortunes in corporate raiding, though suffered a substantial 
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setback in 2002 when his equity investments fell by up to 80% and subsequently 
disappeared from Germany’s wealth ranks. Of the 13 names to amass a fortune of $1 
billion since 1990, only two have managed to appear for the majority of the sample 
period, August von Flick, Jr. and Rolf Gerling. Both individuals coming from inherited 
wealth. Rolf Gerling (born 1954) inherited from his father Hans Gerling the family’s 
insurance business. The family insurance business, Gerling Konzern Versicherungs 
Beteiligungs Aktiengesellschaft, did not cultivate close ties with the 
Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei (NSDAP), though it did do brisk 
business with it. The lack of close ties with the NSDAP allowed it to escape de-
nazification processes by the Allied powers. Unlike many German families where 
interest in the family business continues, Gerling, just like von Flick, has diversified 
away from the traditional family business into diversified investments and consulting 
work. Compared to the US, the UK, France and Australia it is noticeable that there is a 
distinct lack of property billionaires.  
 
The key to much of the recent strength of Germany’s inherited elite seems to be tied to 
the extent to which many of the families have been able to diversify away from the 
traditional family business or diversify internationally through acquisitions. Numerous 
elements to Germany’s modern day legal and tax frameworks may have facilitated this 
process too. Firstly, strong anti-trust laws ensured the longevity and protection of 
German firms during the post-war era, allowing older families to maintain their 
commercial bases intact from competition. The German Act against Restraints on 
Competition prevented mergers and acquisitions allowing many of the family owned 
corporations to survive in the midst of much larger American corporations. However, 
perhaps more importantly has been the role played by estate tax in permitting the 
flourishing of German dynasties and ultimately their longevity. Figure 6.13 compares 
the progressive tax rates across the US, Germany and France. Since the 1930s, both 
Germany and France have shown a lower estate tax burden on their citizens compared 
to the US and also demonstrate substantial inheritance representation among the ultra-
rich. It is particularly telling that during the mid-1950s to mid-1970s, Germany’s top 
inheritance tax rate was 15%, far below the 80% and 78% enforced in UK and the US, 
respectively.26 
 
                                                
26 Chapter 4, section 4.2.6.1 has discussed in more general terms the impact of inheritance taxes on 
estates and gifts in general.  
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Figure 6.13 Top inheritance tax rates, 1900-2013 
Source: Piketty (2014, p. 503) 
 
An alternative argument could be mounted that cultural differences between Germanic 
and Anglo capitalisms are at the core of the differences between the dominance of 
inherited and self-made wealth. Goldsmith’s (1969) seminal work on cultural and 
institutional differences between Anglo-American capitalism and Germanic capitalism 
focused on the roles played by varying financial institutions. As outlined in Chapter 2, 
previous scholars have typically argued that the emergence of extreme wealth has in the 
past, been intrinsically tied to the design of the financial system and its associated 
institutions. Watkins (1907), for example, argued that what differentiated the Gilded 
Age from the previous feudal era was the emergence of abstract ownership forms made 
possible by the development of a financial system. Under a financial market based 
financial system, ‘securities markets share centre stage with banks in terms of getting 
society’s savings to firms, exerting corporate control, and easing risk management’ 
(Demirgruc-Kunt & Levine, 1999, p. 2). In contrast, a bank-based financial system is 
characterised by ‘banks play[ing] a leading role in mobilising savings, allocating 
capital, overseeing the investment decisions of corporate managers, and in providing 
risk management vehicles’ (Demirgruc-Kunt & Levine, 1999, p. 2).  
 
These definitions themselves do not signal any obvious reason why inheritance should 
play such a dominating role in Germany’s economic elite. The ability to link the 
creation of vast, intergenerational family fortunes to close banking relationships is a 
difficult endeavour, since such direct evidence is difficult to come by, particularly given 
the opaque nature of Germany’s banking systems. Historically, German banks have 
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The top marginal tax rate of the inheritance tax (applying to the highest inheritances) in the U.S. dropped from 70% 
in 1980 to 35% in 2013. Sources and series: see piketty.pse.ens.fr/capital21c. 
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projected an influence over industrial Germany via substantial interlocking directorates. 
Jeidels (1905) once argued that in Germany ‘the power of the Great Banks is exercised 
via the legal institution of the supervisory board, rather than through direct influence of 
financial strength’ (p. 145). Gerschenkron (1998) argues that this proximity of corporate 
and banking relations ensured that bank control ‘extended far beyond the sphere of 
financial control into that of entrepreneurial and managerial decisions’ (p. 225). 
 
Recent evidence suggests that the historical case for significant German bank influence 
is overstated. Fohlin (2005) argues that evidence from the industrial era through to 
contemporary times does not support the notion that banking firms have ever actually 
had a substantial influence upon entrepreneurial or managerial decision making among 
these firms. Furthermore, bank influence is being systematically scaled back by the 
largest firms (Fohlin, 2005). This study posits instead that close government 
cooperation in the past in protecting and sustaining wealth is mostly likely to have been 
a major component in developing the composition of German wealth observed today.  
 
In part, the longevity of some of Germany’s ultra-rich family dynasties is due to 
favourable political environments. Germany’s economic elite has been able to maintain 
economic pre-eminence, despite their country having succumbed to the systematic 
destruction of physical capital during the Second World War by the Allied powers. 
During the Second World War, for example, there is evidence that the German 
industrial elite received substantial assistance and guidance during the National 
Socialist regime. During the war itself, for example, much effort was expended by both 
the Nazi regime and the industrialists to ensure that capital was protected. A report 
penned by the Allied ‘Economic Warfare Division’ highlights a number of mechanisms 
through which families such as Krupp and Rochling could maintain their economic 
dynasties. Their capital swelled by war profits, the Nazi regime recommended that the 
industrialists export their capital, as ‘[t]he German industrialists are not only buying 
agricultural property in Germany but are placing their funds abroad, particularly in 
neutral countries’ (Schwinn, 1944, p. 3). For German industrialists this policy 
represented a major Nazi policy reversal that had, until this time, enacted and enforced 
strict controls against the export of capital – now they would receive considerable 
government assistance towards this end. The post-war era’s denazification process did 
not remove these elites from German industry. Many of the heirs of this elite still 
maintain substantial control over Germany’s industrial base in the present era. 
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At least for Germany’s ‘old wealth’ there appear to be parallels between the post-Soviet 
Union states and China and their governments’ roles in cultivating and ensuring the 
continued success of an economic elite during a period of transition, as outlined in 
Chapter 4, Section 4.5. In both instances, declining political elite, vested with the 
control and ownership of a country’s resources begin to relinquish control to capitalists. 
There is an important difference, however. In the case of Germany, for example, pre-
existing economic elites, although under tight control under the Nazi regime, still 
maintained substantial control over their own wealth and commercial interests. By 
contrast, in the former Soviet states and China, economic power was transferred to 
individuals who previously held positions of political power and then managed to 
rapidly establish their vast wealth through commercial enterprise, often on a global 
scale. 
6.3.2 France: Moving Towards an Anglo-Saxon Model of Wealth 
 
Turning to France, the ascendency of patrimonial capitalism is once again observed. 
The geographical propinquity between France and Germany at the surface suggests 
similar economic and social forces may be at work. Daumard (1980) argues that the 
primacy of inheritance in French economic life is largely rooted in a social and 
economic condition where inheritance represented the only reasonable way towards 
greater fortune. At the billionaire level, the French data depicts similar propensity for 
inheritance to still dominate in contemporary times. From Figure 6.11, it is observed 
that the proportion of inherited wealth has ranged between a high of 78.6% in 2004 to a 
low of 57.1% in 2010. In absolute terms, the number of inherited billionaires, as 
reported in Table 6.3, has ranged between 5 (1990, 1997) to 16 (2013). In contrast, the 
number of self-made has never attained double-digit representation. 
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Table 6.3 French industrial distribution of billionaires, 1990-2013 
 Self-made  Inherited   
Year 20 25 30 35 40 45 All   10 20 25 30 35 40 All   Total 
1990  2     2   2 2 1   5  7 
1991  2     2   2 3 1  1 7  9 
1992  2     2   2 3 1  1 7  9 
1993  2     2   2 3 1  1 7  9 
1994  3     3   2 4 1  1 8  11 
1995  3     3   2 4 1  1 8  11 
1996  3  1   4   3 4 1  2 10  14 
1997  2     2   1 3 1  2 7  9 
1998  2     2    3   2 5  7 
1999 2 3     5   3 4 1  2 10  15 
2000 2 2     4   3 3 1  2 9  13 
2001 1 3  1   5  1 2 4 2  1 10  15 
2002 1 3     4  1 2 4 2  1 10  14 
2003 1 3     4  2 2 3 2   9  13 
2004 1 2     3  2 2 3 2   9  12 
2005 1 2     3  2 2 3 2 1 1 11  14 
2006 1 2     3  2 2 3 2 1 1 11  14 
2007 1 2   2  5  2 1 2 2 1 1 9  14 
2008 1 2   2  5  1 2 2 2 1 1 9  14 
2009 1 2     3   2 2 2 1  7  10 
2010  2   1  3   3 2 2 1 1 9  12 
2011 1 2 1  1 1 6   2 2 2 1 1 8  14 
2012 1 2   2 1 6   3 3 2 1 1 10  16 
2013 1 2 1   3 1 8     2 5 6 1 2 16   24 
Note: The table provides a summary of the distribution of billionaires across French industries using the two-code 
Global Industry Classification System (GICS). The data is presented on a 5-year interval basis. The number and 
associated sectors are: 10: Energy, 15: Materials, 20: Industrials, 25: Consumer Discretionary, 30: Consumer Staples, 
35: Health Care, 40: Financials, 45: Information Technology, 50: Telecommunication Services, 55: Utilities.  
Source: Forbes (1990-2013), Author’s compilation from various secondary sources. 
 
 
 
Table 6.3 shows that the overall number of billionaires has steadily increased over the 
sample period. During the 1990s, the mean number of individuals was 12. Much like 
the observations from the US, the late 1990s saw an increase in the overall ranks of the 
French economic elite, increasing from 7 in 1998 to 15 in 1999. Between 1999 and 
2012, the number of billionaires has remained relatively stable, hitting a low of 10 in 
2009 due to the economic crisis. However, by 2013, the ranks of French wealthy had 
increased to 24, its highest point throughout the sample.  
 
Perhaps reflecting the comparative advantage of the French economy, the main industry 
sources for wealth appear in consumer discretionary (25) and consumer staples (30). In 
Germany and the US, retail and media moguls tend to dominate. In contrast, for the 
French, the largest fortunes tend to be found as purveyors of fashion or luxury goods or 
food producers tend to dominate. Examining the list of fashion and cosmetic moguls, 
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there is perhaps little need to explore their backgrounds. A veritable list of fashion 
names and houses emerges. The wealthiest of them all is Liliane Bettencourt, born in 
1922, who is the majority owner of L’Oreal. Bettencourt inherited her late husband’s 
stake in the company. The Bettencourt story, one of patrimony is endemic in the French 
fashion and cosmetics industries. The siblings, Alain and Gerard Wertheimer perfectly 
exemplify this predisposition. In more recent times, the Wertheimer brothers have 
expanded the scale and scope of their portfolio holdings by acquiring numerous fashion 
houses and even a prestigious British gun maker in the form of Holland & Holland. 
 
The pattern of inherited wealth dominating the wealthiest echelons in French society 
continues across less glamorous industries. Many of these names are relatively well 
known globally, whilst others are much more centred on France. Dassault Aviation 
originally founded by Marcel Dassault, is represented today by Serge Dassault who took 
over the reins of the family business in 1986. Reflecting a pattern observed across both 
Germany and the US, the younger Dassault diversified across various sectors and in 
1995, created a new company, Dassault Group, to reflect the more diversified nature of 
the firm. Similarly, Martin Bouygues grew into the Chairman and chief executive 
officer (CEO) of his father’s business, Bouygues. Francis Bougues originally founded 
Bouygues as an industrial works and construction firm. Martin Bourgyes grew the firm 
into a highly diversified conglomerate with interests in real estate, media, water 
treatment and telecommunications.  
 
The self-made billionaire is not wholly missing from the French economic elite. 
Typically, they are found in the finance sector of France and is overall the most 
representative sector for France’s billionaires. This is in stark contrast to Germany, 
where tight regulations appear to have reined in the potential for the amassment of great 
fortunes. In finance and banking, self-made billionaires actually outnumber 
inheritances, albeit the difference is insignificant. Although their absolute numbers are 
small, there are some interesting phenomena at play. Table 6.2 shows that in finance 
(40), the first self-made billionaires appeared in 2007, a number of whose successes can 
be attributed to observing the potential to exploit the opportunities arising from 
deregulation of France’s finance industry. Individuals such as Romain Zaleski and Marc 
Ladreit de Lacharriere managed to accumulate fortunes during the era of French 
financial deregulation. Melitz (1990) emphasises the dramatic scope of the reforms by 
arguing that the reforms in truth represented a significant reversal of the trend towards 
bank nationalisation and increased regulation. Instead, the reforms of the 1980s in 
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particular gave a rapid rise to a liberal system with ‘the only administered interest rates 
that remain concern bank deposits, a host of financial products has emerged, and there 
is no “encadrement”’ (Melitz, 1990, p. 394). Perhaps most tellingly, Melitz (1990) 
views the shift as a move towards a financial system more modelled along the lines of 
the Anglo-Saxon world, as exemplified by the movement to financing of the business 
sector which was ‘once exceptionally reliant on banking for finance… [to one that] now 
depends to a more conventional extent on internal finance and the capital market’ (p. 
398). 
6.3.3 The UK: Europe’s Odd One Out 
 
On the surface, there is no a priori reason to suppose that the defining characteristic of 
continental economic elites, the ascendency of patrimony, should not apply to the UK, 
too. The UK shares much with both Germany and France in terms of social 
stratification, the existence of landed aristocracy, early industrialisation, and significant 
human and capital losses in two world wars and being a former colonial power. If one 
were to turn to history, and to describe the defining characteristic of western European 
civilisation one of the major ideas would be the importance of imperial expansion. 
Britain and France expanded their colonial holdings throughout Africa, the Americas 
and Asia during the 1700s and 1800s. The rise of colonialism is considered by some to 
be a defining characteristic of 1800s capitalism. German colonialism, very much the 
latecomer in European affairs largely grew as a response to the British and French 
expansionism. For Marxists, colonialism, no matter where it took hold represented a 
common valve through which capitalism could flourish in these lands. On writing about 
the links between capitalism and slavery, Eric Williams (1944) famously stated, ‘The 
colonial system was the spinal cord of the commercial capitalism of the mercantile 
epoch’ (p. 142). In some regards, the spinal cord somewhat still manifests itself among 
the family dynasties observed in Germany. Families such as Krupp, Rochling, Merck 
and so forth laid the foundations for their descendants’ success between 1870s and 
1945, for example.  
 
Does the evolution of the economic elite of Great Britain, with all its colonial history, 
and still existent landed aristocracy reflect the experience of Europe? Or does Anglo 
Britain more closely resemble the Anglo US and Canada in the composition and 
evolution of their economic elites? Much work has already been produced examining 
the upper echelons of British society in economic history. Rubinstein (1980) notes that 
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historically (at least when examining the historical record of the mid to late 1800s), 
although inherited wealth has always existed in British society, the degree of new 
wealth represented is surprising.  
 
Table 6.4 British industrial distribution of billionaires, 1990-2013 
 Self-made  Inherited 
Year 10 15 20 25 30 40 50   15 20 25 30 40 
1990    3     1  1  1 
1991    1     1  1  1 
1992   1        2 1 1 
1993   1        2 1 1 
1994   1        2  1 
1995   1        2 1 2 
1996   1        2 1 2 
1997   1       2 2 1 1 
1998   1       1 1 1 2 
1999   1 1  1    1 3 1 3 
2000   1 1  1 1   2 3 1 3 
2001   2 1     1 2 2  3 
2002   1 1  1 1   2 3  3 
2003   1 2  1 1   1 3  3 
2004   1 3  1 2   1 3  3 
2005  3 3 4  7 2    3  3 
2006  4 3 5  7 1    2  3 
2007  6 3 5  9 1    3  4 
2008  6 3 5  11 4    3  4 
2009  3 2 5  4 2    2  4 
2010 3 6 4 4  12 2  2  2 1 3 
2011 1 4 1 5 4 10 2    3  3 
2012 1 5 2 4 4 13 3   1 1  4 
2013 1 6 3 4 4 12 3     2 1   3 
Note: The table provides a summary of the distribution of billionaires across the UK 
industries using the two-code GICS. The data is presented on a 5-year interval basis. 
The number and associated sectors are: 10: Energy, 15: Materials, 20: Industrials, 
25: Consumer Discretionary, 30: Consumer Staple, 35: Health Care, 40: Financials, 
45: Information Technology, 50: Telecommunication Services, 55: Utilities.  
Source: Forbes (1990-2013), Author’s compilation from various secondary sources. 
 
Today, a similar phenomenon can be observed. Turning once again back to Figure 6.11, 
a striking trend is revealed. Between 1990 and 1999, the proportion of inherited wealth 
averaged 76% compared to 24% for self-made wealth among the wealthiest of Britons. 
For the period 2000 to 2013, the values reverse with approximately 31% of elites having 
inherited their fortunes, compared to 69% who made their wealth through their own 
means. The factors for the reversal tend to be many and varied within the industries of 
the British economy. A deep examination of the sectoral distribution, presented in Table 
6.4, reveals that the growth in self-made fortunes tends to be concentrated in the finance 
and consumer discretionary sectors of the economy and more recently in materials. In 
the finance sector, the bulk of wealth has been generated in real estate, but there has 
been a robust representation from diversified financials too. The first financial 
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billionaire appeared in 2000 and had by 2013 increased to 12. These 12 billionaires 
represent the bulk of the British ultra-rich. 
 
Much like the US, the fortunes of these individuals is tightly bound to sweeping 
economic changes particularly brought upon by policy and regulatory change. For 
example, of the propertied rich, there were six individuals in 2013. The majority of the 
individuals first appeared relatively late in the sample, at approximately 2007. In fact, in 
2006, there was only one individual with a fortune in excess of $1 billion, that being 
Joseph Lewis. The lack of property moguls in France and Germany compared to Britain 
can be explained by a comparison of house prices in those countries. Figure 6.14 
compares real house price changes across the three countries since 1980. The UK has 
shown an increase of 218% during this period, compared to 73.8% in France and -
11.8% in Germany. Although many factors could be cited for the rapid rise in house 
prices in the UK, one primary candidate must reside in the effective ‘privatisation’ of 
home ownership. In 1981, the Thatcher Government introduced the Right-to-Buy 
scheme where tenants of local authority housing were provided with a 60% discount to 
purchase the dwelling outright. According to King (2012), the effect of the Right-to-
Buy was to shift 2.5 million dwellings in the less regulated private sector. The scheme 
along with liberalisation of the mortgage market effectively increased demand from the 
working-classes for owner-occupied housing. The massive increase in the debt-to-
income ratio of the UK described in Chapter 3 further provides an element of causality 
to this. The beginnings of the property boom in the 1980s, was also when individuals 
such as John Whittaker, and the Reuben brothers already possessed significant wealth 
holdings in property to benefit from the inevitable property price increases. 
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Figure 6.14 Real house prices in the United Kingdom, Germany, and France 
Source: The Economist (2015) 
 
Despite a history of landed aristocracy, inherited wealth remains of relatively less 
import at least at the extreme end of the wealth distribution tail. Only two individuals 
appear in the list who are of British peerage ancestry. The wealthiest is Gerald 
Grosvenor with an estimated net worth of $11 billion. Beneficiary of the UK’s peerage 
system, Gerald Grosvenor, Duke of Westminster, comes from a lineage that can be 
traced back to Sir Richard Grosvenor, 1st Baronet (born 1585). Peerage has been kind 
also to Charles Cadogan, the only other member of the British peerage system to be 
represented in the rich lists. With an estimated net worth in 2013 of $5.5 billion pounds, 
much of Cadogan’s wealth is tied up in extensive holdings in the exclusive and 
prestigious London suburbs of Chelsea and Knightsbridge. 
 
Given the pre-eminence of London as a global financial centre, or would be expected to 
find numerous individuals involved heavily in banking and finance related activities. 
There is, however, a tendency for the success to have been attributable to the ballooning 
of asset prices in the 2000s. As with real estate, the majority of these individuals can be 
classified as self-made, the majority of these emerging during the 1990s and 2000s – 
with many employing a variety of strategies. A common element, between all, however, 
appears to be the rapid capitalisation of opportunities brought upon by the sudden 
financial deregulations, the ‘Big Bang’ during 1986 and 1987. A clear and direct 
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instance of an individual capitalising on the deregulation was Peter Cruddas who made 
a fortune from financial spread-betting by founding CMC Markets in 1989. Spread-
betting, the method of wagering on price movements, began in the 1960s and was 
regulated under the Betting and Gaming Act 1960. In 1986, the financial deregulations 
transformed futures contracts from a wager into an investment product enforceable 
under the Financial Services Act. This reform significantly increased the amount of 
participants in the futures market (Loussouarn, 2013). Almost immediately, the spread-
betting industry also managed to get the courts to rule that spread-betting, like futures 
contracts, were qualified as financial investments under the Financial Services Act 
1986, thus opening CMC Market to a much wider market.  
 
6.4 The Economic Elite in the Former Centrally Planned Economies 
 
Thus far, the discussion has largely focused on the advanced capitalist economies of the 
western hemisphere. In this section, an exploration of the development and evolution of 
the economic elite amongst the three largest economies outside of the western bloc is 
discussed. Specifically, Russia, China, and India are focussed upon. The focus is on 
determining to what extent they share characteristics with the western elite, and how 
they can be differentiated. 
 
Table 6.5 provides a sectoral breakdown across the three countries. Overall, both China 
and Russia exhibit very high growth rates in billionaire numbers, particularly after 
2005. In Russia, the annual average growth rate is 44% since the first billionaire 
appeared in the list in 1997. In China, the average annual growth is higher at 77% 
although the first Chinese billionaire appears in 2001, a few years after the first 
Russians make an appearance.  
 
Sector wise, there are certain differences worth noting. Russian billionaires are largely 
clustered three industries: materials (GICS 10); industrials (GICS 20); and financials 
(GICS 40). In 2013, these three industries accounted for 77% of Russian billionaires. In 
monetary terms, the combined wealth of this 77% is at an estimated $321USD billion in 
2013. Or approximately 10% of Russia’s gross national income $3.1USD trillion in 
2013.  
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By contrast, the sectoral breakdown of China’s economic elite exhibits far more 
diversity in the number of individuals across industries. The largest represented industry 
is financials with 28 individuals appearing on the rich list in 2013. This is closely 
followed by industrials with 25 individuals, consumer discretionary with 21 billionaires, 
and materials and health care with 15 and 13 individuals, respectively. Jointly, these 
individuals constitute the bulk of China’s billionaires as at 2013, contributing 
approximately 94% to China’s elites. In monetary terms, the combined wealth of the 
individuals in these industries is at an estimated USD198 billion.  
 
In the case of both China and Russia, there is a total absence of inheritance. Given the 
relatively recent transition to market based economies this is to be expected. 
 
India’s billionaire numbers in contrast demonstrate rather anaemic levels and growth, 
when juxtaposed against those of China and Russia. Despite possessing the second 
largest population in the world, India had by 2013 only 55 billionaires. The largest 
movement in billionaire numbers is apparent in the 2005-2006 period when the number 
doubled from 12 to 23 individuals. A similar and approximate doubling is observed 
from 2009 and 2010 when the number increased from 24 to 47, although this is largely 
attributable to the reappearance of billionaires who had fallen from the wealth lists due 
to the global financial crisis as was documented in Chapter 3. Table 6.5 presents a 
sectoral decomposition of India’s economic elites. Similar to China, India’s sectoral 
allocation of billionaires appears to be largely concentrated across 5 of the 9 represented 
sectors, with the other four have 5 or less individuals. The industries with the greatest 
representation include consumer discretionary with 11, followed by financials and 
health care at 10. 
 
Differentials in the sectoral composition across the three former centrally planned 
economies naturally lends itself to the question of what political processes were in play 
that caused such an outcome. For example, why are Russia’s oligarchs concentrated in a 
few key industries whilst China and India appear to exhibit much more diversity in the 
composition of their sectoral billionaire allocation. Is it part of a natural market process 
or a conscious effort on the part of their respective governments? 
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Table 6.5 Billionaire industrial distribution across Russia, China and India 
 Russia               India 
  10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50     Total     10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50      Total 
1997 3   1        4   1990   1         1 
1998  1          1   1991   1         1 
2001 6 1 1         8   1992   1         1 
2002 4 1 1         6   1993   1         1 
2003 10 3 1    2  1   17   1994   2         2 
2004 12 5 3    4  1   25   1995   2         2 
2005 6 10 4    6  1   27   1996 1 1 1         3 
2006 5 14 6    8  1   34   1997 1 1 2         4 
2007 8 19 11 2 1  11  1   53   1998 1 1          2 
2008 9 22 17 5 4 1 29  1   88   1999 1 1 3     2    7 
2009 6 12 6 1   7  1   33   2000 1 1 3 1    3    9 
2010 7 22 14 1 1  13  1   59   2001 1  1     2    4 
2011 9 32 26 6 4 1 22 1 1   102   2002 1 1 1     2    5 
2012 9 29 27 2 3  25 1 1   97   2003 1 1 1  1  1 2    7 
2013 11 33 28 5 6 1 24 2 1     111   2004 1 2 1  1  1 2 1   9 
               2005 1 3 2  1 1 1 2 1   12 
 China              2006 2 2 5 3 2 2 3 3 1   23 
  10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55   Total   2007 2 3 8 6 2 3 6 5 1   36 
2001   1         1   2008 6 3 11 7 2 5 12 6 1   53 
2002     1       1   2009 1 3 3 5 1 3 5 2 1   24 
2004   1         1   2010 1 2 13 4 2 8 11 5 1   47 
2005   1 1        2   2011 2 6 10 7 2 8 11 7 2   55 
2006   2 1 2  2 1    8   2012 2 6 5 7 4 8 8 6 2   48 
2007  1 4 2 4 1 4 1    17   2013 2 6 6 11 4 10 10 5 1     55 
2008 3 4 9 4 5 1 12 4    42   Note: The tables provides a summary of the distribution of billionaires across French industries 
using the two-code Global Industry Classification System (GICS). The data is presented on a 
5-year interval basis. The number and associated sectors are: 10: Energy, 15: Materials, 20: 
Industrials, 25: Consumer Discretionary, 30: Consumer Staples, 35: Health Care, 40: 
Financials, 45: Information Technology, 50: Telecommunication Services, 55: Utilities.  
Source: Forbes (1990-2013), Author’s compilation from various secondary sources. 
 
2009 1 2 10 3 4  6 2    28   
2010 1 9 13 12 9 2 20 6    72   
2011 2 15 24 21 9 15 21 7 1   115   
2012 2 11 21 20 0 8 18 6    86   
2013 2 15 25 21 11 13 28 5   1   120   
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Nefariously, the evolution of vast private wealth holdings in the former centrally 
planned economies have typically been closely tied to either public servant favour or to 
the former or current political elite rather than through the natural outcome of 
competition. In India, for example, the repeal of the Licence Raj, a system of elaborate 
licensing arrangements, reduced enterprise to just a few select large conglomerates. 
Indeed, the Licence Raj would entail acquiring up to 80 approvals from various 
governmental agencies, placing an effective stranglehold on fostering new enterprise, 
while protecting the commercial interests of the large conglomerates, where such family 
names such as Birla and Hinduja came to dominate. Once the Indian economy was 
liberalised with the dismantling of the Licence Raj system in 1991, the Indian industrial 
conglomerates were in the best position to attain scale and diversify into new business 
opportunities. (Hendrick-Wong, 2007). Economic reform, of course, did provide scope 
for new entrepreneurs. IT was largely ignored by India’s central planners, enabling 
enterprising individuals to exploit a clear opportunity during the era of the Licence Raj. 
Even during this era, IT entrepreneurs not tied to conglomerates still faced potentially 
debilitating hurdles. For example:  
 
in the 1980s Narayana Murthy, the legendary founder of Infosys, one of 
India’s leading IT companies and the first Indian firm to list on the US stock 
market, had to make 50 trips over a period of two years, traveling from 
Bangalore, … to Delhi to meet with … bureaucrats in order to get a permit to 
import a computer worth $1,500. (Hendrick-Wong, 2007, p. 67) 
 
In China, the grip of the Communist Party since its takeover in 1949 meant that 
property rights were negligible until 1988. Indeed, during this era, there were no 
individual land rights and no private land ownership, but by 2013 25 Chinese 
billionaires had made their fortunes in property investments, excluding those from Hong 
Kong. A wave of reforms in the 1990s ensured that the road to rapid capitalisation 
would be open to Chinese entrepreneurs. Such laws included, for example, a 1997 
constitutional amendment in which incomes from interest and dividends were 
sanctioned and, in 2006, it became possible for a private citizen to become the sole 
founding member of a limited liability entity (Clarke, Murrell & Whiting, 2008). 
Perhaps coincidently, during the same period, the number of Chinese billionaires 
increased from two in 2005 to eight in 2006, before doubling to 17 by 2007. By 2013, 
there were 121 billionaires, second only to the US in terms of absolute numbers.  
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Has the transformation of the Chinese economy from a centrally planned regime to a 
market-based regime been wholly free from the past regime? That is, is China’s new 
economic elite divorced of ties to the Communist Party (past and present), or is the 
economic and political elite effectively the same? A full analysis of this issue is beyond 
the scope of this chapter, but a number of basic facts provide a clue as to the 
composition and dynamics of China’s economic elite. One journalistic wealth list, the 
Hurun Report, found that in 2011, for the 1,000 richest people in China, 90% were 
either officials or founding members of the Chinese Communist Party. New officials 
often seek membership in the Communist Party to protect their wealth. For example: 
 
The top three richest members of the CPPCC [Chinese People’s Political 
Consultative Conference] are all sons of Hong Kong tycoons, with Victor Li, 
the son of Asia’s richest man Li Ka-shing, coming in first with an estimated 
family fortune of $32bn. 
Hong Kong’s relatively smooth transition from a former British colony 
back to Chinese territory over the last 15 years has been helped by support 
from the territory’s richest citizens, who were mostly co-opted by the 
Communist party in exchange for business opportunities on the mainland. 
(Anderlini, 2013, para. 11-12) 
 
Numerous mechanisms are available to party insiders to protect their wealth, or to 
confer substantial competitive advantage vis-à-vis privately owned businesses. The 
close relationship between state and business affords numerous benefits to insiders. For 
example: 
 
The most important and lucrative sectors of the economy have been reserved 
for state-owned-enterprises (SOEs) through preferential policies and support 
that leaves private domestic firms at a heavy disadvantage. For example, 
during much of the past decade, around two-thirds of the country’s formal 
finance (mainly bank loans) was reserved for SOEs at discounted rates, rising 
to an astounding 90% from 2008 to 2010 before settling back to its current 
80%. (Lee, 2011, para. 3) 
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The family of China’s former premier, Wen Jiabao, is believed to control assets worth 
approximately $2.7 billion. How the family achieved such prominence demonstrates the 
close nexus between political power and the generation and protection of vast wealth: 
 
Unlike most new businesses in China, the family’s ventures sometimes 
received financial backing from state-owned companies, including China 
Mobile, one of the country’s biggest phone operators…. 
The holdings include a villa development project in Beijing; a tire factory 
in northern China; a company that helped build some of Beijing’s Olympic 
stadiums, including the well-known ‘Bird’s Nest’; and Ping An Insurance, one 
of the world’s biggest financial services companies. (Barboza, 2012, para. 6-7) 
 
The apparent monopoly of economic advantage by Communist Party insiders echoes 
Figueroa’s (2008) view that the rise of an economic elite first erects barriers to entry 
and Bodley’s (1999) claim that any major growth policies are aimed to benefit the 
growth in the incumbent elite’s wealth or economic power.  
 
In the case of Eastern Europe, similar factors are at play, but there is some debate over 
the true reason for the number of billionaires. Corruption is the most often cited 
explanation for the size of the fortunes of some of Russia’s billionaires, or the ‘Russian 
oligarchs’ as they are often labelled. Torgler and Piatti (2013) persuasively argue that 
much of the extraordinary wealth observed in former Communist states is generated 
from collusion between former Communist Party members of the Soviet Union, and the 
incumbent regime.  
 
Alternatively, Kryshtanovskaya and White (2005) examine the evolution of Russia’s 
oligarchy and find that there is increasing state interference and control over the 
oligarchs, resulting in fewer individuals presiding over vast conglomerates. Further, 
they document the increasing representation of wealthy individuals in many of Russia’s 
decision-making institutions at both a federal and regional level. The interlocking 
relationships do not necessarily imply corruption. They conclude that Russia’s 
oligarchy is most likely to follow the pattern of South Korea’s chaebols, where a few 
wealthy families with close ties to government possess substantial control and 
ownership over the country’s resources (Kryshtanovskaya & White, 2005). 
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How has Russia’s wealth evolved under President Putin? Rutland (2009) argues that 
there has been a spreading of wealth from oil and gas to various other industries. The 
bulk emanates from banking, largely due to the recycling of the petrodollar earned 
during the 1990s. However, Rutland (2009) agrees with Kryshtanovskaya and White 
(2005) that the impact of Putin’s policies has been to concentrate wealth into fewer 
hands, even if it is spread across more industries – this process, however, has been part 
of a conscious effort by the Russian government. 
 
6.5 South Korea and Japan: Dominance of Family Dynasties? 
 
Shifting focus to the East Asian region, specifically Japan and South Korea, there is 
substantial and readily available evidence that government policies constituted the key 
element in the growth of many of the fortunes. A priori, one could assume that the two 
countries would share many similarities that would filter through to the characteristics 
and composition of their wealthy. Both countries are viewed as the original Asian tigers 
and are often viewed as sharing a common ideological and cultural trajectory. After the 
Second World War, both countries embarked on a programme of orientating their 
respective economies to exporting, with Japan the pioneer throughout the 1950s and 
1960s and Korea following suit throughout the 1970s.  
 
From the perspective of the observer of the ultra-rich, the similarities stop there. An 
examination of the wealth sources, presented in Figure 6.15, presents striking 
differences. Firstly, there is a divergence in the overall trends. As of 2013, the number 
of Korean billionaires has peaked at 25, whilst in Japan it fell to 22, one of the lowest 
recorded points. For Japan, the decrease is secular since the early 1990s when Japanese 
dominated the world rich lists. The main breaking point for Japan appears in 2001, 
when the number of billionaires fell from a high of 43 in 2000 to 29 in 2001 with 
further declines in subsequent years. Conversely, in South Korea it can be observed that 
the number of billionaires has historically remained low. On average, there were 
approximately 3 to 4 billionaires in Korea during the 1990s and first half of the 2000s. 
However, from 2007 there has been a clear increase in the number of known extreme 
wealthy. In 2007, the number of billionaires increased to 7, and by 2013 it had increased 
to 25, representing an increase of 300% since 2007. 
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Figure 6.15 Number of Japanese and South Korean billionaires, 1990-2013 
Source: Forbes (1990-2013), Author’s compilation from various secondary sources. 
 
Secondly, the trends in the two countries are being principally driven by divergent 
patterns in the dynamics of inherited wealth and the infusion of new wealth. Indeed, 
examining South Korea, the number of individuals with inherited wealth increased from 
8 in 2007 to 19 by 2013, compared to 2 and 6 for those of self-made wealth. In Japan, 
the reverse is observed. Since a high of 22 in 1993, the number of Japanese inheritance 
beneficiaries has decreased to single digits hitting a low of 5 in 2011 before settling at 6 
in 2012 and 2013. Instead, the bulk of Japanese wealth now comes from entrepreneurial 
initiatives. 
 
Table 6.6 disaggregates the South Korean wealth ranks by sector, industry and 
inheritance. By far the majority of movement has been in the capital goods (20) and 
consumer discretionary (25) industries. In both, the number of self-made has remained 
exceptionally low, and are often tied to the names of some of Korea’s oldest 
entrepreneurs, such as the founder of Samsung, Lee Byung-chul. With the death of 
many of these individuals in the 1990s, there is a dramatic swelling of the ranks of 
Korea’s inheritance billionaires to family members. For example, the Lee family 
accounts for five names at least, while the Koo family of Lucky Goldstar (LG) also 
show a similar dominance. 
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Table 6.6 South Korean industrial distribution of billionaires, 1990-2013 
 Self-made  Inherited 
Year 15 20 25 35 40 45   20 25 30 40 
1990  2 2     1    
1991  2 2     1    
1992  1 2         
1993  1 2     1    
1994  1 2         
1995  3 3     1 1   
1996  2 3     1 1   
1997  1 1     1 1   
1998   1         
1999   1     1    
2000        1    
2001        2    
2002   1     1    
2003   1     1    
2004   1     1    
2005   1     1 1   
2006   1     2 1   
2007 1  1     2 5 1  
2008 1       3 7 1  
2009        1 3   
2010        3 6  1 
2011   1   1  3 9 1 1 
2012   1   1  7 9 1 1 
2013   3 1 1 1     6 10 1 2 
Note: The table provides a summary of the distribution of billionaires 
across South Korean industries using the two-code GICS. The data is 
presented on a 5-year interval basis. The number and associated sectors 
are: 10: Energy, 15: Materials, 20: Industrials, 25: Consumer 
Discretionary, 30: Consumer Staples, 35: Health Care, 40: Financials, 45: 
Information Technology, 50: Telecommunication Services, 55: Utilities.  
Source: Forbes (1990-2013), Author’s compilation from various secondary sources. 
 
The families that dominate South Korea’s industrial and commercial landscape have 
done so since the 1950s. Their transition to billionaire status in the 2000s followed the 
success of their respective commercial interests across the globe. The manner in which 
Korean families came to dominate Korea’s economic life echoes that found in India, 
where the primary unit of Korea’s industrial organisation, the conglomerates known as 
chaebol were central. The chaebol became the favoured vehicles for Korea’s rapid 
industrialisation in the 1960s by the Park regime. For example, under Lee Byung-Chul’s 
leadership, Samsung managed to develop a close and substantial commercial 
relationship with the Park military dictatorship during the 1960s.  
 
Although state privilege and patrimony explains the initial success of the chaebol and 
their dynastic owners, the narrative of how they have maintained such commercial 
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control shifts in the recent past. Kwon and O’Donnell (2001) argue that much of this 
narrative changes in examining the decades after the 1980s when state privilege largely 
disappeared. The response of the chaebol was to consolidate their economic power 
through rapid diversification and control throughout the Korean economy. By the 
1990s, Samsung had diversified into electronics, engineering and construction. Today, 
such is the dominance of Samsung (and by extension the Lee family) in Korean society 
and economy that it has been estimated that Samsung’s revenue equates to 
approximately 17% of South Korea’s economic output. The Koo family, whose name is 
synonymous with LG, followed a very similar evolution. The process of diversification, 
however, does not necessarily involve majority ownership stakes in newly acquired 
firms. A distinct mechanism used is that of tunnelling. Johnson, La Porta, Lopez-de-
Silanes and Shleifer (2000) define tunnelling as ‘the transfer of resources out of a 
company to its controlling shareholder (who is typically also a top manager)’ (p. 3). 
These tactics allow a controlling shareholder to extend vast control over a network of 
enterprises often involving a degree of wealth transfer from smaller shareholders to the 
family dynasty (Baek, Kang & Lee, 2006). As Moskalev and Park (2010) observe, 
despite the chaebol only claiming 10.96% of the cash flow generated by their firms, 
they paradoxically maintain full control over these firms – with most of the funds 
funnelled to the family dynasties. Baek et al. (2006) find that at least with private 
security offerings there is very strong evidence that the controlling interests of the 
chaebol typically accrue substantial and material private benefits at the expense of 
minority ownership. 
 
If for Korean wealth the rise and dominance of chaebol then for Japan it is the fall of 
many of the dominant families and the rise of an entrepreneurial nouveau riche. The 
experience of Japan’s wealthy is perhaps somewhat at odds with the story of stagnation 
that has beset Japan’s economy since the early 1990s. As presented in Table 6.7, the 
degree of old or inherited wealth has shown a systematic decrease since the mid-1990s. 
In 1990, 22 individuals or families had inherited their wealth, by 2013 the number had 
fallen to just six. In contrast, the self-made billionaires, though initially decreasing from 
a high of 27 in 2007, have been in the mid-teens throughout the 2000s and in fact have 
slightly grown since 2011. Across both the self-made and inherited groups, financials 
fell from 14 (10 self-made, 4 inherited) individuals in 1990 to 3 in 2013. The fall is in 
line with the significant fall in Japan’s wealth-income ratio during the early 1990s, 
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where the fall in the value of property prices played a central role, as discussed in 
Chapter 3. 
 
 
Table 6.7 Japanese industrial distribution of billionaires, 1990-2013 
 Self-made  Inherited 
Year 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50  0 10 15 20 30 35 40 45 
1990 4 2 11  1 10 1      4 2 1 4 1 
1991 4 2 12  1 10 1      4 2 1 3 1 
1992 1 2 5   9 1      6 3 1 4 1 
1993 1 1 6   9 1      8 3 1 5 2 
1994 1  7   9 1      6 1 1 6 1 
1995 1 2 10  1 10 2     1 4 1 1 4 1 
1996  3 12  1 8 3     2 4 1  5 1 
1997  1 5   3 2      0 0  2 1 
1998   3   3 1      0 1  4  
1999  2 10  1 5 1 1    2 1 1  5 1 
2000  3 11 1 2 5 6 1  2  2 3 1  4 2 
2001  2 10  2 3 2     1 3 1  4 1 
2002  1 9  1 3 1    1 1 2 1  4 1 
2003   8   3 1      1 1  4 1 
2004  1 9   3 1     1 1 1  4 1 
2005  1 9   4 1 1    1 1 1  4 1 
2006  1 9   4 2 1    1 1 1  6 1 
2007  1 10   3 2 1    1 1 1  3 1 
2008  1 9   3 3 1    1 1 1  3 1 
2009  1 8   2 2      0 1  2 1 
2010  1 11 1  2 3      1 1  2 1 
2011  1 16   2 4      0 0  2 1 
2012  1 13 1  2 4      0 0  2 1 
2013   1 10 1   2 3 1  1     0 1   1 1 
Note: The table provides a summary of the distribution of billionaires across Japanese industries using 
the two-code GICS. The data is presented on a 5-year interval basis. The number and associated sectors 
are: 10: Energy, 15: Materials, 20: Industrials, 25: Consumer Discretionary, 30: Consumer Staples, 
35: Health Care, 40: Financials, 45: Information Technology, 50: Telecommunication Services, 55: 
Utilities.  
Source: Forbes (1990-2013), Author’s compilation from various secondary sources. 
 
Much of Japan’s ultra-rich arose in the post-war era. Unlike Germany, the continuity 
from an earlier Japanese economic elite is absent. Even among the ‘older’ wealth in 
Japan, wealth generated in the vicinity of the Second World War, the linkages to the old 
zaibatsu are either non-existent, or they are of sufficiently different nature to not permit 
a historical lineage found in, for example, Germany. Compared to post-war Germany, 
many of the Japanese industrialists did not successfully navigate allied occupation. 
Rather, smaller, newer entrepreneurs arose in their place. In the early post-war period, 
the Allied General Command instituted policies to dissolve the zaibatsu, based on the 
rationale that they regarded the zaibatsu as an important mechanism in the creation of 
and maintenance of Japan’s militaristic and imperialistic tendencies. Delving into the 
detail provided by the rich lists, the Allied policy generally appears to have succeeded 
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in its endeavour of severing Japan’s economic links to its imperialistic past. Among the 
inherited wealth group, the Matsushita family is the only one that can directly be 
associated with the older economic order. The Matsushita family name had, however, 
vanished from the Forbes list by 1996. Only for the Toyodas, founders and major 
shareholders in Toyota Motor Corporation (TMC), has allied occupation and the Korean 
War proved to be a boon. Unlike other zaibatsu and the associated controlling families, 
the Toyoda family emerged relatively unscathed from the war and the subsequent Allied 
occupation and have managed to maintain a presence (Bernstein, 1997).  
 
In the absence of the zaibatsu, and with very little to tie them to Japan’s imperial 
adventures, the small nascent enterprises being established in Japan were largely 
ignored by Allied occupying forces. The absence of the large zaibatsu provided a 
vacuum into which many entrepreneurs poured in. These entrepreneurs found wealth 
and fortune in industries that rode to prominence in the consumerism wave of the post-
War globe which export orientated Japan could exploit. As Table 6.5 shows, the 
majority are concentrated in consumer discretionary sector, with most emanating from 
retail, electronics and gaming (be it casino or video game entertainment). Perhaps the 
most well-known Japanese electronics conglomerate is Sony. The founding of Sony in 
the immediate aftermath war exemplifies the success of the Japanese entrepreneur in 
developing new opportunities. Sony was founded in the immediate post-war period by 
Akio Morita and Masaru Ibuka. Early on both agreed to a corporate style that would be 
free of any zaibatsu influence. This freedom ensured that ‘the founders were able to 
exercise real management in the establishment of Sony’ (Lambert, 2001, p. 33). 
Approximately 67 years after the founding of Sony, many of Morita’s relatives and 
offspring have morphed Sony into a conglomerate with businesses groups spanning 
home electronics, gaming, consumable entertainment and financial services. Once 
again, in a model seemingly replicated across time and space, when the original founder 
is no longer heavily involved or has passed away, there is a clear movement towards the 
diversification of business interests, often significantly expanding beyond original 
business lines. The associated concomitant increase in wealth perhaps attests to the 
success of such a strategy. 
 
In gaming, names synonymous with businesses that have captured both the Japanese 
thirst for entertainment and gambling abound. Much of their initial success had almost 
wholly to do with pent up consumer demand but requiring circumventing government 
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policies on gambling and gaming. The pachinko industry grew out of a means of 
negating the prohibition on gambling (Criminal Code, Chapter 23) - the pachinko slot 
machines involve getting a ball into a slot. Successfully doing so entails the user to a 
prize that often involves an avenue to exchanging the prize for a monetary reward 
(Kinder, 2014). The potential for arbitrage was not lost on Han Chang-Woo Han who 
became the biggest and wealthiest supplier of the slot machines (Whan-woo, 2014).  
 
The obvious question is whether self-made wealth will continue to dominate in Japan. 
Given the low growth rates and high savings rates in Japan and slow population growth, 
one could argue that inheritance will invariably come to play a significant role in Japan. 
As Japan has the highest observed wealth-income ratios among the countries considered 
here (see Chapter 3), the possibility does certainly exist that inheritance will come to 
play a strong role.  
 
6.6 Latin America 
 
Traditionally, Latin America’s distribution of wealth has been viewed through the prism 
of its natural resources and European settlement. For example, Torche and Spilerman 
(2008) argue that the high Gini indexes observed across Latin America have been 
associated with the conquest of the continent’s arable land and resources and the 
subsequent political dominance of European settlers over indigenous populations. 
Williamson (2009) has challenged this view. Williamson notes that when compared to 
other regions, Latin America’s experience was not significantly different than other 
regions of the world following the post-colonial and industrial period. What factors are 
relevant when exploring the rise of contemporary economic elites in Latin America?  
 
To begin, Table 6.8 presents the geographical distribution of Latin American 
billionaires. Three interesting facts emerge from the above table. Firstly, since 2006, 
Brazil dominates the enumerated list of billionaires in Latin America. In 2005, there 
were five Brazilian billionaires, the following year it had tripled to 16. By 2011, it had 
nearly doubled again to 29 and had further increased to 46 by 2013. As of 2013, 56% of 
all Latin American billionaires emerged from Brazil. Only two other countries have 
demonstrated dramatic increases in their representation on the rich lists. Chile 
experienced a dramatic increase between 2012 and 2013, increasing from 5 to 14 
individuals. Similarly, Peru also demonstrated a strikingly similar increase. Through the 
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1990s, only one Peruvian billionaire appeared on the rich list in 1996. Throughout the 
2000s, there were no recorded billionaires; only in 2012 is there a reappearance with 2 
billionaires. By 2013, Peru saw an immense increase from two to ten billionaires. In 
comparison, Argentina has never tended to exhibit much growth in billionaire numbers 
despite possessing the second largest economy in Latin America27.  
 
Table 6.8 Distribution of billionaires across Latin America 
  Argentina Belize Brazil Chile Colombia Ecuador Peru Venezuela 
1990   3     1 
1991   3     1 
1992 2  5 3 1   1 
1993 3  7 3 1   2 
1994 4  7 3 3   2 
1995 4  10 3 3   2 
1996 3  9 5 3 1 1 2 
1997 3  3 3 3 1  2 
1998 2  3 1 3    
1999 3  8 4 3 1   
2000 4  9 3 1    
2001 4  6 2 1    
2002 1  6 2 1    
2003 1  4 3 1    
2004 1  6 3 2    
2005 1  8 3 2    
2006 1  16 2 2    
2007 1  20 3 2    
2008 1 1 18 4 2    
2009 1  13 3 2    
2010 1  16 4 2    
2011 2 1 29 4 2    
2012 4 1 36 5 3  2  
2013 5 1 46 14 5   10   
Source: Forbes (1990-2013), Author’s compilation from various secondary sources 
 
As with other regions, the growth of the ultra-rich is not necessarily synonymous with 
new entrepreneurial activity. Often some of the growth emanates from an influx of 
inheritance money. Are similar forces at work in Latin America? Table 6.9 divides the 
Latin American sample by inheritance and self-made. Given the small population size, 
                                                
27 Excluding Mexico.  
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particularly across Argentina, Chile, and Peru, any inferences made would have to be 
tentative. However, some interesting facts present themselves. Across all four countries, 
inheritance has played an important role as a source of great riches. For Chile and Peru, 
the large increase in billionaires from 2012 to 2013 seems to have been significantly 
driven by large inheritances. The Chilean inheritance figure increased from 3 in 2012 
(60% of billionaires) to 11 in 2013 (78.6% of billionaires). These inheritances do not 
appear to be associated with prior dynasties in the ultra-rich lists at least as produced by 
Forbes. Peru’s rise in the rich lists is recent emerging most strongly in 2013. The 
increase is associated both with new wealth (5 self-made) while the number of 
inheritances increased from 2 in 2012 to 5 in 2013. 
 
Brazil is the most abundant producer of billionaires in South America. The large growth 
in overall billionaire numbers from 2006 onward appears to be largely driven by both 
increase in self-made wealth and inheritances. On average, inherited wealth represented 
51% of Brazil’s economic elite until 2006. From 2006, the dynamic change of wealth 
creation shifts to self-made wealth. On average, inherited wealth accounted for 40% of 
Brazil’s economic elite. 
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Table 6.9 Sources of Latin American wealth, self-made and inherited 
 Argentina    Brazil    Chile    Peru  
  Self-made Inherited    Self-made Inherited    Self-made Inherited    Self-made Inherited 
1992 2    1990 3    1992 2 1  1996   1 
1993 2 1  1991 2 1  1993 2 1  2012   2 
1994 2 2  1992 3 2  1994 2 1  2013 5 5 
1995 2 2  1993 5 2  1995 2 1     
1996 2 1  1994 5 2  1996 2 3     
1997 2 1  1995 6 4  1997 2 1     
1998 2    1996 3 6  1998 1       
1999 2 1  1997 1 2  1999 2 2     
2000 2 2  1998 1 2  2000 2 1     
2001 2 2  1999 3 5  2001 1 1     
2002 1    2000 3 6  2002 1 1     
2003 1    2001 1 5  2003 2 1     
2004 1    2002 1 5  2004 2 1     
2005 1    2003 1 3  2005 2 1     
2006 1    2004 2 4  2006 1 1     
2007 1    2005 4 4  2007 2 1     
2008 1    2006 9 7  2008 1 3     
2009 1    2007 13 7  2009 1 2     
2010 1    2008 12 6  2010 2 2     
2011 1 1  2009 9 4  2011 2 2     
2012 2 2  2010 10 6  2012 2 3     
2013 2 3  2011 14 15  2013 3 11     
    2012 20 16         
    2013 27 19         
Source: Forbes (1990-2013), Author’s compilation from various secondary sources.
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The sectoral decomposition reveals substantial variation between the countries as 
presented in Table 6.10. Although finance dominates in numerous areas of the globe, 
only in Brazil does finance present a dominant influence. On average, 40% of Brazil’s 
billionaires made their wealth in finance. Contrary to the observations in North America 
and Europe, the majority of these came from banking as opposed to “investments”. 
Further, inheritance plays a major role amongst financial elites – in 2013, 6 of the 13 
billionaires came from inherited wealth. Further, despite possessing an abundance of 
natural wealth, none of the industries that could be associated with these natural 
resources, such as energy or materials, barely register on Brazil’s wealth ranks. In 2013, 
the two industries just produced 6 billionaires. Instead, consumer staples and 
discretionary sectors both generated more billionaires at 9 and 10 individuals 
respectively.  
 
Both Chile and Peru from a sectoral context, do not appear to follow any continental 
wide pattern. At most, materials (GICS sector 15) dominate in both. As of 2013, there 
were 6 Chilean billionaires and 5 Peruvian billionaires from this sector. For both, 
consumer discretionary and staples closely follow.  
 
Situating the rise of the relatively nascent South American elite (relative to global 
terms) in an analytical framework is difficult. In the one instance, entrepreneurial nor 
inherited wealth dominate. In North America and Western Europe, clear trends are 
apparent behind the two groupings. Further, much like Russia or China, the appearance 
of South American billionaires is a relatively recent phenomenon. These observations 
and both their dissimilarities and similarities to other regions of the world have 
manifested itself in economic analyses previously. As with continental Europe vis-à-vis 
the UK and US, a useful starting point is to consider the main differentiators of South 
American capitalism. 
 233 
Table 6.10 Latin America, industrial distribution of billionaires 
	 Brazil   Argentina   Chile   Peru  
 0 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45   0 10 20 25 30 35   0 10 15 20 25 40   15 30 40 
1990    2 1      1992   1  1   1992  1 2     1996 1   
1991    2 1      1993   2  1   1993  1 2     2012 1  1 
1992    4 1      1994   2  2   1994  1 2     2013 5 4 1 
1993   1 5 1      1995   2  2   1995  1 2         
1994   1 3 1 1  1   1996  1 1  1   1996 2 1 2         
1995   1 4 1 1  3   1997  1 2     1997  1 2         
1996 1   4 2   2   1998  1 1     1998  1          
1997    1 1   1   1999  1 2     1999 1 1 2         
1998    1 1   1   2000  1 2 1    2000  1 2         
1999 1   2 2 1  2   2001  1 2 1    2001   2         
2000 1   2 2 1  3   2002  1      2002   2         
2001    1 2   3   2003     1   2003  1 2         
2002 1   1 1   3   2004     1   2004  1 2         
2003 1       3   2005     1   2005  1 2         
2004 1    1 1  3   2006     1   2006  1 1         
2005    1 1 3  3   2007     1   2007  1 1   1      
2006   1 5 1 5  4   2008     1   2008   2 1  1      
2007  1 3 5 1 5  5   2009     1   2009   2   1      
2008  1 4 1 1 5  6   2010     1   2010   2  1 1      
2009   2 1 1 5  4   2011  1   1   2011   2  1 1      
2010  1 2 1 1 5  6   2012 1 1  1 1   2012   3  1 1      
2011  1 3 1 1 6 2 15   2013 1 1  1 1 1  2013   6 1 5 2      
2012  2 3 1 3 7 2 18                       
2013   3 3 5 10 9 2 13 1                                           
Note: The table provides a summary of the distribution of billionaires across South Korean industries using the two-code GICS. The data is presented on a 5-year interval basis. The 
number and associated sectors are: 10: Energy, 15: Materials, 20: Industrials, 25: Consumer Discretionary, 30: Consumer Staples, 35: Health Care, 40: Financials, 45: Information 
Technology, 50: Telecommunication Services, 55: Utilities. 
Source: Forbes (1990-2013), Author’s compilation from various secondary sources. 
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Historically, Latin America’s political economy has undergone substantial changes and 
movements – often flowing from regime change. Overall, Latin America’s political 
economy can be divided into three eras. Firstly, there was the nineteenth century that 
saw the rise of the oligarchical states. Secondly, this gave way to “populist 
developmentalism” between the 1930s to the 1960s. A primary characteristic of this 
period was the development of import-substituting strategies. Thirdly, economic crises 
in the 1970s and 1980s paved the way for the rise of neo-liberal policies. Lewis (2009) 
writes that ‘a questioning of state-directed development was giving way to neo-
orthodoxy …. The pro-active state was being displaced by the ‘dismantler’ state 
charged with ‘privatising’ economic activity – returning the economy to the market’ (p. 
159). The emergence of the Washington consensus in Latin American political 
economy certainly had tremendous impact upon the economy. Whether the change 
provided represented a net benefit for the states of Latin America is one that is highly 
debatable (for contrasting perspectives see Williamson 2006;  Moreno-Brid, Caldentey, 
and Nápoles 2004).  
 
Of greater interest, is to what extent was the evolution of Latin America’s political 
economy commensurate with observed increases in the number of ultra-wealthy. Petras 
(2008) directly attributes the Washington consensus as the catalyst for the increased 
frequency of billionaires. ‘If blood and guns were the instruments for the rise of the 
Russian billionaire oligarchs, in other regions the market, or better still, the US-IMF-
World Bank-orchestrated Washington Consensus was the driving force behind the rise 
of the Latin American billionaires’ (Petras 2008, p. 321). Further positing that the 
‘principal cause of poverty in Latin America is [sic] the very conditions that facilitate 
the growth of billionaires… The so-called “self-made” billionaires benefited from the 
privatization of the lucrative financial sector… and the iron and steel complexes.’ 
(Patras 2008, p. 322). 
 
An alternative viewpoint is provided by Schneider (2009) who explores Latin American 
capitalism as one of many “capitalisms”. According to Schneider (2009), Latin 
American capitalism is characterised by four features. Firstly, diversified business 
groups dominate. These groups incorporate widely disparate business entities that are 
often not related by market or technological relations. In addition, these business groups 
are dominated and controlled by family dynasties. Schneider (2009) argues that 
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‘[c]ontrary to expectations of convergence, diversified business groups survived and 
prospered through the liberalization and globalisation of the 1990s and 2000s’ (p. 559). 
Secondly, multinational corporations constitute a significant element of commerce in 
Latin America. The other two main features of Latin American capitalism are atomistic 
employee and labour relations and low levels of education and vocational skills. Here, 
the potential nexus between the first two characteristics is of most interest for its impact 
on economic elites.  
 
In Brazil, much of the wealth associated with finance and banking is inherited and 
predates the Washington consensus, but did handsomely profit policy shifts. One of the 
world’s richest bankers, Joseph Safra, is descendant from a family tracing their 
commercial lineage back to Aleppo in Syria, once one of the great trading cities of the 
Ottoman Empire. With holdings in Brazil, the US, and Switzerland’s private banking 
system, the Safra Group has always maintained tight control over significant 
geographically diverse assets. However, from the 1990s the Safra Group became highly 
engaged in many large investments and purchases originating from the privatization 
program of Brazil in the 1990s. For example, in 1992 Banco Safra was part of a 
multinational group purchasing Acesita, a former government owned steel works, for 
USD465 million. In 1997, it was involved in a buyout of Band B services in 
conjunction with BellSouth for an estimated USD2.47 billion. 
 
Mass media appears to have maintained high levels of ownership concentration largely 
through policy of the military dictatorship in 1964-1984. According to Amaral and 
Guimaraes (1994), during this period the military aimed for a monopolistic competition 
in Brazil. ‘As a result of monopolistic capitalism without regulation, the military’s 
politica de redes … concentrated about 400 channels into a few corporations, resulting 
in a sistema de redes…’ (Amaral and Guimaraes, 1994, p. 26). During this period, the 
current Brazilian moguls cemented their dominance. The Maronho family (combined 
wealth of USD26 billion in 2013), Silvio Santos and Roberto Civita all found a role 
during the period of dictatorship. The Marinho family, particularly appeared to have 
maintained tight relations to mutual benefit during the dictatorship (Coelho, 2013). 
 
Other individuals demonstrated, including the self-made, a closer relationship to wealth 
from privatisations. Julio Bozano was involved in a purchase and makeover of the 
government owned steelworks, CS Tubarao in 1992 for an estimated $837 million. By 
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1996, Bozano had sold his stake and had generated a $327 million capital return and an 
unknown amount of dividends (Katz, 1996). In 1994, Bozano was involved in a similar 
deal to buy and overhaul aircraft manufacturer Embraer. In banking, he was involved in 
the overhaul of state owned bank Banerj and received a consulting fee of USD36 
million and a 5% cut of the auction price.  
 
Other self-made billionaires follow a more traditional path to wealth – exploiting the 
opportunities that arose from deregulation. The Constantino family conglomerate, 
involved in transportation catapulted to great wealth by creating a new airline carrier, 
Gol Airlines. During the 1990s, the Constantino family reasoned that Brazil’s tight 
regulation over air fare prices would lessen. The family established in secret the plans 
for a low fare carrier during this period. Regulation came, and so did the massive profits 
(Wheatley, 2005). Although regulation was an element in the family’s success, 
ultimately tight hierarchical control by the family, in the vein identified by Schneider 
(2009) has played a major role.  
 
The Chilean experience with the Pinochet dictatorship similarly had a pervasive 
influence on today’s wealthy Chileans. The Angelini family (represented by Roberto 
Angelini Rossi and Patrical Angelini Rossi in 2013) represented a prime example. The 
family patriarch Anacleto Angelini, founded a fisheries enterprise in the 1950s. But it 
was during the Pinochet regime that Angelini attained rapid wealth: 
 
… Mr. Angelini benefited from the military government’s privatization scheme. 
One of Mr. Angelini’s top executives, Felipe Lamarca, was a Pinochet campaign 
adviser. 
 
In the mid-1980s, Mr. Angelini acquired a large minority share in Copec, a 
conglomerate with holdings in gas stations, mining interests, shipyards, forestry 
products and insurance. Through Copec, he also maintained a significant stake in 
Chile’s largest thermal electric generation company (Bernstein, 2007). 
 
The Angelini’s fortunes largely remained secured in the post-Pinochet Chile, through 
continued close relationships with legislators. A far older dynasty, the Mattes have had 
a profound role in Chile’s economic growth. The primary family business, La Papelera, 
is in paper. However, the family controls more than 30 companies in sectors as varied as 
finance to health, mining to manufacturing (Benedikter and Siepmann, 2013). The 
family has always maintained close connection to government. Patricia Matte was an 
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architect of social policy in the Pinochet regime and has maintained close ties to 
elements of the old regime (Benedikter and Siepmann, 2013). 
 
6.7 Australia and New Zealand 
 
Writing on the wealth of the Gilded Age, Rubinstein (1980) argued that the size of the 
observed riches in the US to Great Britain was very much a product of the large land 
mass of the US relative to Great Britain. Given the size of Australia, and the relative 
small population density, one would expect Australia to have also produced substantial 
wealth. In the context of Australia, a similar set of forces seems to apply to the observed 
composition of ultra-rich. 
 
Table 6.11 presents the combined sectorial distribution of wealthy individuals for 
Australia and New Zealand. A perusal of Australia’s popular media would often suggest 
that the majority of Australia’s economic elite come from the ranks of miners and media 
moguls. However, as Table 6.6 shows, most of the great fortunes come from finance in 
the form of diversified financials. The majority who appear in the list are relatively new 
entrants, with the number from financial services increasing from five in 2006 to 13 by 
2013. Among the property magnates, there is a small increase from three in 2004 to 6 
by 2013. In financial terms, aggregate wealth among this group increased from 
USD4.800 billion to USD17.6 billion over the course of the same period. In the 
diversified financials sector, the rise over the 2006 to 2013 period is just as impressive. 
In 2005, there were no Australian or New Zealand investors that could claim a net 
worth in excess of $1 billion. In 2006, there were two, both from New Zealand, and by 
2013 there were six from both Australia and New Zealand. Just like the property 
tycoons, their associated aggregate wealth holdings substantially increased over this 
period. In 2006, the New Zealanders Richard Chandler and Graeme Hart had a 
combined net worth of $3.7 billion. By 2013, a small increase in the Australian 
representative contingent had bolstered aggregate holdings to $20.2 billion. Among the 
Australians are Michael Hintze, Kerr Neilson and Ivan Glasenberg. 
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Table 6.11 Australian and New Zealand industrial distribution of billionaires, 1990-2013 
Year 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 
1990    1    
1991    1    
1992    1    
1993    1    
1994    1    
1995    1    
1996    1    
1997    1    
1998    1    
1999  1  1    
2000  1  1    
2001 1 1  1    
2002    1 1   
2003  1  1    
2004  1  1    
2005  1  2    
2006 1 1  2   5 
2007 1 3  4   7 
2008 1 3 2 3   9 
2009  3  2   7 
2010  2  4   7 
2011  3 2 4  1 10 
2012  4 2 3  1 11 
2013   2 2 6 1 1 13 
Note: The table provides a summary of the distribution of billionaires 
across Australian and New Zealand industries using the two-code GICS. 
The data is presented on a 5-year interval basis. The number and 
associated sectors are: 10: Energy, 15: Materials, 20: Industrials, 25: 
Consumer Discretionary, 30: Consumer Staples, 35: Health Care, 40: 
Financials, 45: Information Technology, 50: Telecommunication 
Services, 55: Utilities.  
 
Source: Forbes (1990-2013), Author’s compilation from various secondary sources. 
 
Much of the wealth generated by property investments are associated with property 
development rather than pure speculation, and very much follows the patterns of the 
US, whose government policies in the post-war era fuelled massive demographical 
changes and coincidently provided ample opportunity for expansion. Individuals such as 
Frank Lowy, John Gandel, Harry Trigbuff and Langley Walker all benefited from these 
changes. For Frank Lowy, the longest-serving Australian billionaire, the path to great 
wealth resided in entrepreneurial alertness to the massive urbanisation across 
Australia’s metropolitan cities. Mass immigration, growth in public housing and 
increasing industrial production provided the necessary catalyst to spur population 
increases from which Lowy was able to significantly capitalise. Similarly, John Gandel 
managed to exploit rising population and incomes in Melbourne’s south-eastern suburbs 
to create one of the largest shopping centres. Gandel’s road to riches started with the 
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inheritance of his parents’ successful Australian clothing business, Sussan, in the 1970s. 
A latecomer to property development, Gandel purchased Chadstone Shopping Centre in 
1983 and has since expanded to other Australian cities.  
 
The miners perhaps represent most accurately the Australian economic story over the 
past decade. The boom in the mining business has generated enormous levels of 
national income for Australia throughout the 1990s and 2000s. It is, therefore, startling 
that among Australia’s wealthiest individuals, only two from mining are recorded by 
Forbes. Nevertheless, the combined wealth of those two, Gina Rinehart and Andrew 
Forrest, in 2013 was an estimated $22.7 billion compared to, for example, the $17.6 
billion estimated for the property sector. Although a booming China represents the 
obvious reason for the wealth of the miners, the actual genesis often lies much earlier as 
is often the case. The genesis of the Rinehart fortune is largely found in a fierce political 
battle, in which Rinehart’s father, Lang Hancock, managed to gain a virtual monopoly 
over the Pilbara region’s iron ore deposits through a fierce campaign against the 
Western Australian government (Jamieson, 2011). Gina Rinehart has carried on her 
father’s legacy in terms of both business ambition and political influence. The other 
titan of Australian mining, Andrew Forrest, founder of the mining company Fortescue 
Mining Ltd., demonstrated a keen sense of entrepreneurial awareness in extending the 
fortunes he has generated throughout the Pilbara region in Western Australia. A 
significant element of both individuals has been the propensity to enlarge the scope of 
their holdings, with both entering agriculture on an enormous scale, mainly in response 
to slowing demand from Asia for iron ore. 
 
Media and entertainment, often considered the other great pillar of Australia’s wealthy, 
has generally remained a small affair, with only a few making the list. When one 
considers the small size of the Australian market, this may not be surprising. Although 
the Murdoch family once resided in Australia, since Rupert Murdoch took up US 
citizenship, they no longer appear in Australian wealth lists. Instead, Kerry Packer 
(deceased) and his son James Packer, and the part-time media mogul, Kerry Stokes, 
dominate the list. Kerry Packer’s rise to wealth resides in the media empire first 
established by his grandfather, Sir Frank Packer. Kerry Packer significantly altered the 
family’s business interests by shifting into gaming and film production. Given the exit 
of James Packer from Australia’s media industry, in reality the only other wealthy 
individual now associated with media is Kerry Stokes. Stokes very much represents the 
 240 
romanticised rags-to riches-story that stands in stark contrast to the story of the Packers 
and other Australian wealth dynasties. Often forgotten, Stokes’ diversified interests are 
such that, along with his holdings in WesTrac, he now largely controls the lucrative 
machinery hire sector in Australia. 
 
6.8 Summary 
 
This Chapter analyses the major social and policy sources of great fortunes amongst 
many of the world’s largest economies. The analysis at the national levels reveals 
striking differences in the source of wealth and how it is managed. The most significant 
finding pertains to the degree of differentiation between the relative proportions of 
inheritance and self-made wealth. North America (dominated by the US), the UK and 
Australia all exhibit a trend towards more self-made individuals appearing in the ranks 
of the economic elite. The rise of the self-made billionaire is only evident in Japan. The 
finding in Japan is somewhat counterintuitive given the significant element of state 
patrimony in the business affairs of Japan’s corporations. By contrast, France, Germany 
and South Korea all exhibit greater representation of inherited wealth amongst their 
wealthiest.  
 
For the self-made wealthy, particular amongst the Anglo-Saxon countries, in countries 
where self-made wealth dominates, much of the evidence suggests that fortuitous social 
and political developments played a substantial role. This is particularly prevalent 
amongst those industries which benefitted greatly by the changes in political landscape 
in the post-World War II era. In Australia and the US, property interests benefited 
greatly from the great urbanisation and immigration developments of the era. Even 
amongst industries where direct state aid may have been absent, there still appear to be 
substantial government influence. Both the finance and information technology sectors 
benefitted substantially from deregulation in the case of finance, to public aid in 
research and development in the instance of information technology moguls. 
 
The role of the state in great fortunes is far more evident in countries where inheritance 
dominates the wealth ranks. In Germany and South Korea, various government and 
regimes throughout history have supported the rise of family dynasties. In Germany, the 
immediate post war period saw many dynasties manage to maintain their control over 
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vast swathes of Germany’s industrial base despite close ties to the Nazi regime. In 
South Korea, certain dynasties were favoured to ensure rapid national growth. 
 
The many in which the individuals managed their vast fortunes suggests that 
diversification plays an important role. Across most family dynasties, inheritance 
beneficiaries tend to form major conglomerates with commercial interests across 
various industries or through diversified financial holdings. Similarly, this strategy is 
reflected amongst the oldest self-made cohorts. Many individuals are observed to have 
either divested their holdings in their original founding enterprises and moved into 
financial investments or property holdings. The consequent decline of overall 
entrepreneurial effort in some countries and the move into more rentier-based activities, 
particularly by inheritance beneficiaries, may be a response to the observation of 
declining real rates of return. 
 
Finally, a significant finding is the extent to which finance dominates of self-made 
wealth across the UK, the US, France and Australia compared to the other countries 
examined. Here, either financial deregulation or agreeable property-related dynamics 
have given rise to vast fortunes. This echoes one of the defining characteristics of the 
first Gilded Age, which was the prevalence of the financiers among the extremely 
wealthy (Rockoff, 2012). 
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Chapter 7 Conclusion 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
The global economic system has generated substantial upsurges in prosperity since the 
conclusion of the Second World War. An outcome of this process has been a 
concomitant increase in high wealth accumulation. Globally, the extremely wealthy 
have attained levels of wealth that closely resemble those of the Gilded Age of the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries in the US. This New Gilded Age represents not 
only a global historical phenomenon but potentially has enormous implications with 
regard to economic growth policy and policies that seek to lift individuals out of 
poverty through redistributive mechanisms. The purpose of this thesis was to document 
and analyse the rise of this new economic elite as a section of society worthy of study in 
itself, and to explore how its wealth has been generated and sustained across the globe 
since the 1990s. By utilising a comprehensive database on the globe’s wealthiest 
individuals, this thesis has sought to shed light on the degree to which entrepreneurial 
effort and inherited wealth have played their part across various advanced economies. 
Given the importance of financial holdings in the dynamics of modern wealth, attention 
was also paid to the degree to which the level of wealth acts as a function of risk 
aversion.  
 
This chapter is structured as follows. Section 7.2 summarises the main findings of this 
study. Section 7.3 explores the possible policy implications of the findings, with 
particular attention to calls for wealth taxes and the potential impact on economic 
growth. Lastly, Section 7.4 suggests possibilities for future research.  
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7.2 Summary of Findings 
 
Although wealth accumulation, particularly as represented by the ultra-rich, often 
receives substantial attention from popular media, as well as from policy makers in the 
context of taxation, economists on the whole have shied away from exploring the ultra-
rich. This lack of research output can be contrasted against the vast literature in relation 
to the poverty. The reasons for this are a confluence of factors. Firstly, there has been a 
relative dearth of easily accessible data on the ultra-rich, and the data that is available is 
often criticised for its potential inaccuracies. Secondly, the bifurcation of the definitions 
of wealth and capital has resulted in discussions of vast wealth accumulation being 
jettisoned in favour of notions of human capital, for example.  
 
Although lacking in quantity, the extent to which economists have explored patterns of 
extreme wealth accumulation in the modern era can be divided into three approaches. 
The first approach focused on the associated industrial structure in which wealthy 
individuals found success. Generally, the wealthiest are found in industries in which 
intense competition is the norm, but this is to be expected given the stochastic nature of 
free enterprise success. Secondly, the ability of skills and education, under the umbrella 
of human capital, has been espoused to support the existence of the extreme wealthy, 
such as computer scientists who became billionaires owing to the return to their human 
capital. Thirdly, institutional approaches have sought to place the rise of extreme wealth 
accumulation in the context of significant technological, legal or financial changes. 
However, the problem of these approaches is that they do not necessarily take account 
of the broader macroeconomic trends that have led to the overall wealth distribution 
observed across the advanced economies. 
 
Chapter 3 examined the nexus between wealth accumulation, inequality and the various 
macroeconomic forces governing them. It adopted the general frameworks of Piketty 
(2014a), Piketty and Zucman (2014a) and Saez and Zucman (2014), considering the 
relations underpinning the aggregate wealth-income ratio across seven advanced 
economies and how they have evolved over the past 40 years. A significant element in 
the rise of wealth-income ratios has been the high rates of return relative to national 
income growth, which were observed to be associated with progressively lower real 
returns since at least the 1960s. The reasons for the inverse relationship between rates of 
return and the wealth-income ratio were explored in Chapter 6. Initial entrepreneurial 
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effort in the 1960s and before were viewed as a potential catalyst for this phenomenon, 
while subsequent decades have witnessed a decrease in entrepreneurial effort and a 
concomitant increase of more rentier-based approaches to wealth accumulation.  
 
While wealth accumulation has substantially increased since the 1960s, as evidenced by 
increasing wealth-income ratios, the nature of the accumulation has been highly 
inequitable. The process of inequality appears to be tied to the processes of 
consumerism and financialisation. Both processes have ensured little upward mobility 
for the low to middle classes, while maintaining the upward trajectory of the wealthiest 
individuals and households. In Chapter 3, various economic forces were shown to have 
given rise to the aforementioned social changes. Consumption is undertaken by poorer 
households in greater proportion to their wealth or income compared to wealthy 
households. In addition, given the low rates of income growth among poorer 
households, the manner in which they have sought to maintain their consumption has 
had a further deleterious impact on their potential for wealth accumulation and upward 
mobility. The increasing financialisation of households results in greater debt levels, 
and supresses the potential for upward mobility. In contrast, rather than assume greater 
levels of liability, wealthier households have typically increased their holdings of 
savings and investment, with the latter becoming more significant as one moves up the 
wealth ladder, as these households derive a greater proportion of their income from 
capital investments. 
 
The extent to which modern wealth has accrued to an extraordinary degree to the 
highest echelons of society was explored in Chapter 4. The global nature of the New 
Gilded Age is clearly delineated, with much of the growth in billionaires arising due to 
the influx of individuals from the developing world and the re-emergence of new 
entrepreneurs in North America, particularly in finance and IT. Since 1990, the number 
of billionaires has increased from approximately 200 to nearly 1,500 in 2013. The 
growth in the number of ultra-rich is also reflected in the growth of the number of 
countries represented in the sample. The growth in billionaires has seen a commensurate 
stabilisation of the average wealth of billionaires across the globe at approximately 
USD4 billion throughout the 2000s. Much has been made of the impact of crises on the 
wealth of the ultra-rich. The GFC only had a transitory impact on the extremely 
wealthy, as many of those who fell out of the wealth lists eventually reappeared a year 
or two afterwards. A global sectoral decomposition of the data reveals that wealth is 
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predominantly concentrated in the finance and consumer discretionary industries, 
reflecting the increasing consumerism and financialisation of the global economy. 
Although all industries have exhibited growth in billionaire numbers, IT has 
demonstrated the greatest increases, closely followed by financial services. Old 
established industries such as energy, despite being popularly perceived as the means to 
riches, have not had dramatic representation in the wealth rankings since the 1990s. 
 
The influx of new billionaires has emanated from across both the developed and 
developing world. In the latter, China, India and Russia have demonstrated significant 
growth, which can be tied just as much to political favouritism as to economic growth 
by itself. Indeed, many of the billionaires from Russia and China had, or have, 
meaningful or material ties to the governing powers of their country. In India, where 
private enterprise has maintained a degree of freedom, the stringent controls or 
regulations imposed by the government largely ensured the rise of large conglomerates 
and the families that dominate them. The relation between former (or current) 
authoritarian regimes and an economic elite is observed in South Korea and Germany, 
too. 
 
Perhaps the most striking differences across the globe are the patterns of old wealth 
versus new wealth. Here, old wealth refers to family dynasties or the incidence of 
inheritance, whereas new wealth refers to wealth generated from entrepreneurial effort. 
The proportion of old wealth is much lower in the developing world than in the 
developed world, although this is mainly driven by the influx of billionaires from 
Russia, Eastern Europe and China. In the developed world, there are substantially 
different inheritance patterns. North America demonstrates the lowest propensity 
towards inheritance, and this has consistently decreased over the sample period. In 
contrast, Western Europe has consistently shown a propensity for majority inheritance.  
 
An important element in the process of wealth accumulation is the ability to derive 
income and grow wealth from sources other than labour and simple savings. In this 
regard, the ability to leverage the availability of financial investments to increase or 
sustain one’s position in the wealth stakes would seem obvious. Despite this, financial 
economics has tended to view the propensity to assume risk in financial matters, or the 
degree of risk aversion, as being divorced from the level of wealth one holds. Chapter 5 
tested the proposition that one’s risk aversion is not a function of wealth (or CRRA) on 
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a panel of Australian households. The level of risk aversion was found to be 
substantially high for lower percentile households and systematically decreased as 
wealth increased. The competing hypotheses of CRRA and DRRA as a function of 
wealth were formally tested in a first differences panel regression framework. In the 
presence of a range of socioeconomic variables, the negative relationship between risk 
aversion and wealth held, that is, RRA is a decreasing function of wealth. In addition, 
financial advice was found to have an impact on the risk aversion of households across 
the entire wealth spectrum. The wealthier still assumed greater risk tolerance, but even 
among poorer households there appears to be an impact on the propensity to assume 
greater risk in one’s financial portfolio. 
 
Although the reappearance of the ultra-rich is a global phenomenon, the possibility of 
heterogeneity in the patterns of ultra-rich development across countries was explored in 
Chapter 6. Overall, there are substantial similarities in the degree to which certain 
sectors generate vast fortunes across the seven developed countries. In Chapter 3, it was 
suggested that financialisation and consumerism are two of the major forces that have 
shaped the distribution of wealth in advanced economies. Consequently, it is not 
surprising perhaps to find that industries at the cutting edge of these phenomena tend to 
dominate wealth lists. This was evident in the US and the UK, where the financial 
services and consumer discretionary sectors have represented a robust source of growth 
particularly over the past 10 years. However, continental Europe shows significant 
divergence from such patterns, as inherited wealth plays a far more dominant role. In 
both France and Germany, the majority of extreme wealth is held by inheritors, and, 
although the proportion has decreased, inheritance is still highly represented in the 
wealth stakes. Given the destruction that both nations experienced in the Second World 
War, this is surprising. Particularly in Germany, many of the individuals on the wealth 
lists are associated with families whose heritage stretches back to periods before the 
war. Whereas entrepreneurial success was the key in the Anglo world, the Germanic 
model very much followed a pattern of solidifying and tying business interests with 
political interests. 
 
The Far East also shows contrasting patterns of development. Japan and South Korea 
demonstrated dramatic variations in the degree to which old wealth dominates. The 
immediate post-war era saw a dramatic reduction in the role of Imperial Japan’s 
economic elite due to the occupying forces’ economic policies. This created a vacuum 
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in which new entrepreneurs emerged and propelled Japan to the forefront of, for 
example, the electronics industry. In contrast, South Korea adopted an approach in 
which political and business interests largely intersected, particularly in the 1960s, 
allowing five or so key families to dominate the economy. Since the 1990s, the Korean 
families at the head of chaebol have come to extend their corporate holdings and wealth 
without direct state preference through the exploitation of the corporate governance 
structures, such as by tunnelling.  
 
A further finding of Chapter 6 was the substantial role played by diversification in the 
business affairs of extremely wealthy individuals across all countries and sectors. Here 
diversification refers to the expanding sphere of business holdings and activities beyond 
the individual’s or family’s originating point. This phenomenon cuts across the old and 
new rich and industries. The conglomeration of business interests among the ultra-rich 
originating in advanced economies suggests a tendency to seek out new business 
opportunities. Theoretically, in periods of low returns, one may expect a degree of 
diversification to emerge as individuals try their hand at different business 
opportunities. At a macro level, real rates of returns demonstrate secular decreases 
across all economies since the 1960s and 1970s, which appears to have increased the 
degree of diversification by billionaires. Although inherited wealth tends to exhibit this 
trend more strongly, similar behaviour is observed among self-made entrepreneurs, 
even among the new breed of Internet entrepreneurs. 
  
7.3 Policy Implications 
 
The extent of extreme wealth accumulation in the contemporary era is clearly being 
grappled by policy makers, as outlined in Chapter 1. Broadly speaking, policy discourse 
has centred on creating tax regimes to reduce tax avoidance or evasion or to implement 
a progressive taxation regime. The most visible manifestation of the former arose from 
the G20 summit of April 2009, where G20 countries sought treaties with tax havens 
under the threat of sanctions. Between the G20 summit in April 2009 to December 
2009, more than 300 treaties had been signed by the world’s tax havens (Johannesen & 
Zucman, 2014).  
 
On implementing progressive wealth tax regimes, a strong argument can be mounted 
that it would not have a deleterious impact on entrepreneurialism and economic growth. 
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The evidence accumulated in Chapter 6 suggests that much of the extreme wealth today 
emerged in the post-war era when wealth-income ratios were at their lowest point. 
Indeed, many of today’s billionaires made their initial fortunes in the midst of high 
taxation and high government spending. The majority of North America’s property 
tycoons, for example, required the massive highway infrastructure being developed in 
the 1960s. In South Korea, government contracts and a penchant for rapid development 
policies help to explain the emergence of that country’s economic elite. Entrepreneurial 
effort is unlikely to be blunted by greater incidence of wealth taxation. Of all the 
industries considered, only IT has shown a degree of natural competitive evolution, 
although its beginnings too were associated with large government spending in research 
and development. The individuals at the forefront of the central processing unit (CPU) 
revolution managed their initial seismic innovations in this climate. Even among the 
fashion houses of France, entrepreneurialism was not dented by higher taxes. 
 
Although a global wealth taxation system would provide a rapid mechanism through 
which wealth inequality might be reduced, the political realities are likely to make this 
an ineffective approach. Even tentative steps to reduce the incidence of tax avoidance 
through ‘treasure island’ tax havens have not been effective. Johannesen and Zucman 
(2014) provide a convincing account of how the wealthy simply reorganise their 
financial affairs, negating the impact of bilateral or multilateral policies aimed at 
increasing tax revenues. Shaxson and Christensen (2011) argue that the moves by policy 
makers, particularly at the G20 level, were shambolic and not likely to result in any 
significant reversal of the conjoint issues of tax evasion and avoidance, and financial 
secrecy. The political realities between nation-states are also likely to sound a death 
knell for a global wealth tax, despite evidence of the effectiveness of wealth taxes in the 
past (Piketty, 2014a). 
 
An alternative approach to reducing the inequality of wealth accumulation is to view it 
within the context of how households deal with their financial holdings. The increasing 
household financialisation has so far appeared to have an asymmetric impact on 
households, depending on which side of the wealth distribution one examines. The 
extent to which household risk-taking in financial matters is a function of wealth was 
analysed in this study. The results suggest that wealth is the largest element driving the 
propensity to save and invest. A policy implication that naturally emerges from this is to 
consider the adoption of policies that incentivise savings and investment by all. The 
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potential of utilising finance to increase the probability of upward mobility regardless of 
classes was well recognised by Watkins (1907) and more recently by Saez and Zucman 
(2014).  
 
In addition, the extent of the representation of inheritance in the wealth lists requires 
some attention. Setting aside the moral issue of whether such vast inheritances should 
be under the examination of policy makers and society for the moment, the issue of how 
one should lessen the effectiveness of family dynasties needs to be considered. Wealth 
taxes in themselves are not likely to have a dramatic impact given the formidable 
international issues that would emerge. Instead, large wealth accumulation by these 
dynasties may perhaps be blunted by restricting the span and sphere of business 
interests in which these families engage.  
 
7.4 Avenues for Future Research 
 
Any study that seeks to investigate issues associated with wealth accumulation utilising 
micro data is invariably confronted with problems of the accessibility and quality of 
data, particularly when focusing on the ultra-rich. Despite the limitations of the data 
used in this thesis, a number of fruitful research avenues have been identified.  
 
The existence of substantial heterogeneity in the proportion of inherited versus self-
made wealth across countries warrants further research. The acute differences observed 
even among countries in relatively close geographical and cultural proximity, as in the 
cases of Germany, France and the UK or Japan and South Korea, suggests that minor 
legal or historical developments can have a profound impact on the degree to which 
patrimony dominates a society. An underexplored element in this thesis (Chapter 6) is 
the extent to which differing patterns of inheritance across countries is a function of 
alternative corporate governance institutions. In South Korea, for example, legal forms 
of tunnelling have ensured that the wealthiest families are easily able to extend their 
sphere of control through their country’s business landscape. Similarly, for Germany, 
the prevalence of dynastic wealth may in part be explained by the realm of corporate 
governance, where stakeholders have a rational interest in maintaining the status quo. In 
the future, a natural experiment may be found in comparing China and Russia as their 
first billionaires make way for new entrepreneurs or their families assume the dynastic 
dynamic observed in some advanced economies over the past 60 years. 
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A further potential research avenue revolves around the issue of wealth diversification 
by the ultra-rich, which can be explored along two lines. Firstly, Chapter 6 noted the 
propensity of the ultra-rich, be they inherited or self-made groups, to expand the sphere 
of their business holdings. This is particularly the case in Anglo economies where the 
general pattern appears to be one of entrepreneurial activity followed by the 
proliferation of holdings across a range of business activities and investments. In 
contrast, less-developed economies appear to forgo this pattern and typically rapidly 
establish large conglomerates and holding companies from the outset. In Germany, the 
pattern appears to be one of acquiring companies within the same or similar sectors. The 
issue is why this should arise in the first place. A potential key element in this regard is 
the empirical regularity of the existence of lower rates of return since the 1960s. Could 
the secular decline in rates of return potentially explain the rise of highly diversified 
business interests? Watkins (1907) once argued that during periods of low interest rates, 
speculative activity becomes an attractive option for the ultra-rich. Alternatively, with 
the lower cost of capital in recent years, the ultra-rich may just be seeking to diversify 
their holdings, rationally responding to changed market conditions. Secondly, 
diversification can be explored from the perspective of how it is attained. In the 
developing world, for example, much of the industrial diversification arises within the 
confines of large conglomerates. In the West, this does not appear to universally hold, 
with the ultra-rich’s business interests not being necessarily tied under the umbrella of a 
single holding company.  
 
In addition, the issue of how the wealth of the ultra-rich is secured during economic or 
financial crises warrants further consideration. Chapter 4 touched upon this and found 
that the impact of the GFC was not as pronounced as one may have previously thought. 
Many billionaires were able to rapidly reassert their wealth in subsequent years, with 
those from the financial sector demonstrating a particularly robust survival rate. A 
systematic analysis should be undertaken of the determinants of dramatic reversals in 
fortune during these periods and of those factors that ensure the security of wealth. 
 
Finally, one consequence of both the rise of an ultra-rich, greater returns to capital and 
depressed wage growth of workers has not been considered. That is, the possibility of 
an upper bound to the accumulation and concentration of wealth being achieved. 
‘Trickle down economics’ has in contemporary times not been as effective as hoped. 
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Conversely, the ultra-rich can only maintain their position of through a trickle up, but 
the invariably this process can only plateau or even decline in the future. Taxation and 
transfer policies can all assist in reducing further accumulation but, in the very long 
term wealth accumulation will plateau. So how much of a concern is this for the 
wealthy? 
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